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Supreme Court l' .S.
F I T. ;-. . •>

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DEC S 1919

October Term, 1979

MICHAEL RODAK, JR., CLERK

No.

79-8 5 6

SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL.,
Petitioners,

v.
PRESIDENT JAMES EARL CARTER and
SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE,
Resoondents.

MOTION BY PETITIONERS FOR EXPEDITIOUS
CONSIDERATION OF THEIR PETITION FOR
WRIT OF CERTIOR.~RI AND OTHER RELIEF
Petitioners, through their undersigned counsel,
respectfully pray that this Court grant expeditious consideration t ·o their Petition for Writ of Certiorari To The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
filed herewith.
On November 30, 1979, the Court of Appeals, en bane,
reversed the October 17, 1979 judgment of the District Court,
and held, in a per curiarn opinion, that the Executive :i;,ossesses
the constitutional power to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty
with the Republic of China (6 U.S.T. 433) without any form of
approval by the Legislative Branch.

Goldwater v. Carter, No.

'

79-2246 (D.C.Cir. Nov. 30, 1979) (Wright, C.J., and
Tamm, J.,
I
concurring in the result) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).

According to the notice of termination
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given by the Executive on December 23, 1978, the Mutual
Defense Treaty will be terminated on January 1, 1980.
If this Court does not dispose of this case by
December 31, 1979, the matter will be moot and the constitutional powers of the Congress will be irrevocably usurped
by the Executive.

Consequently, Petitioners request that

under Rule 24 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the time
for Respondents Opposition to the Petition be shortened and
that any such opposition be filed by 5:00 p.m., December 6,
1979, so that this Court may have the opportunity to consider
the Petition as early as December 7, 1979.
If the Petition is granted, it is suggested that since
time is of the essence, the Court dispens~ with the requirement
of an Appendix under Rule 36 and instead proceed to hear the
case on the original record which is being certified and transmitted pursuant to Rule 21 from the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners also suggest an expedited briefing schedule,
with cross-briefs filed and exchanged on December 13, 1979, a~d ,
optional reply briefs filed by December 17, with oral argument
on December 19, or at such time as the Court's schedule permits.
Petitioners are also prepared to waive the filing of briefs and
to have this case heard on the parties' briefs and papers filed

in the Court of Appeals because of the unusual time constraints
in this case.

Petitioners will accomodate this

Court's schedule to hear this case as much as possible.
Finally, Petitioners request that because of the time
considerations, that the Court temporarily suspend Rule 39(1}
regarding the printing format of the Appendix to the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari and to accept the 20 copies of the temporary
Appendix with the 40 copies of the printed Petition.

Petitioners

will file 40 replacement copies of the Appendix in a form that
complies with Rule 39 as soon as they are printed .
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Respectfully submitted,

~\'.1,.-v\',~ ., J\ .FJ\.~~

~-~-,\~v,-,,,
-l6 . TERRY: E~1ERS0N ~ ', ~
427 Russell Building
Washington, D.C.
20510
(202)224-2235
OF COUNSEL:
EUGENE V. ROSTOW
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-DANIELL J. POPEO
Washington Legal Foundation
1612 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20006

~:~t;-::~
PAUL;~ ·{.ANENAR

Sterling Professor of Law
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut 06520
CHARLES E. RICE
Professor of Law
University of Notte Dame
Law School
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556
J. DANIEL ~L~HONEY
Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives
51 West 51st Street
New York, New York 10019

910 Seventeenth Street, N.W.
Tenth Floor '
Washington, D.C.
20006
I (202) ~223-3148
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Law Offices of Northcutt Ely
Watergate 600 Building
Washington~ D.C.
20037
(202) 342-0800

Attorneys for Petitioners
December 3, 1979

--~· -

'

I

'

--- ---- ·----·- -

. .. .

..
107A
/'.~PErmIX

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL.~
Plaintiffs,
v.

JAMES EARL CARTER, ET AL. ,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action
No. 78-2412

ORDER
Upon consideration of plaintiffs' motion to alter
or amend the Court's judgment in this case of June 6, 1979,
the memoranda in support thereof and in opposition thereto,
the arguments of counsel in open Court, the entire record
herein, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum
of this same date, it is by the Court this

17~

day of

October, 1979,
ORDERED that plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend
the judgment of June 6, 1979 be, and hereby is, granted; and
it is further
ORDERED that the Order and accompanying Memorandum
of June 6, 1979, be, and hereby is, altered and amended by this
Order and accompanying Memorandum of this same date; and it is
further
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss or, in
the alternative, for summary judgment be, and hereby is, denied;
and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary
judgment be, and hereby is, granted; and it is further
ORDERED that it be, and hereby is, declared as the
Judgment of this Court that defendant President Carter's notice
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of termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States and the Republic of China must receive the
approval of two-thirds of the United States Senate or a
majority of both houses of Congress for that notice to be
effective under our Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty of 1954; and it is further
ORDERED that defendant Secretary of State Cyrus R.
Vance and his subordinate officers be, and hereby are, enjoined
from taking any action to implement the President's notice of
termination unless and until that notice is approved as herein
declared.

~ 1:
___;....,4'---~-Judge
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL. ·,
Plaintiffs,

v.
JAMES EARL CARTER, ET AL. ,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action
No. 78-2412

MEMORANDUM
Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion under Rule 59(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to alter or amend the
Court's judgment in this case of June 6, 1979.

This suit was

brought by eight members of the United States Senate, a former
senator, and sixteen members of the House of Representatives
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the notice given
by defendant President Carter to the Republic of China ("ROC" or
"Taiwan") to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Republic of China.

Plaintiffs

seek to have this Court declare that the termination of the
1954 Treaty cannot be legally accomplished, nor can notice
be given of intended termination, without the advice and
consent of the United States Senate or the approval of both
houses of Congress.

Plaintiffs contend that President

Carter's unilateral notice of termination violated their
legislative right to be consulted and to vote on the termination and also impaired the effectiveness of prior votes
approving the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty .

....

By Memorandum-Order dated June 6, 1979, the Court
dismissed plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice on the
ground that plaintiffs lacked standing.

Under the circumstances
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then presented, the Court believed that plaintiffs had not
suffered the requisite injury in fact to support standing.

The

Court now concludes, for the reasons set forth in Part II A of
this Memorandum, that all plaintiffs with the exception of
1/
former Senator Curtis- have suffered and are suffering a
present judicially cognizable injury in their capacity as
individual legislators.

Accordingly, the Court hereby alters

and amends its judgment of June 6, 1979 to hold that these plaintiffs have standing to seek a judicial declaration with respect
to the constitutionality of the President's unilateral termination of the 1954 Treaty.

The Court further concludes, for the

reasons set forth in Part II B, that this case does not present
a nonjusticiable political question, and thus the issue of treaty
termination should be decided on the merits.
For the reasons set forth in Part III of this Memorandum,
the Court holds that the termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of
China cannot be constitutionally accomplished without the advice
and consent of the United States Senate or the approval of
both houses of Congress.
I.

A full discussion of the events leading up to the
present diplomatic situation is contained in the Court's MemorandumOrder of June 6, 1979, and is incorporated herein by reference.

17

The

The Court continues to reject the particular standing claims of
plaintiffs Thurmond and Curtis that are grounded on the allegation that the President's action has impaired the effectivene~s of their prior votes approving the 1954 Treaty. An
in~erest in ensuring enforcement or the proper administration
of laws for which a legislator has voted is insufficient to
confer standing. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 21314 (D.C. Cir. 1977~Harrin~ton v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455,
459 (4th Cir. 1975). All p aintiffs other than former
Senator Curtis also claim an injury to their legislative right
to be consulted and to vote on treaty termination, and it is
this injury that the Court now finds sufficient to support
standing.

-2-
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essential dispute concerns the constitutional validity of
President Carter's unilateral notice of termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty, given on December 23, 1978 through the United
States Deputy Secretary of State, Warren Christopher.

According

to the notice, the termination will be effective January l, 1980
pursuant to the termination clause contained in Article X of the
2/
treaty.
The President has not submitted, for the purpose of
obtaining legislative concurrence, the notice of termination to
3/
either the Senate or the Congress as a whole.- Instead the
President maintains, and has continued to maintain, that he
possesses the unilateral authority under the Constitution to
terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China.
II.

Before reaching the merits of that constitutional question, however, it remains necessary to resolve the threshold issues
of standing and political question, which are subsumed within the ~
concept of justiciability.

These inquiries become particularly

sensitive in the context of a suit by Senators and Congressmen
seeking to challenge executive action, because of the accompanying
political overtones and separation of powers concerns.

Although

in this context, standing to sue and the political question doctrine are interrelated to a large degree, the Court, as it did
in its earlier opinion, believes it appropriate to address the

4/

standing issue first.-

'l)

Article X of the treaty contains a termination clause which
states that the treaty "shall remain in force indefinitely,"
but continues: "Either party may terminate it one year after
notice has been given to the other party."
Had.this been done under Senate Rules VII and XXVIII the
President's message would have been given priority. Deferential attention in the Senate where both the Majority leader
and the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Coll'llllittee
support the President's position would be expected.

4/

See Reuss~- Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n.14 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
aenied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190,
194 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

-3-
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A.

Standing.
In moving this Court for an order to alter or amend

its judgment of June 6, plaintiffs contend that the requirements for injury in fact expressed in the Court's earlier
opinion have been satisfied and that they now have standing
to assert their derivative constitutional rights.
It has been noted that no special standards govern
congressional standing questions.

As articulated by the Court

of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, a legislator
must satisfy the same basic requirements for standing as any
other litigant:

(1) that he has suffered injury in fact; (2)

that the interests being asserted are within the zone of interests
to be protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question; (3) that the injury is caused by the challenged action;
and (4) that the injury is capable of being redressed by a
;

favorable decision.

Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204, 205

n.68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

At issue here is the existence of injury

in fact, a constitutionally mandated requirement inherent in
the Article III "case or .controversy" limitation on federal
judicial power.

See Association of Data Processing Service

Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
The Court of Appeals, beginning with its important
5/
decision in Kennedy v. Sampson,- has developed a comprehensive
body of law setting forth an analytical framework for
approaching cases involving congressional standing.

The theory

of standing established in Kennedy is one of derivative injury,

5~! F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Kennedy, the Court held
that the plaintiff Senator had standing to seek a declaratory judgment that a bill for which he had voted had become
law despite a presidential pocket veto. The Senator's vote
in favor of the bill and his constitutional right to participate in a vote to override the veto had been nullified by
the executive action.

-4-
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based upon the right of each individual legislator to partici6/

pate in the exercise of the powers of the institution.-

This

concept of derivative institutional injury requires a plaintiff
Congressman to show, first, an injury in fact to the institution
of Congress, and, second, that as an individual legislator he
has been injured in fact because of the harm done to the institution.

Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir.

1977).

The institutional injury alleged by plaintiffs here is

that President Carter's unilateral notice of termination of the
1954 Treaty has violated the constitutional right of Congress
7/
to be consulted and to vote on that termination.- Under the
circumstances present at the time of the Court's June 6 decision,
the Court could not discern the existence of a definite and concrete institutional injury, and thus held that the individual
legislators could not claim a derivative injury to their participatory rights.

In large part this was due to what the Court

perceived as a substantial likelihood of resolution of the
treaty termination issue through the legislative process and
the Court's reluctance to . interfere with a potential political
solution.
The question of the availability of alternative
political remedies to redress executive action is indeed
another dimension underlying the congressional standing

~/

Id. at 435-36.

II

In Kennedy v. Sampson, the nullification of a specific constitutionally prescribed vote was sufficient to constitute
injury in fact. Id. at 436. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190 4 211 (D.C. Cir:-1977). Th~mpairment of other rights of
Cort"gress conferred by the Constitution may also serve as a
basis for standing under the participatory rights analysis of
Kennedy. See Note, Contressional Access to the Federal Courts,
90 Harv. L-:--llev. 1632, 641 (1977). The right to participate
in the treaty termination process would constitute such a
right.

-5-
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8/

cases and the insistence on a clear showing of injury in fact.It is in this context that the prudential and functional concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962), the leading statement on the political question
doctrine, interrelates with the analysis of congressional
standing.

Both reflect the deference to be accorded a coordi-

nate branch of government under our system of separation of
9/

powers.-

Hence, courts are justifiably concerned when a suit

by individual legislators seeks to vindicate derivative rights
susceptible to being adequately redressed in the political arena.
The potential availability of a remedy through the
legislative process, however, is not conclusive on the
question of injury in fact and thus certainly not fatal to a
legislator's standing claim.

Metcalf v. National Petroleum

Council, 553 F.2d 176, 189 n.129 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see Reuss v.
Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 997 (1978); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435 n.17 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).

Rather, in deference to the fundamental constitutional

principle of separation of powers and in order to avoid
abuse of the judicial process, the Court must require a clear
showing of injury in fact.

In each case where a denial of

standing has been based in part on the existence of alternative
political remedies, there was no impediment to the legislative
process whatsoever and the powers of the plaintiff Congressmen

8/

See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 468 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
aenied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National Petroleum
Council, 553 F.2d 176, 189 & n.129 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Harrington
v.·Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975); Public
Citizen v. Sam son, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem.,
515 F.2d 1018 D.C. Cir. 1975).

1

See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n.14 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d
190, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Note, Con~ressional Access to the
Federal Courts, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 163 , 1643-52 (1977).

-6-
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10/
remained rather clearly undiminished.~ In those instances,
there was a genuine risk that granting standing could have

10/ Thus in Public Citizen v. Samhson, 379 F. Supp. 662 (D.D.C.
1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 1 18 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a group

of 17 Congresiiiien challenged a General Services Administration regulation authorizing agencies to grant exclusive
rights to patents developed under federal research contracts. The Court found no injury in fact and denied
standing because promulgation of the regulation could not
deprive Congress of its "uncontested right and power" to
dispose of government property by proposing legislation
regulating the contractual authority of GSA. The powers
of the plaintiff Congressmen in that case were not diminished
in any respect.

Comparable factual situations were posed in Metcalf v.
National Petrolewn Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
and Harrin~ton v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In
Metcalf, t e plaintiff Senator alleged that the NPC and
Its subgroups were unlawfully functioning as advisory committees in violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
and the Federal Energy Administration Act. Standing was
denied partly on the basis that plaintiff's power to act
in his role as legislator and Subcommittee chairman to
acquire accurate, unbiased information was completely
intact. 553 F.2d at 189. In HarrinEton, a Congressman
sued for a declaration that certainIA activities were
in excess of the agency's statutory authority, and an
injunction prohibiting the CIA from using the funding and
reporting provisions of the CIA Act of 1949 in connection
with those illegal activities. The Court again denied
standing, noting that the legislative process regarding
the power to prescribe CIA activities remained unimpeded,
and that plaintiff to a large extent was attempting to
get more information concerning CIA funding than the
Congress wished him." to have. 553 F.2d at 199 n.41, 201
n.50, 214-15.
Finally, in Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978), the Court of Appeals
again appeared to base its denial of standing in part on
the existence of an alternative political remedy. In that
case a Congressman sought declaratory and injunctive relief
alleging that 12 U.S.C. § 263(a) provided for an unconstitutional composition of the Federal Open Market Committee of
the Federal Reserve System in violation of the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution. In rejecting plaintiff's theory
of legislator standing, the Court noted that the Congressman could simply introduce a bill requiring all FOMC members
to be presidential appointees, and thus that "no supposed
impairment of his legislative functions [was] due, in any
pa,tt, to the actions or omissions of the named defendants."
584 F.2d at 468. See also Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d
455, 459 (4th Cir.-r9"7'51--1bo1ding that plaintiff Congressman lacked standing to challenge military expenditures as
violative of statutes limiting United States involvement in
Southeast Asia because of the available legislative solution of tightening the statutory restrictions).

-7-
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the effect of interfering with or circumventing the legislative
process~ and thus provide judicial redress for Congressmen
who had simply failed to take advantage of, or to succeed in
persuading their colleagues to take advantage of, an expedient
opportunity for legislative action.

The Court is convinced

that this suit is distinguishable, given the present legislative
posture and the nature of the derivative injury claimed.
At the time of the Court's June 6 decision, at least
three resolutions dealing with the treaty termination power
and the notice of termination given with respect to the 1954
Mutual Defense Treaty were then pending before, and apparently
11/
being actively considered by, the United States Senate.~ The
Court was especially concerned that a premature judicial declaration might circumvent legislative action directed at either
approving or rejecting the President's notice of termination.
Believing that the resolution of the ultimate issue of treaty
termination authority in this case should in the first instance
be in the legislative forum, the Court stated that its judicial
powers should be exercised only after the legislative branch
.
12/
had been given the opportunity of acting.~ At that time there
was no indication whether the Senate or the Congress as a whole
intended to assert a right to participate in the treaty termination process, nor whether the action likely to be taken would
be such that a judicial declaration would interfere with it.
The legislative branch has now had further opportunity
to act.

On

June 6, 1979, within hours after the Court's initial

11/

Meii7orandum Opinion of June 6, 1979, at 9 n.13. Additionally
there was a commitment by the Senate leadership that Resolution 15 would be considered not later than June Sth. 125
Cong. Rec. S2297-S2305 (March 8, 1979).

12/

Memorandum Opinion of June 6, 1979, at 11.

-8-
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ruling in this case, the United States Senate voted 59 to 35 to
adopt an amendment proposed by Senator Harry F. Byrd, containing
13/
language identical to original Senate Resolution 15,~ as a
14/
substitute for the substitute amendment~ proposed by the
Senate Foreign Relations Collmlittee.
(June 6, 1979).

125 Cong. Rec. S7038-7039

The language adopted by the Senate vote reads

as follows:
That it is the sense of the Senate that
approval of the United States Senate is required
to terminate any mutual defense treaty between the
United States and another nation.
125 Cong. Rec. S7015.

Subsequent to that vote, additional amend-

ments were proposed by Senator Church, Chairman of the Foreign
Relations Committee, and by Senator Goldwater, a plaintiff in this
15/
action.~ Neither amendment came up for a vote, and Senate

13/

Senate Resolution 15 was introduced by Senator Harry F.
Byrd on January 18, 1979. 125 Cong. Rec. S220.

14/

The Senate Foreign Relations Connnittee, on May 1, reported
Resolution 15 with an amendment to strike all after the
resolving clause and insert substitute language providing
several grounds for unilateral Presidential terminations of
treaties. 125 Cong. Rec. S5018. It was this substitute
Committee amendment that was displaced by the Byrd amendment
on June 6.

15/

The Church amendment would add the following language:
The provisions of this Resolution shall not apply
with respect to any treaty the notice of termination
of which was transmitted prior to the date of adoption of this Resolution.
125 Cong. Rec. S7061 (June 6, 1979).
would add the following language:

The Goldwater amendment

(1) The provisions of this resolution shall not be
construed to approve or disapprove of the proposed
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the
Republic of China, such proposed termination not
having been submitted to the Senate or the Congress
-- for approval prior to the date of adoption of this
resolution.
(2) Nor shall anything in this resolution reduce
or prejudice any of the Constitutional powers of the
Senate.
125 Cong. Rec. S7861-62 (June 18, 1979).

-9-
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Resolution 15 as amended by Senator Harry F. Byrd's language
has been returned to the Senate calendar without further action.
The vote in favor of the Byrd amendment does not constitute final
16/
action by the Senate,~ although it stands as the last expression
of Senate position on its constitutional role in the treaty termination process.

By that vote, the Senate rejected a Committee

substitute that would have expressly approved of the action
17/
taken by the President in terminating this treaty.~ No further
steps have been taken by the Senate with respect to treaty
termination powers.
The action taken by the Senate has admittedly not been
decisive.

It does, however, evidence at least some congressional

determination to participate in the process whereby a mutual
defense treaty is terminated, and clearly falls short of approving
18/
the President's termination effort.~ At the same time, as was
true in Kennedy v. Sampson, Congress has given no indication that

it

disapproves of the individual suits, and there appears to be no action
19 /
presently planned with which a judicial declaration would interfere.~

16/ See Declaration of Murray Zweben, Parliamentarian of the

Senate, dated June 29, 1979, submitted in support of
Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or
Amend the Judgment of June 6, 1979.

17/

One of the grounds for unilateral Presidential treaty termination provided in the Committee substitute was "where . . .
provisions of the treaty itself, give rise to a right of
termination or suspension on the part of the United States
. . . . " 125 Cong. Rec. S7014 (June 6, 1979). Article X
of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty contains a termination
clause giving either party the right to terminate one year
after notice. See note 2, supra.
The Court continues to reject defendants' suggestion that the
enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8,
93 j,tat. 14 (April 10, 1979), can be interpreted as legislative
ratification of the notice of termination. See Memorandum
Opinion of June 6, 1979, at 9 n.14.
See Note, Con ressional Access to the Federal Courts, 90 Harv.
i:-:-Rev. 16 ,
- . See a so Press er v. Simon, 428 F. Supp.
302, 304 (D.D.C. 1976) (tbree"}udge court), aff'd mem. sub
nom. Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978).

-10-
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It must be emphasized, moreover, that when President Carter
gave notice to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty without submitting it for congressional approval, effective legislative
participation was delayed and became more difficult in light of
20/
that action.~ Indeed, it can be argued that the theoretical
ability of Congress to pursue an alternative political remedy
through affirmative legislative action in these circumstances
is not necessarily relevant to an analysis of injury in fact to
a protected constitutional right, since the Constitution already
limits the power of a coordinate branch to act in a particular
21/
area.
Without adopting the latter position, it certainly
can be said that, by the President's unilateral action, the
matter of the treaty termination became less amenable to
congressional control than the matters involved in other
22/
cases presenting the availability of legislative solutions.~

20/

In each of the four instances where Presidents have
initiated the termination process and then requested
authority from Congress to terminate treaties, Congress has
responded promptly to authorize completion of the termination
process. President Taft received legislative ratification
and approval to terminate a coun:nercial treaty with Russia
three days after his request came to the Senate. 37 Stat. 627.
President Wilson on May 17, 1920 sought the "advice and consent"
of the Senate to withdraw from the International Sanitary Convention. On May 26, 192.1 two-thirds of the Senate present
resolved to advise and consent to the denunciation of the
convention. 61 Cong. Rec. 1793-1794. President Polk
sought authority to terminate the Convention on Boundaries
with Great Britain concerning the Oregon Territory. By joint
resolution such action was authorized by Congress in less than
five months. 9 Stat. 109-110. President Pierce requested
authority to give notice to Denmark of the termination of a
commercial treaty. Within four months the Senate unanimously
gave the requested authority. S. Res. of March 3, 1855, 33d
Cong., 2d Sess.; 9 Sen. Executive Journal 431.
The Court assumes that a request by the President in the
iustant case would have been met with similar deferential
S'ttention. See note 3 su~ra. The record discloses that, prior
to President---cirter's delivery of the notice of termination,
Senator Goldwater and Senate Minority Leader Baker sought to
have the President call a special session of Congress to allow
for legislative participation. See Plaintiffs' Supplementary
Memorandum on the Privileged Status in Congress of Presidential
Messages, Exhibits 2-5.
See Note, Congressional Acces~ to the Federal Courts, 90
Harv. L. Rev. 1632, 1642 (1977).
See note 10, supra.
-11-
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It is in this vein that plaintiffs' efforts at pursuing an alternative political remedy, and the danger of the
Court's preempting that remedy, must be viewed.

Though any

such assessment is certainly problematic in the context of
relative congressional inaction, in this instance the Court
is convinced that there is no apparent risk of circumventing
or evading the legislative process by a decision on the merits.
The Court therefore concludes that plaintiffs have suffered
and are suffering injury in fact to their legislative right to
be consulted and to vote on the termination of the 1954
Mutual Defense Treaty.

Defendants do not challenge, and indeed

there can be no serious dispute, that plaintiffs meet the remaining three requirements of standing relating to zone of interests,
23/
causation, and redressability.~ Thus, plaintiffs satisfy the
criteria for standing to sue in their capacity as individual
legislators.

Hence, unless plaintiffs have presented a nonjus-

ticiable political question, the Court may decide the case on
the merits.
B.

Political Question Doctrine.
Defendants contend that even if plaintiffs have

standing, they are not entitl~d to a judgment on the merits
because this case presents a nonjusticiable political question.
23/

Clearly, the denial of plaintiffs' participatory role in the
treaty termination process is "within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the . . . constitutional
guarantee in question." Ass'n of Data Processin~ Serv.
Organization, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1 70). In
addition, it is the President's purported termination of
the Treaty, without submitting the notice of termination for
congressional approval, from which the denial of plaintiffs'
role can be fairly traced. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare
Rights Organ., 426 U.S. 26, ZiI="42 (1976). Finally, a judici-ttl decision declaring the constitutional requirements
for terminating the Treaty can afford plaintiffs the precise
relief requested, and thus the injury is one "likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 38. The
critical requirement to be satisfied ~the congressional
plaintiffs here is that they have suffered injury in fact.
Any difficulty in demonstrating causation in this case could
only derive from the same issue of alternative political
remedies already resolved under the injury in fact inquiry.
See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

-12-
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The political question doctrine reflects the view that under
our governmental system of separation of powers some issues
are not to be resolved by the j~diciary but by one of the
political branches of the government~

Consequently, if a

true political question comes before the courts for adjudication, it should be dismissed as nonjusticiable.
Political questions traditionally have been defined
as those issues that have been committed by the text of the
Constitution, either explicitly or by reasonable inference, to
24/
the autonomous control of a coordinate branch.-- The textual
commitment test is indeed an important aspect of the political
25/
question doctrine,--- although other prudential and functional
concerns also characterize this flexible restraint on judicial
power.

In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme

Court stated that on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question was at least one of the following formulations:
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable -standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.
Id. at 217.

Defendants contend that several of these formulations,

including a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
to the &tecutive, are inextricable from the case at bar.
Cases involving the foreign relations of the United
States are commonly cited as examples of judicial abstention

24/

Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1959).

25/

See, !.:.A.:.., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-21, 548~(1969).
-13-
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26/
because the issues presented were political questions.- For
example, courts have considered themselves bound by the
Executive's determination regarding which political group
27/
represents the government of a foreign state,- which nation
28/
has sovereignty over disputed territory,- and whether cer29/
tain aliens should be deported.- But as the Supreme Court
noted in Baker v. Carr, "it is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
30/
beyond judicial cognizance."Certainly, it is clear that the conduct of the
foreign relations of the United States is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative branches of
the government and "the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
31/
inquiry or decision."- This is the basis of the Supreme Court
decisions in the foreign relations cases traditionally viewed
as raising political questions.

In none of these cases did

the Court refuse to consider whether the President's action
had exceeded his constitu~ional authority.

Instead it con-

cluded that the President's decision was within his authority
32/
and therefore binding on the courts.- In the area of foreign

26/

See L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
ID"-16 (1972).

27/

Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126, 137-38 (1938);
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420

(1839).

28/

Foster & Elam v. Wilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829).

29/

Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952).

30/

369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).

31/

•

Id. at 211 n.31, quoting Oet en v. Central Leather Co.,
ee a so Chicago & S. Air Lines,
Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp.:--!3~S. 103, 111 (1948).

'24o U.S. 297, 302 (1918).

Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85 Yale

L. J. 597, 612 (1976).

-14-

A

r

123A

relations, as in any other area, a court generally should not
dismiss a case as a political question if the Constitution does
not entrust resolution of the issue to a coordinate political
branch or if the challenged governmental action is ultra vires.
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519, 548-49 (1969);
United States v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 567 F.2d
121, 125-28 (D.C. Cir. 1977).

Unless the case raises other

concerns of a prudential or functional nature, a judicial resolution under those circumstances requires no more than an
interpretation of the Constitution--a responsibility that beyond
33/
question lies with the courts.~
Defendants urge that the executive power over
34/
foreign affairs~ represents such a constitutional counnitment and that the President's action in giving notice of
termination in accordance with the terms of the Mutual Defense
Treaty is within this authority.

The Constitution carefully

delineates the roles played by the executive and legislative
branches in treaty formation, stating that the President "shall
have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
35/
11to make Treaties .
The Constitution is silent, however,
on the question of treaty termination.

Although defendants

argue that the President's recognized constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs and the implementation
of treaties includes the power to terminate treaties, they
acknowledge, as they must, that there is no express constitutional commitment of this power.

33/

Their argument that such a

See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974);

PoweJl v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-49 (1969); Marbury v.

Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

The President's powers over the conduct of foreign relations
derive from a number of Constitutional provisions. U.S.
Const., art. II, § 2 ("The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy . . . . ") ; id. ("He shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties . . . . "); id., art. II,§ 3 ("[HJe shall
receive Ambassadors and other public ministers; he shall
take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . . ").
35/

U.S. Const., art. II,

§

2.
-15-
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36/
commitment can be implied- is unsatisfactory, for it is just
as possible to imply the requirement of a legislative role in
the termination process.

Thus, the "textual commitment" formu-

lation of the political question doctrine does not bar judicial
resolution of plaintiffs' claim.
Defendants also contend that this case presents a
political question principally because of the "unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,"
the "potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one issue," and the "impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
37/
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion."- The Court finds
that an interpretation of the Constitution with respect to the
allocation of power between the political branches in the
treaty termination process presents none of these prudential
and functional concerns.

Nor are any of the other formulations

of a political question "inextricable from the case at
38/
bar."- In this case, the Court is not attempting to evaluate
See Youngstown Sheet

ms2).
See
--

&

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
. 186, 217 (1962).

Id. The Court finds distinguishable those decisions that
fieid actions challenging the ~egality of military
operations in Southeast Asia to be nonjusticiable.
Because of various pieces of congressional legislation
in support of such operations and the changing nature
of the hostilities, those cases primarily involved the
difficulty posed by the "lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards." ld. Thus, the courts were
not competent to resolve disputes over the specific form of
legislative action required to constitute congressional
approval, whether unilateral action by the President
escalating the activities had exceeded the scope of
congressional authorizations, or whether, if unauthorized,
the President was nevertheless acting in good faith to
terminate involvement in the war. See,~. Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 614-16 (D.C. C!r:" 1973); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974); Dacosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d
Cir. 1973). Simply determining what the constitutionally
required allocation of power between the two political
branches is with respect to treaty termination, and
that some mutual participation is required, involves no
such problems.
-16-

125A

the wisdom of the underlying political decision or to substitute
its judgment for that of a political department, but simply
to determine whether the treaty termination was effectuated
by constitutionally permissible means.
Many times in our history, courts have heard and
resolved disputes concerning the allocation of power between
the legislative and executive branches without raising the
39/
bar of the political question doctrine.~ Rather than presenting a nonjusticiable political question, the procedure
required by our Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty must be decided on the merits.

The Court is confronted

with a dispute consisting of a clash of authority between
the two political branches in a posture suitable for judicial
resolution.

III.
The prime question confronting the Court in this
case is what governmental action is required by the Constitu-

tion to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.
Because that treaty conta~ns a termination clause stating that
notice of termination may be given by either party, the narrower
issue becomes whether the President of the United States is a
"party" for purposes of this clause and thus able to take unilateral action with respect to the notice of termination.
Unlike its careful allocation of the power to enter
into treaties, the Constitution contains no specific reference
to the manner in which treaties are to be terminated.

Nor is

.

there any definitive evidence of the intentions of the Framers .
No court has ever addressed the precise issue here presented
See,~. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Youngstown
Sneet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Cam ai n Activities
v. N xon,
D.C.
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of the President's authority to effect termination of a validly
binding treaty, let alone a mutual defense treaty, without legis40/
lative participation.-- A wide range of legal opinion has been
presented by scholars and commentators, who are unable to agree
concerning which branch of the federal government has authority
41/
to represent the United States in treaty terminations.-Since the first treaty to which the United States
42/
was a party was terminated in 1798 by an act of Congress,-- a
variety of means have been used to terminate treaties:

by

statute directing the President to deliver notice of termination;
by the President acting pursuant to a joint resolution of

40/

In Van Der Wyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1935),
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
President's delivery of a notice of termination of treaty
provisions that were in conflict with the Seamen's Act of
1915, where such termination was specifically "requested
and directed" by Congress in the Act. The Court found
it unnecessary to pass on the question of "the authority
of the Executive in the absence of Congressional action,
or of action by the treaty-making power, to denounce a
treaty of the United States . . . . " Id. at 117.
The Court has also recognized the President's power to
determine compliance and the continuing validity of a
treaty. See,~. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 508-14
(1947); Cnarlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 474-76 (1913);
Terlinder v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285-88 (1902). That
power, however, is sharply distinguishable from a power
to act affirmatively to terminate a validly binding
treaty--as here, in accordance with a treaty provision
granting the United State's the option to terminate.
See note 46 infra and accompanying text.

41/

See,~. L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution
Io7-7l (1972); Scheffer, The Law of Treatt Termination as
A lied to United States De-Reco nition o the Re ublic of
China,
Harv. Int 1 L.J.
; Ne son,
e Termination
of Treaties and Executive A
b the United States:
eory an
ractice,
inn . . ev.
; iesen eld,
The Power of Congress and the President in International
Relations: Three Recent Su reme Court Decisions, 25 Calif .
. ev.
, 5 ; M. Reisman & M. McDougal, Who
Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?, The National Law
Jout"'nal, May 21, 1979, at 19. See generally Resolution
Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties: Hearin~s on S. Res. 15
Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 6th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979).

42/

The first treaties terminated by the United States were the
treaties of 1778 between the United States and France, terminated by the Act of July 7, 1798, 1 Stat. 578. The validity
of that congressional action was upheld in Hooper v. United
States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 425 (1887).
-18-

Congress or otherwise acting with the concurrence of both
houses of Congress; by the President acting with senatorial
43/
consent; and by the President acting alone . ~
The final
method of termination is of particular relevance here, but the
44/
precedents involving unilateral executive action~ are of only
marginal utility.

None of these examples involves a mutual

defense treaty, nor any treaty whose national and international
45/
significance approaches that of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.~
Virtually all of them, moreover, can be readily distinguished
46/
on the basis of some triggering factor not present here.~
See ~enerall~ Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties:
ffear1n son · . Res. 15 Before the Committee on Forei n Relations,
t Cong., st ess.
History o Treaty Terminations by the United States," an appendix to a memorandum prepared by the Department of State Legal Advisor) [hereinafter
cited as State Dept. Memorandum]; Emerson, The Le~islative
Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. Legis. 46, 52-64 1978);
Scheffer, supra note 41, at 979-85, 993-95 (1978).
44/

46/

Of the more than fifty treaty terminations in our nation's ~ ~
history, defendants point to thirteen instances in which
the President acted to terminate a treaty and his action was
unaccompanied by specific senatorial or congressional approval.
See Supplementary Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend; State Dept.
Memorandum, supra note 43. Not all of the cited examples constitute precedent for presidential termination, since in two
cases the notice of termination was subsequently withdrawn by
the President. See . 1965 notice of termination of the Warsaw
Convention. 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876; 1933 notice of
termination of the Extradition Treaty with Greece, 47 Stat.
2185, T.S. No. 855. For . a critical analysis of these precedents for unilateral presidential termination, see Scheffer,
supra note 41, at 979-86.
Most of the terminations by the President alone involved
commercial situations where the need for the treaty, or the
efficacy of it, was no longer apparent.
Unilateral executive action in terminating a treaty would
presumably be permissible, as both parties recognize,
when the treaty is superseded by an inconsistent law
or treaty; when the treaty becomes impossible to perform
or is otherwise rendered inoperative; when the treaty is
vicu.ated or denounced by the other party; or when there has
been a fundamental change in circumstances affecting the
treaty. In such cases, the President may determine
that the continuing validity of the treaty has been destroyed,
either because under principles of international law the
United States could justifiably withdraw from the treaty or
because the treaty is in conflict with more recent legislation.
Scheffer,
pci note 41, at 987-88; s e e , ~ . Clark v. Allen,
331 U.S. 5
947); Van Der Wyde v.-o'cean Transport Co., 297
U.S. 114 (1935); Charlton v. Kell!, 229 U.S . 447 (1913);
Terlinder v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 ( 902).

03

(footnote continued on page 20)
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The great majority of the historical precedents
involve some form of mutual action, whereby the President's
notice of termination receives the affirmative approval of the
.
47/
Senate or the entire Congress.~ Taken as a whole, the historical
precedents support rather than detract from the position that the
power to terminate treaties is a power shared by the political
branches of this government.

A.
Defendants' argument that the President has authority
to terminate unilaterally the Mutual Defense Treaty is premised
on the executive power over foreign affairs.

This authority

derives from the enumerated Article II powers, including those
that authorize the President to make treaties with the advice
48/
and consent of the Senate~ and to receive representatives of
49/
foreign nations.~
Because the President has been termed "the sole organ
50/
of the federal government in the field of international relations,"~
defendants argue that construing the Constitution to require
that the Senate or the Co~gress also has a right to participate
Many of the instances cited by defendants in which the
President has acted alone involve one or more of the above
factors. In others, if ~he treaty was not actually superseded by inconsistent legislation, there was at the very
least a substantial participation by Congress in establishing the policy that led to the termination, the result of
which amounted to an implied authorization. ~ . 1933
termination of the Multilateral Convention for the Abolition
of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions of 1927,
46 Stat. 2461, T.S. No. 811. In those few remaining instances
in which the presidential termination cannot otherwise be
justified, the treaty had already become generally ineffectual or the matter involved was relatively insignificant.
~ . 1944 Termination of the Inter-American Convention for
Traaemark and Commercial Protection of 1929, 46 Stat. 2907,
T.s~·No. 833; 1927 termination of the Convention with Mexico
on the Prevention of Smuggling, 44 Stat. 2358, T.S. No. 178.
47/

See notes 66-70 infra and accompanying text. See
generally authorities cited at note 43 supra.

48/

U.S. Const. art. II, S 2.

49/

Id. i 3.

50/

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.

304, 320 (1936).
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in treaty termination would be inconsistent with the President's
constitutional authority over foreign affairs.

They further urge

that the Senate's . role of advis~ng and consenting in the making
of treaties is not an independent so~rce of legislative power,
but only a limitation upon the treaty-making power of the
President.

Such limitations, they conclude, must be strictly

construed and not extended by implication.

See Myers v. United

States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926).
An attempt to justify a unilateral presidential power
to terminate treaties by analogy to the Supreme Court's treatment
of the removal power in Myers is unpersuasive.

The power to remove

executive personnel cannot be compared with the power to terminate
an important international treaty.

The removal power is restricted

in its exercise to "purely executive officers" charged with a duty
51/
unrelated to the legislative or judicial power.~ It concerns the
President's administrative control over his subordinates and flows
from the President's obligations to see that the laws are faithfully
52/
executed.~ By contrast, treaty termination impacts upon the
substantial role of Congr~ss in foreign affairs--especially
in the context of a mutual defense pact involving the potential
exercise of congressional wa~·powers--and is a contradiction
rather than a corollary of the Executive's enforcement
obligation.

The same separation of powers principles that

dictate presidential independence and control within the
executive establishment preclude the President from exerting
an overriding influence in the

sphere of constitutional

powers that is shared with the legislative branch.

..-

A power

to terminate treaties that are made "by and with the advice
53/
and consent of the Senate"- simply does not fall within
the limited scope of the Myers rationale.
Hum~hrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32
(19 5); ~ Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 235, 163-64 (1926).
U.S. Const. art. II, I 2.
-21-
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Nor, for reasons more fully set forth below, can the
President's status as the nation's spokesman and representative
in foreign affairs serve as the basis for exclusive executive
power over the entire process of treaty termination.

While

the President may be the sole organ of communication with
foreign governments, he is clearly not the sole maker of
foreign policy.

In short, the conduct of foreign relations
54/
is not a plenary executive power.

Defendants also suggest that the recognition power
55/
of the President~ is directly implicated in the present situation because termination of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty was
generally viewed as a prerequisite to normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of
56/
China.~ As a result, defendants urge that the President's
notice of termination is supported by his exclusive "[p]ower
to remove . . . obstacles to

recognition," a power that

has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court.

United States v.

Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v . Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1934).
The Pink and Belmont cases both involved the propriety
of the Litvinov Assignment, a~ ·international executive agreement
As Justice Jackson, in referring to Article II, § 1 of the
Constitution, stated in his concurring opinion in Youngstown
Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 529, 641 (1952): "I
cannot accept that this clause is a grant in bulk of all
conceivable executive power but regard it as an allocation
to the r.residential office of the generic powers thereafter
stated. '
The President's power to recognize a government as the
representative of a foreign state--in this case recognizing
the People's Republic of China as the sole government of
Chin.a--is not challenged. See,~. United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229; Guarant Trust Co. v. United States,
~U.S. 126, 137-38 (193 . The recognition power
ows
from his express authority under U.S. Const. art. II, § 3,
to "receive Ambassadors and other public ministers."
56/

See,!.:..&.:.., Declaration of Warren Christopher, Deputy
Secretary of State, in support of Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary ~udgment,
11 4, 7. Steps toward nonnalization were taken with the
exchange of ambassadors on March l, 1979.
-22-
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providing that Soviet claims to Russian assets in the United
States would be assigned to the United States government and
used to settle American claims resulting from Soviet nationalization decrees.

Settlement of these claims had become a condition

precedent to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the
Soviet government.

The Supreme Court held that this agreement

was valid and superseded New York state laws and policy against
confiscation of private property.
Defendants rely on the following statement of
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Pink:
Power to remove such obstacles to full recognition
as settlement of claims of our nationals . . .
certainly is a modest im!lied !ower of the President
who is the "sole organ o the ederal government in
the field of international relations." . . . Unless
such a power exists, the power of recognition might
be thwarted or seriously diluted.
315 U.S. at 229-30 .(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Defendants' argument lacks merit.

The power to termina~e;

a Mutual Defense Treaty cannot similarly be described as a "modest
implied power of the President."

A holding that the recognition

power incidentally confers the power to make an executive agreement settling property claims and that such agreement has supremacy
over conflicting state law does not justify an incidental power
to terminate treaties without congressional approval.

The argu-

ment that any executive action becomes constitutional if it is
ancillary to an act of recognition is without merit.

If limi-

tations imposed by other constitutional provisions exist, the
recognition power cannot be used as a "bootstrap" to support the
President's unilateral action in terminating the Mutual Defense

..

Treaty ~ith Taiwan.

B.
The termination of a treaty is not a single act entrusted
by the Constitution to one or the other of our political branches.
Like treaty formation, treaty termin~tion is comprised of a series

-23-
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execute those laws; the implications to be derived from the
constitutionally delineated role of the Senate in treaty
formation; and the fundamental doctrine of separation of
powers.

It is further bolstered by the historical experience

represented by constitutional interpretation and practice.
Article VI of the Constitution provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.

Defendants argue, however, that

the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty is not a "law of the land" for
supremacy clause purposes.

They assert that only those treaties

that are self-executing, and thus become effective as domestic
law at the time the agreement goes into effect, constitute the
59/
supreme law of the land.~ Careful consideration of the provisions of the Mutual Defense Treaty establishes that a number of
60/
its provisions are self-executing~ and that still others have

59/

The distinction between self-executing and non self-executing
treaties was first expressed by Chief Justice Marshall in
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829): "Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It
is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, wherever it operates
of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties engages to perform a particular
act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract, before it can become a rule for the court."
Id. at 314. See generallt L. Henkin, Foreign Affairs and
tne Constitution, 156-611972); Restatement (Second) of
the Foreign Relations Law of the United States§ 141 (1965).

60/

The.Treaty's key provision--Article V, which declares that
eacb party would act to meet the common danger of an armed
attack in the West Pacific area "in accordance with its
constitutional processes"--is self-executing. Under the
"constitutional processes" of the United States, the President has authority to take certain action, short of a
declaration of war by Congress, to alleviate the threat
of armed attack. Thus the provision does not require the
(footnote continued on page 26)
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61/
been implemented by subsequent legislation.~ In light of the
terms and conditions of the Treaty, as well as the acts subsequently taken by the Congress arid the President which have
fixed and defined the nation's responsibilities under it,
it is now far too late to assert that this Treaty fails to have
the status of the supreme law of the land under Article VI.
Moreover, none of the factors that would impair that status
62/
are involved here.~

Article II, section three of the Constitution requires
that the President "shall take care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."

This constitutional responsibility clearly extends

to all laws of the land, including in this instance the Mutual
Defense Treaty.

The President cannot faithfully execute that

treaty by abrogating it any more than he can faithfully execute
•

by failing to administer.

He alone cannot effect the repeal of

a law of the land which was formed by joint action of the

executive and legislative branches, whether that law be a
statute or a treaty.

The limits upon his authority are in no

way altered by the inclusion of a termination provision in
Article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty, allowing either party
aid of implementing legislation in order to be operative.
The mere fact that a congressional power exists does not
mean that the power is exclusive so as to preclude the
making of a self-executing treaty within the area of that
power. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States§ 141 comment f (1965).
61/

For instance, Article VII, which provides for the location
of United States forces in and about Taiwan, is not selfexecuting at least to the extent that it requires appropriatiQRs by Congress, but such appropriations have been made.
This non self-executing provision has thus been legislatively
implemented.
See note 46 supra and accompanying text. The termination here
!'s'"based solely upon the invocation of the termination provision in Article X of the Mutual Defense Treaty, rather
than upon a determination that the Treaty is no longer
validly binding.

-26-
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to terminate upon one year notice.

The President's powers of

administering the Treaty do not include the power to terminate
in accordance with the provisions of Article X.

The "party"

to which the term-ination provision refers is the United States,
not the President alone, and such termination can only be effectuated in accordance with United States constitutional processes.
The requirements imposed by the Supremacy Clause
and the President's responsibility to faithfully execute the
laws are further supported by the doctrine of separation of
powers and its corollary concept of checks and balances, which
lies at the heart of our constitutional system.

In the treaty

formation process, the Constitution expressly limits the
Executive's role by requiring the advice and consent of two-thirds
63/
of the Senate.~ This constitutional requirement reflects the
concern of the Founding Fathers that neither political branch
64/
possess unchecked power.~
A judicial determination that the President enjoys
unilateral authority to terminate treaties would raise the
same fears and present t~e same possibility of abuse.

It would

be incompatible with our system of checks and balances if the
executive power in the area of. foreign affairs were construed
to encompass a unilateral power to terminate treaties.

It is

undisputed that the President is without power to amend the
terms of a treaty.

Any such amendment must be submitted to
65/
the Senate for its advice and consent.~ If the lesser power

63/ Article II, § 2 provides:

64/

65/

"[The President] shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present
co~ur • • • • "
Alexander Hamilton, in discussing the treaty-making power,
stated: "The history of human conduct does not warrant that
exalted opinion of human virtue which would make it wise in
a nation to commit interests of so delicate and momentous
a kind as those which concern its intercourse with the rest
of the world to the sole disposal of a magistrate, created
and circumstanced, as would be a president of the United
States." Federalist No. 75, pp. 505-06 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
See The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 75 (1821);
leitatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States I 163(2) (1965).
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to amend treaties is denied the President,~ fortiori, the
greater power to annul should also be denied.

In the present

situation the President may very well be carrying out the
wishes of the Ameri_c an people but .·because the legislative
branch has not participated in the treaty termination process,
there is no way to ascertain this fact.

•

As Justice Frankfurter

stated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 529,
594 (1952):
a day.

"The accretion of dangerous power does not come in

It does come, however slowly, from the generative force

of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even
the most disinterested assertion of authority."
The predominate United States' practice in terminating
treaties, including those containing notice provisions, has
66/
involved mutual action by the executive and legislative branches.~

In most instances, the President's notice of termination has
received the affirmative approval of either the Senate or the
entire Congress.

Although no one constitutional interpretation

has been accepted, nor has a definitive procedure emerged, the
weight of historical precedent clearly supports the view that
some form of congressionai. concurrence is required.

Support

can be found for requiring either of two alternatives: 1) the
.
67/
approval of a majority of both houses of Congress,~ or 2) the
At the Court's request counsel supplied information as to
the number of treaties terminated and whether the terminations were effected by joint action or unilaterally. Different totals were submitted. Further study of these terminations indicates that in most of them there was some congressional action which was consistent with the position of
the Executive .
67/

The passage of a joint resolution specifically authorizing
or.airecting the President to give notice of termination
has been a relatively common method employed by Congress
in exercising its role in the treaty termination process.
Two examples involving express presidential requests for
such authority are particularly instructive. The
termination of the 1827 Convention with Great Britain for
the Joint Occupation of the Oregon Territory--the first
termination pursuant to a notice provision in a treaty-(footnote continued on page 29) · ·
~28-
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68/
consent of two-thirds of the Senate.~ The latter is of course
69/
the most analogous to the treaty-making power,
while the former
was effected in 1846 following the enactment of a joint
resolution authorizing Pres"ident Polk to give the notice
of termination. H.J. Res. of April 27, 1846, 9 Stat. 109.
The 1832 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Russia
terminated when President Taft's delivery of the notice of
termination--again pursuant to treaty provision--was
subsequently approved by joint resolution, H.J. Res. of
December 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 627, following the President's
message to the Senate of his intent to terminc:tte "with
a view to its ratification and approval," 48 Cong. Rec.
454 (1911). In other instances, joint resolutions directing
or authorizing the termination of treaties pursuant to notice
provisions have been passed without any prior presidential
initiative. J. Res. of Feb. 26, 1883, 22 Stat. 641 (Amity
Treaty of 1871 with Great Britain); J. Res. of June 17, 1874,
18 Stat. 287 (Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1858 with
Belgium); J. Res. of Jan. 8, 1865, 13 Stat. 566 (Reciprocity
Treaty as to Fisheries, Commerce, and Navigation of 1854 with
Great Britain). In addition, Congress has enacted statutes
which conflict with earlier treaties and which specifically
request the President to terminate inconsistent treaties.
Fishery and Conservation Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-265, Title II, § 202(b), 90 Stat. 340; Seamen's Act of
1915, Pub. L. No. 63-302, § 16, 38 Stat. 1184. See also
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, Pub. L. No":- ~O.
§ 5, 65 Stat. 72.

~

68/

At least two treaties have been terminated pursuant to
Senate approval without any participation by the House of
Representatives. Pursuant to notice of termination delivered
by President Buchanan, the 1826 Convention of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation with Denmark was terminated following a unanimous Senate resolution. S. Res. of March 3, 1855,
33d Cong., 2d Sess. · In connection with that termination,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee issued a report in
April, 1856, which concluded that the treaty-making power-the Senate and the President acting together--could terminate
a treaty without participation by the House of Representatives.
S. Rep. No. 97, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. (1856). A second instance
was the termination of the International Sanitary Convention
of 1903 following a two-thirds vote of approval by the Senate
as requested by President Wilson. S. Res. of May 26, 1921,
61 Cong. Rec. 1793.

69/

Several commentators have argued the constitutional soundness
of terminating treaties in accordance with the same power that
concludes those treaties. ~ . Scheffer, iupra note 41, at
1002-03; Riesenfeld, supra note 41 at 660-6 . There is also
some eminent dictum to support that approach: in Techt v.
Hufhes, 229 N.Y. 222, 243, 128 N.E. 185, 192, cert. denied,
25 U.S. 43 (1920), Judge Cardozo stated: "[The] President
and senate may denounce the treaty, and thus terminate its
life."
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is based primarily on congressional authority to repeal a law
70/
of the land.~
When faced with an apparent gap in the Constitutional
allocation of powers, the Court must refer to the fundamental
design of the entire document and determine how its purposes
would be best served in the gap area.

The Court believes that

either of these two alternative procedures for congressional
participation is a constitutionally sound means of terminating
treaties.

The important point is that treaty termination

generally is a shared power, which cannot be exercised by the
President acting alone.

Neither the executive nor legislative

branch has exclusive power to terminate treaties.

At least

under the circumstances of this case--involving a significant
mutual defense treaty with a faithful ally, who has not violated
the terms of the agreement, and the validity of which has not
otherwise been destroyed--any decision of the United States
to terminate that treaty must be made with the advice and
consent of the Senate or the approval of both houses of
Congress.

That decision cannot be made by the President alone.
In view of the foregoing, it is the declaration of

this Court that the President's notice of termination must receive
The Supreme Court's decision in Van Der Wyde v. Ocean
Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1935), would appear to be the
strongest judicial authority for participation by the entire
Congress in the treaty termination process. See note 40 supra.
Requiring such participation is supported by the fact that a
treaty, like a statute, constitutes the supreme law of the
land whose repeal is the proper subject of congressional
authority. In that regard, it is undisputed that a subsequent act of Congress which is clearly inconsistent with a
tr~~ty supersedes that treaty as domestic law to the extent
of the conflict. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 599-601 (1889); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190,
194 (1888); Head Monet Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884);
Diggs v. Shultz, 470 .2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See
also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. l, 18 (1957).
~
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the approval of two-thirds of the United States Senate or a
majority of both houses of Congr_e·s s for it to be effective
\lllder our Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense
71/
Treaty of 1954.~ It is further ordered that the Secretary of
State and his subordinate officers are hereby enjoined from taking
any action to implement the President's notice of termination
unless and until that notice is so approved.

Judge

Date:

17

&.,

t'f 7 'I

71/ As previously indicated, nothing contained in the Taiwan

Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14, can be
construed as legislative approval of or acquiescence in
the President's notice of termination. See note 18 supra.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
v.

JA}1ES EARL CARTER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JAMES F. DAVEY, Cieri<

Civil Action
No. 78-2412

ORDER
Upon consideration of defendants' motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for summary judgment, and of plaintiffs' crossmotion for summary judgment, the memoranda in support thereof, the
oppositions thereto, the arguments of counsel in open Court, the
entire record herein, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's
-q::;--

memor andum of this same date, it is by the Court this

{,

day

of June, 1979,
ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss be, and hereby
is, granted; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment
be, and hereby is, denied; and it is further
ORDERED that this action be, and hereby is, dismissed.

Judge

/
F.11.;ED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
V.

JAMES EARL CARTER, ET AL.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUN

C1979

JAMES F. DAVEY,. Clerk

Civil Action
No. 78-2412

MEMORANDUM
This is a suit by eight members of the United States
Senate, a former senator, and sixteen members of the House of
Representatives seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
the notice given by defendant President Carter to the Republic
of China ("ROC" or "Taiwan") to terminate the 1954 Mutual Defense
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of
China.

Plaintiffs seek to have this Court declare that the

termination of the 1954 Treaty cannot be legally accomplished,
nor. can notice be given of intended termination, without the
advice and consent of the United States Senate or the approval of
both houses of Congress.
Plaintiffs contend that President Carter's unilateral
notice of termination violated their legislative right to be consulted and to vote on the termination and also impaired the effectiveness of prior votes approving the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.
They also claim that the President's action violated section 26
of the International Security Assistance Act of 1978.
Defendants have moved to dismiss or, in the alternative,
for summary judgment contending that this case is nonjusticiable
because it presents a political question, plaintiffs lack standing

.,
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to sue, and the President possesses constitutional authority
to give notice of the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty.
Plaintiffs have filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, asserting that the case is justiciable, plaintiffs have standing, and
the President is without legal authority to terminate treaties
without congressional participation.
I.

On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced that
the United States would, as of January 1, 1979, recognize the
Government of the People's Republic of China ("PRC") as the sole
1/
government of China.- The United States and the PRC agreed to
exchange ambassadors and to establish embassies.on March 1, 1979.
This represented a significant change in the relatjonship between
the two countries, because for almost thirty years after the estab- ,.
lishment of the PRC on mainland China in 1949, the United States
had no diplomatic ties or other regular relationship with it due
to the United States' continued recognition of the Nationalist
2/
Government on Taiwan as the sole legitimate government of China.-

On December 2, 1954, a Mutual Defense Treaty Between
the United States of America and the ROG was signed in Washington,
D.C.

The Senate gave its consent to ratification on February 9,

1955 and the treaty was ratified by President Eisenhower on
February 11, 1955. The treaty entered into force on March 3,
3/
1955.- The Mutual Defense Treaty obligates the United States,

17

See Declaration of Warren Christopher in Support of
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Summary Judgment, t 4.
For background information on the historical relationship
between the Unitert States and the PRC and events leading up
to the present diplomatic initiatives, see generally Scheffer,
The Law of Treat! Termination as Applieat"o United States
De-Recognition o the Republic of China, 19 Harv. Int'l L. J.

931 (1978).

6 U.S.T. 433, T.l.A.S. No. 3178.
-2-

upon joint agreement with the ROC and "in accordance with its
constitutional processes," to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores

4/

from an armed attack.-

Article X of the treaty contains a termi-

nation clause, which states that the treaty "shall remain in force
indefinitely," but continues:

"Either party may terminate it one

year after notice has been given to the other party."

The issue

posed by this lawsuit is thus not whether the United States has the
right to terminate the defense treaty, a right expressly guaranteed
by Article X, but the procedure by which that right of termination
should be accomplished.
During the past decade, initial steps towards normalizing relations between the United States and the PRC were
taken.

The PRC has always maintained that recog~ition of two

Chinas was unacceptable and that continuation of the Mutual Defense
Treaty with Taiwan was incompatible with normalization of relations ~;
with PRC.

On December 15, 1978, the leaders of the United States

and the PRC announced their agreement to establish diplomatic relations as of January 1, 1979.

On December 23, 1978, United States

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, at the direction of
the President, gave notice of termination of the Treaty to ROC
authorities on Taiwan.

According to this notice, the Mutual

Defense Treaty will terminate on January 1, 1980.
Perhaps anticipating this change in United States policy,
in the latter part of 1978 both houses of Congress passed the
International Security Assistance Act of 1978, which was signed
5/
by President Carter on September 26, 1978.- Section 26 of the
Act, popularly known as the Dole-Stone amendment, provides:

~/

Id. Art. V.

~/

Pub. L. No. 95-384, § 26, 92 Stat. 746 (1978).
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(a) The Congress finds that-(1) t
continued security and stability
of East Asia is a matter of major strategic interest
to the United States;
(2) the United States and the Republic of
China have for a Prriod of twenty-four years been
linked together by the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954;
(3) the Republic of China has during that
twenty-four-year period faithfully and continually
carried out its duties and obligations under that
treaty; and
(4) it is the responsibility of the Senate
to give its advice and consent to treaties entered into
by the United States.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that there
should be prior consultation between the Congress and
the executive branch on any proposed policy changes
affecting the continuation in force of the Mutual
Defense Treaty of 1954.
22 U.S.C.A.

§

2151 note (1979).

Defendants maintain that consul-

tations with members of both Houses occurred both prior and subsequent to the enactment of this act and that th~se consultations,
which concerned negotiations with the PRC generally and the necessity
for terminating the Mutual Defense Treaty, fully complied with the ~'
6/
intent of the Dole-Stone amendment.- For reasons subsequently set
forth, the Court does not reach the question whether the contacts
mentioned amount to consultation.
II.
The issue with which the Court is confronted is whether
the President has unilateral authority to terminate a mutual defense
treaty with a friendly nation which has not violated any of the
provisions of the treaty.

Reference to the historical precedents

since the beginnings of this nation discloses terminations of
7/
treaties in more than fifty instances.- Some have been terminated by

~/

See Declaration of Richard Holbrooke in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment,
~, 2-3.

21

See generally Resolution Concerning Mutual Defense Treaties:
Hearin son Sen. Res. 15 Before the Committee on Forei n Relations,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 157 1979
history of treaty terminations
by the United States prepared by the Dept. of State); Emerson,
The Le islative Role in Treat Abro ation, 5 J. Legis. 46, 526
1 78 ; Sche -er, supra note 2, at 979-985, 993, 995.
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legislative action; some have been terminated by the President
with the concurrence of both houses of Congress; some have been
terminated by the President with senatorial consent; and some
have been terminated by the President acting alone, but these
Presidential terminations have been in situations in which it
might be inferred that the Congress had no reason to question
Presidential action, such as the termination by President Coolidge
of the ~1exican Smuggling Treaty, which had been found to be completely ineffectual.

Based on the Court's consideration of

these historical precedents, the Court believes the power to
terminate treaties is a power shared by the political branches
of this government, namely, the President and the Congress.

In

this instance, however, ~ince the Congress has, not yet acted on
the question of treaty termination, a serious question arises concerning the standing of these congressional plaintiffs to seek a

.,

judicial injunction or declaration respecting the power of the
executive.

An increasing number of senators and congressmen have
invoked the jurisdiction of the courts to challenge executive

8/
actions and policies.-

Because of their political overtones,

these cases present difficult jurisdictional questions.

In a

numher of cases the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit has considered the interrelationship between
standing to sue and the political question doctrine and expressed

9/
its view that the standing issue should be resolved first.-

Thus,

8/

See, ~~. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, ~436 U.S. 907 (1978); ~1etcalf v. National Petroleum
Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Dole v. Carter, 444 F.
Supp. 1065 (D. Kan.), motion for injunction pending appeal
denied, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977).

2_/

Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n.14 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978); American Jewish Congress v.
Vance, 575 F.2d 939, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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,.

at the outset, the Court must consider whether plaintiffs have
standing to obtain a judicial declaration that the President lacks
authority unilaterally to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan.
A.

Standing.
There are no special standards to be employed in

analyzing congressional standing questions.
553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C . Cir. 1977).

Harrington v. Bush,

Like all plaintiffs, a legis-

lator must show that he has suffered an injury in fact; that the
interests he asserts are within the zone protected by the statute
or constitutional provision in question; that the injury resulted
from the challenged illegal action of defendants; and that the
injury be capable of being redressed by a decision in his favor.
Id. at 205 n.68.
Perhaps the most important decision concerning congressional standing is Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir.
1974).

In that case the Court found that Senator Kennedy had stand-

ing to seek a declaratory judgment that a bill for which he had
voted had become law despite a presidential pocket veto.

The Court

held that to the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so too
is the power of each congressman, because his office confers the
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of the institution.

Id. at 435-36; see Trible v. Brown, No. 79-1229 (4th Cir.

Apr. 26, 1979) (oral opinion) .
Plaintiffs Thurmond and Curtis, who voted to ratify the
1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, rely on Kennedy to support their claim
that the President's action impaired the effectiveness of their
prior votes approving the treaty.
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In considering the analogous
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claim of legislators who alleged that they had an interest in
ensuring enforcement of laws for which they voted, however, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
once a bill has become law the legislators' interests are indistinguishable from those of any citizen and legislators "cannot claim
dilution of their legislative voting power because the legislation
they favored became law."

Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455,

459 (4th Cir. 1975).
All plaintiffs with the exception of former Senator Curtis
claim that the unilateral notice of termination impaired their legislative right to be consulted and to vote on treaty termination.
Several courts have suggested that the availability of alternative
political remedies to redress executive action, .such as impeachment,
denial of funds, or a vote on pending legislation, is evidence
that there has been no injury in fact to congressional rights or
10/
For example, in Public Citizen v. Sampson, 379 F. Supp.
powers.
662 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 515 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1975); a
group of congressmen sued to overturn an agency regulation granting inventors exclusive rights to patents developed under federal
research contracts.

This regulation was promulgated by the General

Services Administration ("GSA") without congressional approval,
and the congressmen claimed that it infringed on their right
to participate in the disposal of government-owned property.
The Court found no injury in fact and denied standing because
promulgation of the regulation could not deprive Congress of
its uncontested right to dispose of government property by
limiting the contractual powers of the GSA.

379 F. Supp. at

666-67.

10/

See, ~ . Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th
Cir. 1975); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 407 F. Supp.
257, 260 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 553 F.2d 176
(D.C. Cir. 1977).
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The availability of alternative means to remedy an
allegedly unconstitutional action was recently considered in
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 598 (1978).

In that case a congressman sought declaratory

and injunctive relief from the allegedly unconstitutional composition of the Federal Open Market Committee ("FOMC") of the
Federal Reserve System.

In rejecting the theory of legislator

standing advanced by plaintiff, the Court noted that the congressman was not without the means of challenging the allegedly unconstitutional composition of the FOMC because he could introduce a
bill requiring all FOMC members to be presidential appointees.
Id. at 468.

The Court stated:

"This circumstance, while cer-

tainly not fatal to [plaintiff's] standing clai.m, does illustrate
that his actual controversy lies, or may lie, with his fellow
legislators; no supposed impairment of his legislative functions
is due, in any part, to the actions or omissions of the named
defendants."

Id.

This analysis of congressional standing is based on a
consideration of prudential and functional concerns, similar to
those described by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.

186 (1962), the leading statement of the political question doctine that reflects the deference to be accorded a coordinate

11/
branch of government under our system of separation of powers.~
A suit such as this by a group of individual legislators seeking to vindicate derivative constitutional rights bypasses the
political arena which shou]d be the primary and usual forum in
12/
which such views are expressed.~

11/

See Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 Yale
L.J. 597 (1976).

12/

See Note, Congressional Access to Federal Courts, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 1632, 1649 (1977).
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At least three resolutions dealing with the treaty
termination power and the notice of termination given with
respect to the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty are presently pending
13/
before the United States Senate.
If .the Senate as a whole were
to take action approving the termination of the Mutual Defense
Treaty, the issues raised by this suit would be moot because the
14/
President's action would no longer be unilateral.~ If the Senate
or the Congress rejected the President's notice of termination
or asserted a right to participate in the treaty termination
process, the Court would be confronted by a clash of the political
branches in a posture suitable for judicial review.
The situation then would be comparable to that presented
in Kennedy v. Sampson, in which congressional power had been exercised ~nd was about to be frustrated by a pocket veto.

Here, however,

13/

Senate Resolution 10, which was introduced by Senator Dole on
,
January 15, 1979, and referred to the Foreign Relations Committee, resolves:
"That the Senate disapproves of the action
of the President of the United States in sending notice of
termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of
China." 125 Cong. Rec. S209 (Jan. 15, 1979). Senate Resolution 15, which was introduced by Senator Harry F. Byrd, states:
"That it is the sense of the Senate that approval of the
United States Senate is required to terminate any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and another nation." Id. S220
(Jan. 18, 1979). Hearings on this resolution were conducted
before the Committee on Foreign Relations on April 9-11 and a
report was issued on May 7, 1979.
S. Rep. No. 96-119, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
Senate Concurrent Resolution 2, which
is subtitled "To uphold the separation of powers between the
executive and legislative branches of Government in the termination of treaties," was introduced by Senator Goldwater and
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.
125 Cong. Rec.
S219 (Jan. 15, 1979).

14/

On April 10, 1979 the President signed the Taiwan Relations
Act, which addresses major aspects of United States-Taiwan
relations and contains a security assurance expressing continued United States concern in the absence of the Mutual
Defense Treaty.
Pub. L. No. 96-8, § 2(b) (Apr. 10, 1979).
Defendants suggest that this Act can be interpreted as legislative ratification of the notice of termination. During debate
on the proposed legislation, however, several members of the
Foreign Relations Committee, including the majority and
minority floor managers of the bill, stated that nothing in
the bill constituted a determination of the legal and constitutional issue raised by the President's notice of termination.
See 125 Cong. Rec. S2124, S2126, S2130, S2134, S2151 (March 7,
1979) (statements of Senators Javits, Glenn, Baker, Hayakawa,
Helms, and Stone).

-9-
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plaintiffs have not established the necessary injury required for
standing.

Either the Senate or the Congress as a whole still

can utilize thP. legislative process to assert its right and demonstrate that it possesses a shared power with the President to act
in terminating a treaty.

Although the Court is inclined to agree

with plaintiffs' assertion that the power to terminate the 1954
Mutual Defense Treaty is a shared power to be exercised by the
action of both political branches, at the present time there is no
indication that the Congress as a whole intends to assert its prerogative to act.

Under these circumstances, the President's notice

of termination does not constitute injury.

In the absence of any

injury to the institution as a whole, the individual legislators
here cannot claim a derivative injury.
B.

Cause of Action Under Pub. L. No. 95-384.
Plaintiffs also have alleged that the statutory rights
;

conferred by section 26 of the International Security Assistance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, have been violated because there
was no prior consultation between the Congress and the executive
branch prior to the notice of termination of the Mutual Defense
Treaty.

Defendants dispute this factual allegation and have sub-

mitted an affidavit detailing the consultation that occurred after
15/
enactment.
The final language of the Dole-Stone amendment is
16/
general and nonmandatory in nature.
This was substituted for
the apparently mandatory language originally proposed by Senators
17/
Dole and Stone.~ Because section 26 apparently does not set forth

15/

Declaration of Richard Holbrooke in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment;
see Defendants' Answer to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 7.

16/

"It is the sense of the Senate that there should be prior consultation between the Congress and the executive branch on any
proposed policy changes affecting the continuation in force of
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954." 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151 note
(1979).

1]__/

The consultation language proposed by Senators Dole and Stone
stated:
"It is the sense of the Senate that any proposed policy
(footnote continued on page 11)
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a mandatory or binding duty to consult and because the Court
could not effectively resolve the question of how much consulta18/
tion would meet its terms if it were binding,~ plaintiffs, in
alleging injury under this section, have failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted.
CONCLUSION
Our Constitution provides for a government of checks
and balances.

Legislative power is vested in the Congress.

Among

other powers the President is the "sole organ of the federal govern19/
ment in the field of international relations."~ In Article II,
section 3 he is charged with the responsibility of faithfully
executing the laws which under Article VI specifically include
treaties.
The Court believes that the extraordinary remedy of
injunction or the related power of a declaration should be exercised sparingly and only when the legislative branch has been
given the opportunity of acting.

At least three resolutions are

presently pending in the Senate.

For these reasons the Court

~

believes that the resolution of the ultimate issue in this case
should in the first instance be in the legislative forum.

If

the Congress approves the President's action, the issue presently
before the Court would be moot.

If the Senate or the Congress takes

action, the result of which falls short of approving the President's
changes affecting the continuation in force of the United StatesRepublic of China Mutual Defense Treaty shall be a matter for
prior consultation with the Senate." See 124 Cong. Rec. Sll727
(July 25 1978),
I

18/

See Greater Tamna Chamber of Commerce v. Adams, C.A. No. 780517, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. Nov. 29, 1978), appeal docketed,
No. 79-1123 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1978).

1:2_/

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936).
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termination effort, then the controversy will be ripe for a
judicial declaration respecting the President's authority to
act unilaterally.

Until then, the complaint is dismissed without

prejudice.

Judge

Date:

!• .

•
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
;

December 7, 1979 Conference
No. 79-856
GOLDWATER
v.

CARTER

The SG has filed a response which, on the merits, basically
repeats the arguments used by the majroty opinion below.

Like CADC,

the SG argues that this case involves only a particular treaty and
will

have

terminate

no
is

effect
1 inked

on
to

other
the

treaty

Presdent' s

obligations.
power

to

The

recognize

power
POC

to
and

2.

derecognize ROC.
is

no

reason

The treaty contains a termination clause and there
to

believe

that

the

congressional assent to termination.

Congress

meant

to

require

This treaty involves the use of

the President's power as Commander-In-Chief.
Further,
limited

as

the

the

grant

grant

President may need

to

of

powers

Congress.

In

the

President

some

The Supremacy Clause governs

domestic

law,

not

circumstances,

the

ef feet

of the

the existence or termination of a

historical matter,

is

as
the

to move quickly to extricate the nation from a

treaty.

not

to

the President has

sometimes

treaty on

treaty.

terminated

a

As an
treaty

alone, and the Congress has never overridden the President's decision
to terminate.
The

SG

also

Chief Judge Wright
presents

a

manageable
example,
petrs

restates

and Judge Tamm.

political
standards

there

prevail,

the

question
by

which

is no way for
both

Houses

standing

ground

And

SG contends

the

because
a

court

relied

there

are

could

grant

no

this

approve

termination,

by

case

judicially
relief.

this Court to decide whether,
need

upon

or

For

if the
whether

Senate approval alone is sufficient.
Also, the SG discusses the mootness point. Unless notice is
withdrawn,

the

treaty

will

terminate

on

January

1.

Under

international law, that termination will be irrevocable regardless of
any subsequent judicial holding.
I

continue

to believe

that cert should

be denied but,

if

cert were to be granted, the case is nonjusticiable absent a direct
congressional challenge to the President.

~-

SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
December 7, 1979 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
SG's Response and Further
Discussion of DC's Opinion

No. 79-856
GOLDWATER

v.
CARTER
The SG filed a response at 4:30 p.m. today, December 6.
DC'S OPINION:

Although the earlier memorandum on this subject

referred to the DC's opinion and legislative history, the following
;

add~tional comments are provided.
The DC (D.C.) (Gash) originally dism~ssed petrs' suit for declaratory and injunctive relief.

At the time of Judge Gash's opinion,

June 6, 1979, at least three resolution~ _dealing with the treaty
termination power were pending in the Senate.

If the Senate as a

whole took action approving the Treaty, the suit would be moot because
the President's action would no longer be unilateral.

And if the

-

2 -

Senate or Congress rejected the President's notice, the DC would
then be confronted by a clash of the political branches in a posture
suitable for judicial review.

The DC also observed "[i]f the Senate

or the Congress takes action, the result of which falls short of
approving the President's termination effort, then the controversy
will be ripe for a judicial declaration.

II

Accordingly, the

DC dismissed without prejudice.
Within hours of the DC's original ruling, the Senate voted
53 to 35 to adopt Sen. Byrd's amendment containing language identical
to Sen. Res. 15 which Sen. Byrd had introduced Jan. 18, 1979 as a
substitute for the substitute amendment proposed by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.

The language adopted read:

That it is the sense of the Senate that
approval of the United States Senate is
required to terminate any mutual defense
treaty between the United States and another
nation.
The important thing to note is that Sen. Res. 15 as amended by
Sen. Byrd's language was returned to the Senate calendar without
further action.

Thus, all the Senate did was adopt the above

quoted language as the language of the amendment.

It did not vote

on the amendment, and there was thus no final action.
Petrs went back to DC and on Oct. 17, the DC found that petrs
had standing.

It recognized that Senate action was not decisive.

But by adopting Byrd's language (quoted above) the Senate rejecteg

' · proposed by the Foreign Relations Committee
the amendment language
which would have approved the President's termination of the Treaty.
Therefore, the DC was of the view that there was evidence of at
I

(

least some congressional determination to participate in the process,
and its action "falls short of approving the President's termination
effort."

The DC also observed that Congress gave no indication that

it disapproves of the individual suits, and there appears to be no
action presently planned with which a judicial declaration would
interfere.

The DC concluded that with the President's unilateral

action, the matter became less amendable to congressional control.
In the context of "relative congressional inaction" the DC found
standing since

there is no apparent risk of circumventing

or evading the legislative process.

The DC

held that petrs

suffered injury in fact to their legislative right to be consulted
and to vote on the termination.
SG'S VIEWS:

The SG believes petrs lack standing and their com-

plaint. presents a nonjusticiable political question.

Further, the

CA's decision is correct and further review is not warranted.

The

CA rendered a narrow decision dealing only with "this treaty in the
circumstances before us now."

No sweeping constitutional rule is

involved, and the CA did not finally settle an important constitutional
question of extensive significance.
The SG states that the termination remains outstanding, and unless
withdrawn before January 1, 1980, the treaty will terminate that date.
Assuming arguendo that injunctive relief is available the Court would
have to act by January 1.

Otherwise, the treaty will terminate on; that
~

date, and under international law that termination will be irrevocable,
regardless of any subsequent judicial holding that the United States'
internal procedures for arriving at the decision to terminate were
defi~~ent.
1.
denied.

The SG agrees that the case wil be moot on January 1.

There are two jurisdictional gounds on which cert should be
Petrs lack standing and their complant presents a nonjus-

ticiable political question.

,:

The SG states that the concurring opinion by Wright and Tamm
properly concludes that individual members of congress, acting
without institutional support or authority, lack standing.

The

majority of CA judges found that legislators had standing to litigate
the question because the President's action impaired their interest
in voting on the treaty termination question in the moot effective
fashion.

The SG observes that:

The President has not deprived petitioners of an
opportunity to vote on the termination question. They
have always been free to introduce whatever bills and
resolutions they deem appropriate.
Indeed, several
such resolutions were introduced. The fact that none
of them ever came to a final vote is attributable to the
actions of other Senators and not to the conduct of the
President.
The cour.ts do not manage the Senate's calendar and so there is
no personal right to cast a vote regardless of whether the institution wants

to consider the matter. ·

Relying on Baker v. Carr, the SG states that this issue is a
nonjusticiable political question.

There are not judicially managable

Constitutional standards by which a court could grant the required
relief.

The Constitution does not suggest whether both Houses or just
what
the Senate must act. And if just the Senate then by/majority1 Likewise there are no standards by which courts can distingish between
~

treaties based on their substance or importance.

Courts would

windpp in the middle of foreign policy disputes between the Executive
and the Legislative.
The questions involved call for single-voiced statements of the

Govern~ea~: views.

Continued normal relations with the People's

Republic depends on termination of this treaty.

--

Congress has ample means to assert and implement its view on ·
treaty terminatlo~

In view of nearly 200 years of successful accomo-

dation and compromise between the political branches regarding treaty
termination, the courts should decline to designate a single constitutional method that must be employed in all circumstances.

Such

judicial intervention would eleminate the felxibility intended by
the framers and detract from the efficient and effective conduct of
American foreign policy.
2.

In light of the close relationship in this case between the

treaty termination and the transfer of diplomatic recognition, the
CA correctly concluded that the President did not exceed his powers by
giving notice~termination without congressional consent.

Recognition

of the People's Republic was a political executive act and no congressional action can reverse the President~

determination that our former

treaty partner is no longer a government w. ithwhich the U.S. will maintain formal foreign relations.
There are unquestionably some circumstances in which the President
has constit±onal responsibility to determine whether treaties remain
effective.

-fl.c.

Thus, CA correctly concluded that court~ · can not make

distinctions between which treaties fall within that class.
Article X's termination provision creates a treaty right which is
an international act to be done by the President.

In the absence of
'"Mt.. ?a~,dt,,,,,fsome indication to the contrary the normal inference is that·
may
II

exercise any treaty right of the U.S., including termination,
\.

without revertine to the Senate .

.£ee, Restatement (2d) of the

Foreign Relations Law of The U.S., §163 ( 1965).

6 -

There is no evidence in this case that Congress intended any different. ·

And Congress had taken no definitive action with~ respect

to the termination of this Treaty.
The SG argues that this Treaty implicates the President's power
as Commander- in-Chief.

The President is empowered to terminate the

Treaty because only he is empowered to implement it through the exercis
of his discretionary authority.

Certainly no court could order the

President to send troops to defend Taiwan.
3.

The structure of the Constitution and its allocation of

power to the President in the area of foreign affairs confirms in
more general terms the correctness of the CA's decision,

~(

\

.

*SG's brief in opposition, pp. 14 - 20

Discussion:

(
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There is a response.

*

/tM'Yv~/o~~
~
/ ~~S?
k_,,

lu,

f

<-p-1 -1".J t't. ~~.

tM-4~ £a ~ C£,v/-k ~ 'i)ec 7 a.;
6V

/Jtrlr"- ~~

G1--.? ~ .
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1.

Motion to Expedite Consideration and for other Relief

2.

Cert to CA DC
( en bane, p. c. )

No. 79-856

(

GOLDWATER

v.
CARTER
CA'S OPINION (continued):

Federal/Civil

Timely

The en bane opinion noted that Judge

MacKinnon's position (consent required by both Houses) also requires
reversal of the DC; hence, the DC's approval of Senate advice ~rrd
consent as sufficient is reversed without dissent.
Chief Judge Wright, joined by Tamm, concurred in the result but
filed an opinion which stated that because petrs lack standing no
\

other issue need be reached.

Petrs must show that the challenged

Executive action has nullified a vote already taken by preventing it
from ever taking its intended legal effect.

Where a legislator

all eges Executive impairment of the effectiveness of his vote, his

-

2 -

injury can only be derivative.

Congress (or a member ) suffers no

injury unless the Executive has thwarted its will; and there is no
such will to thwart unless a majority of Congress has spoken
unequivocally.

In this case neither House has ever taken final

action to voice disapproval of the termination of the Treaty.
Congress as a body has chosen not to confront the President directly
(see pp. 38A to 42A of Appendix for legislative history).

Denied

that confrontation by political reality, petrs seek judicial relief.
Petrs' apparent political inability to "exhaust" their legislative
remedies

rebut their claim of a judicially cognizable injur~

Judge Wright went on to state :
The majority opinion attempts to circumv~nt the
requirement of final action by asserting that since
the President never formally submitted the treaty
termination to Congress, he has already dealt them a
distinct injury--depriving them of their vote within
the prescribed constitutional scheme. There may well
be, as the majority opinion suggests , practical
political differences betw\,:!en voting on a treaty termination submitted by the President and initiating an
independent resolution within Congress. The very
point, however, is that those differences are political,
not legal. Moreover, the specific mode by which the
President and Congress interact is a political question in which the courts have no say.
Se~ Holtzman v.
Schlesihger, supra note 3, 484 F.2d at 1309; Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971).
The issue of whether or in what manner Congress anq the President
share the power to terminate treaties has been dealt with by these
branches for 200 years without the help or need of courts.

Whether

or not the historical record supports either party's constitutional
arguments, it does how that Congress can participate directly in
treaty termination when
'-

1

it wants to.

In view of all that Congress

has done over the years (Appendix, pp. 44A-45A) it can pass a reso-

-

3 -

lution objecting to termination of a treaty if it wishes to do so.
A president is likely to pay heed to such disapproval, in which
event no court need intervene.11
Judge MacKinnon agreed that petrs had standing.

However, he

dissented because he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
the Constitution confers absolute power on the President, acting
alone, to terminate a Mutual Defense Treaty.

No prior President

has ever claimed the absolute power to terminate such a treaty.
And the majority's advance attempts to minimize its harmful effects
for the future is accomplished by stating that the opinion is narrow,
and could not necessarily be relied upon to confer the same absolute
power to terminate the NATG Treaty which has a similar termination
provision.
Under the "necessary and proper clause",

"which the majority

avoids like the plague," power is conferred upon the Congress to
pass a law to term i nate treaties.

Since the Constitution makes

treaties along with other laws the "Law of the Land," a treaty is
to be terminated in the same manner as any other ''law"--by formal
l/In note 25 (p. 45A of Appendix) Judge Wright states:
As the majority concedes, the heart of its reasoning is that even
if Congress does take a final vote disapproving treaty termination, the
President might well ignore it and persist in carrying out the termina~
tion~ Thus, the majority asserts, the appellees' injury is already
manifest.
Even if the President does now take such a stand, the prospective
of this 200-year-old, continuing political controversy suggests that we
view - that stand as a bargaining position which cannot confer standing
where it would not otherwise exist.
Since there has been no definitive
congressional vote disapproving termination, a large enough number of
congressmen may well agree with the President's view of the constitutional issue as to prevent any legal controversy.
Similarly, no matter
how resolute the President's position appears, we cannot know if he would
maintain it in the face of an unequivocal vote of disapproval by Congress.
Thus we see how the standing issue in this case may be cast as a
ripeness issue. The President's alleged position may portend a true
legal controversy, but it remains part of a chain of contingency too
attenuated to confer standing. Compare Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967).

-

4 -

act of Congress approved by the President .

Judge MacKinnon's

opinion appears in the Appendix on pages 47A to 106A, and contains
a detailed review of historical precedent .

He finds that of the

54 treaties the U.S. has terminated , 52 were with the concurrence
of Congress.

II

[T]here were only two minor treaties in which the

President could be said to have acted alone since 1788."

And all of

the 13 instances relied upon by the President 'were of such minor
impact , or so non-controversial and widely approved that no person
would have suspected that such instances would later be claimed as
precedents to support.

." an absolute Presidential power.

PETRS ' REASONS FOR GRANTING CERT:

Petrs contend that the CA

has decided an important question of constitutional law which has
not , but should be , settled by this Court.

A termination clause

2/
similar to the one in this treaty appears in nine major treaties . Petrs contend that dicta in two opinions of this Court suggest
that the power of treaty termination is shared : in Amiable Isabella
6 Wheat.

(19 U.S.) 1 (1821), the Court said:

[T]he obligations of the treaty could not be
changed or varied but by the same formalities with
which they were introduced; or at least by some act
of as high an import, and of as unequivocal an authority.
Id. at 75.
And in Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), the Court quoted
Judge Cardozo in Techt

v.

Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 192 (1920), cert

den. , 2 5 4 U.S. 6 4 3 ( 19 2 0) :
'- .

[T]he President and senate may denounce the treaty,
and thus terminate its life. Congress may enact an
inconsistent rule, which will control the action of the
courts.
Id. at 509.
~/Mutual Defense Treaties:
NATO, Japan, Philippines, Korea.
And national defense: Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Outer Space Treaty.
(Citations on p. 11 of the cert petn).

-

5 -

Petrs also contend that the CA's decision expands the President's
foreign affairs power on an unprecedented scale .

Petrs believe the

CA's 10 reasons are wrong, and it attacks each of them in equivalently

3/
nwnbered paragraphs :1.

.

There is no real analogy between the treaty power and the

fijCaJJ.CR.
£
·rt

appointment power .
2.

Au,Jw:r,~
aJ,h?y
I; + a £ ~ hko/le ~~--t,tu
-J.rr. /
I)"

, ,.. ne. UL+IJIIM

;eMd'Ve

~ ,-,ncltUJ.

The mere fact that this case does not involve a conflict

with state law does not prevent the use of the Supremacy Clause in
the constitutional construction necessary to the resolution of th~
,.{1,tuw..11, it. ('~ l,d&
a.rd tlJ telolt.Je
question presented in this cas e;.
£,t'lu,u,u. ~!d.W t-

6.e.uc,

t-e.-tt"-a,,

Lcmft;J-

3.

The founding fathers were just as concerned about entering

_;{so

entangling alliances as ending the:Z.
4.

~

/J1b~t4

/d"J turrD11l''i de.rtf

L,ct.&J/J k, U4li) f;j(,IJ.J /lew.

The CA attempts an unprecedented feat of construction by

transforming the sparse executive powers of Article II into a power
to end treaties .

The underlying question is whether Article II

delegates all executive power to the President unless there is a
specific restriction in the Constitution or whether Article II shall
be construed as delegating to the President only such powers as ,are
.,.
consistent with the checks and balances of the Constitution as a
whole .
Sheet

The CA's rationale is clearly in conflict with Youngstown
&

Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which rejected a

similar argwnent (that executive power in Article II is plenary
unless expressly limited in the Constitution).

The CA's theory in

'-.

this case of aggregate powers was rejected .
5.

While the President may have primary responsibility for

treaty making in certain areas Congress has always had competence
3/The CA's views are not repeated.
memo on pp . 5-8.

They appear in the first

-

6 -

in repeal of the law of the land.

Cf., Reisman

&

McDougal , "Who Can

Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?" , The National Law Journal
28, and July 23 , 1979 )t
6.

J&.t.<1J.t41.. ct ~t..4 is ftp

ltMcJ ~~I~, 'tfs

[mul· ~//&W ~'hH" (J.lt;,u..

(May 21 ,

feA,.,,,,.tJ.nPi

Just because it might be useful for the President to be

able to take immediate action and terminate a treaty does not make
it constitutional .

"The peculiar circumstances of the moment may

render a measure more or less wise, but cannot render it more or
less constitutional ."

John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v.

Maryland at 190-91 (G. Gunther ed . 1969 ).

And in all events congres-

sional involvement need not prevent immediate action .
7.

Petrs think Judge MacKinnon properly evaluated the

historical evidence about how treaties should be terminated .
8.

The court could easily lay down a rule that some form of

congressional concurrence is required.
made on the facts of this
9.

And a distinction could be

, ~c~

cas)..

ftz

Mt:_Jo1,..

lih c(~ 71e.,ily

tM.

f_!J' eMUISJrk ~ f t , ~ &,J,;;;t~ e.uJ'd.

Recognition of the People ' s Republic does nnot give the

President the power to terminate the Treaty .

iy,JeeJ;..}

Th e President deemed
,,; /9?
the Treaty in continuing effec ,
espite his recognition of the ~

People's Republic~jnco
00011

ne decLaea

te tok~i~sto

~~e

~

~rcaty by i~s

LeYm~ .

(10)

Just because the Treaty has a termination clause (l ike

most other U.S.
terminate .

treaties ) the President does not have power t o

The President ' s action is contrary to congressional

intent (in view of the Dole-Stone Amendment calling for prior consultation before termination of this Treaty , the Taiwan Relations
Act preserving all treaties with Taiwan , and the Senate vote on the
Byrd substitute amendment ).

A~

/'tf'lf e;r,J'

-
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The absence of a provision in the Treaty reserving a role for
Congress is not significant since it was generally understood from
past practice that termination of treaties , including those with
termination clauses , require action by the Senate or Congress .
The absence of a provision for treaty termination in the
Constitution does not mean the "power consequently devolves upon
the President'' as the CA would have it .

What Youngstown Sheet

&

Tube teaches is that the President is not presumed to have the power
to act .

His power ".

. if any , .

.must stem either from an act of

Congress or from the Constitution itself ."
DISCUSSION :

343 U.S . at 585 .

There is an interesting procedural aspect.

The

CA ' s mandate has not yet issued and apparently will not issue until
this Court acts on the cert petn.
Nov. 30.

The CA ' s judgment was entered

Rule 41 , F.R.A.P., provides that mandate shall issue 21

days after the entry of judgment unless the time is shortened or
enlarged by order .

At my request , the Clerk ' s office spoke with the

clerk ' s office at CA DC .

They advise that mandate has not issued ,

no special order has bee n entered , and it is their practice t o
withhold issuance of mandate pending review on cert by this Court
where,as here , a party seeks cert in the 21 days.

I am not sure

what import the Court wil l . assign to this .
Should the Court be prepared to deny cert , the case shoul d be
expedited and cert denied at this Conference . ! /
'\

If the Court believes the case is certworthy , the first question
is whether or not to grant petr s' motion to expedite an d for othe r
4/If the SG has filed a response t o the cert petn , the Court
could-deny petrs ' motion t o expedite and fo r other relief .
If the
SG has not file d a response , t h e Court woul d have t o grant petr s'
motion to shorten the time fo r response t o De c. 7, but could deny
petrs ' motion in all other respects .

-

8 -

relief, and as requested decide the case by Dec. 31.

I doubt it

would be productive for me to speculate on the answer to this question
or suggest what result the Court should reach on the merits .
There is no response .

~/
Marsel

12/5/79

CA & DC ops .

in
temporary appendix

PJC

\

-

5/If time allows , a second supplemental memo will be circulated
when the SG files a response .

December 7, 1979 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
1.

Motion to Expedite Consideration and for other Relief.

2.

Cert to CA DC
1/
(en bane, per curiam-)

No. 79-856
GOLDWATER [Senator]
v.
CARTER [President]
SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Petrs ask the Court to expedite their cert petn which

was filed Dec. 3, and review the CA DC's en bane per curiam opinion
~

which reversed the DC's (D.C.) (Gash) opinion, and held that the
Executive possesses the constitutional power to terminate the Mutual
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China (6 U.S.T. 433) without
Legislative approval.
CONTENTIONS:

According to the U.S. 's

notice of termination, the

Mutual Defense Treaty will be terminated on Jan. 1, 1980.

Petrs state

that if this Court does not dispose of this case by Dec. 31, the
matter will be moot and the constitutional powers of the Congress will
be irrevocably usurped.

In order for the Court to decide the case

1/Wright, joined by Tamm, filed an opinion concurring in the
result; MacKinnon filed an opinion dissenting in part and concurring
in part.

-

2 -

before Jan. 1, petrs propose that the resp's time to file an opposition
be shortened to Dec. 6 so the Court can act on the petn by Dec. 7.

If

the petn is granted, petrs propose that the Court dispense with an
Appendix (Rule 36) and hear the case on the original record.

Petrs also

propose an expedited briefing scheduleI/ and oral argument on Dec. 19.
On cert, petrs contend that the President does not have the absolute power under the Constitution to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty
with the Republic of China without any form of approval by the Legislative Branch.
FACTS:

(Petrs' claims on cert are discussed below.)
The Mutual Defense Treaty was signed by representatives of

the U.S. and the Republic of China (ROC) on Dec. 2, 1954.

It was

approved by the Senate and signed by the President on Feb. 11, 1955.
Article V provided that in the event of an attack on Taiwan, the
,..

Pescadores, or U.S. territories in the Western Pacific, each nation

(

"would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

Article X provides that the Treaty would remain

in force ''indefinitely" but "either Party may terminate it one year after
notice has been given to the other Party."

On Dec. 15, 1978, Pres ..,

Carter announced that on Jan. 1, 1979, the U.S. would recognize the
People's Republic of China (PRC) as the sole government of China, would
withdraw recognition for the ROC, and terminate the Mutual Defense
Treaty in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty.

On Dec. 23,

1978, the State Dept. formally notified the ROC that the Treaty would
terminate Jan. 1, 1980.

...

'

2/Cross briefs filed Dec. 13, optional reply briefs filed Dec. 17.
Alternatively, petrs state that they are prepared to have the case
heard on the briefs and papers filed in the CA. Petrs also ask that
Rule 39(1) be temporarily suspended to allow filing of 20 copies of a
temporary appendix which will be replaced with 40 copies that comply
with Rule 39 as soon as they are printed.

- - - - - - - .<
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The DC found that petrs had standing in their

capacity as individual legislators to seek a judicial declaration
with respect to the President's unilateral termination of the Treaty,
since they claimed an injury to their legislative right to be consulted and vote on treaty termination.

The DC also found that the

case did not present a non-justiciable political question.

The DC

concluded that the President's notice of termination must receive
the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both Houses
of Congress for it to be constitutionally effective.

The DC therefore

enjoined the Sec. of State from implementing the President's notice
of termination until the notice is approved.
The CA reversed.

It agreed that petrs have standing.

The CA

stated that if there is merit in the Senators' theory that they have
(-

a constitutional right to vote on the President's proposed treaty
termintion (and block it with a one-third plus one vote) then such
Senators have suffered injury in fact from the President's action
terminating the Treaty without Senate consent.

This Presidential

action has deprived the Senate of what petrs claim is their constitutionally prescribed right to vote on the treaty termination.

Petrs
;

allege an objective constitutional right to vote, and allege dis~
enfranchisement in the context of a specific matter.

The CA was of

the view that the question was whether the President's action amounts
to complete disenfranchisement, or whether petrs have left any legislative means to block the termination of the Treaty despite the
President's action.

The CA was of the view that on the record before

it, there is no conceivable senatorial action that could likely
prevent termination of the Treaty.

A congressional resolution or

-

4 -

statute might at most have persuasive effect.

It could not block

termination if the President persisted in his present interpretation
that the Constitution gave him unilateral power.

Petrs claim that

they have a right to block termination with one-third plus one of
their colleagues.

Such a minority cannot obtain a remedy, and even

a majority would be unable to achieve a remedy.

The only way the

Senate can effectively vote on treaty termination, with the burden
on termination proponents to secure a two-thirds majority, is for
the President to submit the proposed termination to the Senate as
he would a proposed treaty.

Since this is the remedy petrs seek,

the CA was of the view that requiring some other legislative acti~n
before allowing standing to pursue this claim would be to require

3/

a useless act.-

(

The CA therefore reached the merits and at the beginning of
its opinion it observed that the Treaty contained a provision
for termination by either Party on one year's notice.

In the

course of giving consent, the Senate exhibited no purpose and took
no action to reserve a role for itself in effectuation of this provision.

Neither has the Senate, since the giving of the notice of

termination, purported to take any final or dispositive action with
respect to it either by way of approval or disapproval.

The constitu-

tional issue is therefore whether the President, in these precise
circumstances, is empowered to terminate the Treaty in accordance
with its terms.

The CA concluded that he is, and the limitations.

which the DC purported to place on his actions have no constitutional
foundation.

The CA listed 10 reasons why it concluded that the

3/The CA outlined extensive background information in pages
3 to 9 of its opinion (Appendix pp. 4A to lOA).

-
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President's termination is effective without legislative action.
The CA stated that its conclusion rested on the totality of the
10 factors discussed; no hierarchical value is assigned, and no one
factor or combination of factors is is determinative.
1.

Article II, §2, provides that the President cannot enter

into a treaty without consent of the Senate.

But the CA felt it

did not follow as a matter of language alone that the inference

(co.,et /VI

is inescapable that the President must in all circumstances seek 1..:>'4ttL o...
the same senatorial consent to terminate a treaty.

r,t,1S~

Cf. Myers

V.

~ppotMtd

w!tt.. t!,.
---------------r1d>1(e.

United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); In Re Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).

Expansion of the language of CDl,($wt'
·J

· the Constitution by sequential linguistic projection is a tricky
business at best.

'IL

1w.di

The CA observed that " [ a] s the Supreme Court has

!Mee

):ove}

recognized with respect to the clause in question, it is not abstract ".!J,lt.J
logic or sterile symmetry that controls, but a sensible and

f.tu,

"JiM)

realistic ascertainment of the meaning of the Constitution in the
\

context of the specific action taken."
2.

The DC suggested an alternative theory.

To wit, the

necessary authority to terminate the Treaty in this instance may
be granted by a majority of each house of Congress, presumably
under Article VI, which holds that the laws of the U.S., and all
treaties,shall be the supreme law of the land.

The CA was of the

view that the Constitution is silent on the matter of treaty termina~
tion, and the Supremacy Clause speaks to the common characteristic
of the supremacy of the Constitution, federal law, and treaties over
state law.
I

It does not provide any basis for concluding that a

•

treaty must be unmade either by the same process by which it was
made or the alternative means by which a statute is made or terminated.

-----·---·------------~--,-...--...-----"""
."

.-

-
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The constitutional requirement of advice and consent of

the Senate is an extraordinary condition on the exercise of
Presidential powers, and is not extended absent an unmistakably
clear implication.
sound.

The DC's extension of this limitation is not

Making or amending a treaty involves entangling alliances.

A constitutional provision dealing with this special occurrence
does not necessarily apply to its termination in accordance with its
terms.
4.

Foreign affairs powers proceed directly from the sovereignty

of the Union and the President is the constitutional representative
of the U.S. with respect to external affairs.
The Constitution confers no specific power to terminate treaties
on either Congress or the Executive, but the powers conferred on
Congress are detailed; those of the President are generalized,and
bespeak no such limitation on foreign affairs powers.

The President

is the constitutional representative of the U.S. with respect to
external affairs and the treaty power appears in Article II, relating ·
to the Executive Branch.
It would take an unprecedented feat of judicial construction
to read into the Constitution an absolute condition precedent of
congressional or Senate approval for termination of all treaties,
similar to the specific one relating to initial approval.

And it

would unalterably affect the balance of power between the two Branches
laid down in Articles I and II.
5.

Ultimately, what must be recognized is that a treaty is

sui generis.

The issue is whether the Senate (or Congress) must in

this case give its prior consent to discontinue a treaty which the
President thinks it desirable to terminate in the national intere·st
and pursuant to a provision of the Treaty itself.

f;m,u 1t.o f~

7"/i,~

u;4wJ..~

85 &u.~ t- l>"C4>JdJdb a rie4ly 1JiF ~"'~tc leuu .

e//.f-/i~cJ-

.
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l
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The rule sought by petrs would give a small minority of

Senators the constitutional power to deny the President the authority
necessary to conduct foreign policy in a rational and effective
manner.

Many treaties are terminable under international law for

breach or frustration and the President must be able to act immediately.
7.

A variety of means have been used to terminate - treaties.ii

The diversity of historical precedents are inconclusive, yet the CA
thought it significant that in no situation has a treaty been
continued in force over the opposition of the President.

The

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations found there were 14 different
bases on which a President could terminate a ·treaty in the course
· of his executive function, and it is well established the President
can determine that a treaty has been terminated because of breach,

(

Charlton v. Kelley, 229 U.S. 447, or is at an end because of changed
circumstances.
-~

Although the CA found no need to define the term, the

President has "_foreign affairs powers."

-'

8.

-· •

All the CA decides today is that two-thirds Senate consent

or majority consent in both Houses is not necessary. to terminate this
;

i/As the DC observed,
Since the first , treaty to which the United ·States
was a party was terminated in 1798 by an act of
Congress, a variety of means have been used to terminate treaties:
by statute directing the President
to deliver notice of termination; by the President
acting pursuant to a joint resolution of Congress
or otherwise acting with the concurrence of both
houses of Congress; by the President acting with
senatorial consent; and by the President acting
alone.
•

-

&+~+r=

Goldwater v. Carter, No. 78-2412, slip op. at 18-19 (D.D.C. Oct. 17,
1979) (footnotes omitted).

- 8 treaty in the circumstances before it.

The CA found its judicial

role limited, and it could not find an implied role in the
Constitution for the Senate in treaty termination for some but not
all treaties based on their relative importance.
9.

Termination of this treaty has some unique elements,

revolving around the U.S. 's diplomatic relations with PRC and ROC.
The President makes a responsible claim that he has authority as
President to determine that there is no meaningful vitality to
a mutual defense treaty when there is no recognized state.~
10.

Finally, of central significance is Article X of the

Treaty which permits termination on one year's notice.

No specific

restriction or condition on the President's action is found within
the Constitution or this Treaty itself.
(-

The termination clause

is without conditions and without designation as to who shall act
to terminate it.

No specific role for Congress is spelled out in

the Constitution or Treaty.

Therefore, there is no basis for a court

to imply a restriction on the President's power to terminate.

DISCUSSION:

The papers in this case were received earlier tog~y.

This partial memorandum is circulated in order to avoid further delay.
The remainder (discussing the concurring opinions, petrs contentions
on cert, etc.) will follow.
The Clerk advises that the Government intends to file a response,
probably by noon, Thurs., Dec. 6.
There is no response.
Marsel

-------

-~~...,...
~
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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
December 7, 1979 Conference
No. 79- ~ ~5~

Cert to CADC (en banc}(per cur1am)
(Wright & Tamm concurring)
(McKinnon dissenting)

GOLDWATER

v.
Federal/Civil

CARTER

Attached

are

two

fine

the facts and the holding below.

Timely

memoranda

from Bob Marsel

outlining

I have taken the liberty of adding

a few handwritten annotations.
I believe that the majority opinion may be properly read as

an attempt to decide this

issue while creati~

i ttle precedent as

2.

possible.
that

Thus,

the

China

the

President

(ROC)

factors,

opinion

,

may

while

is

-

lists

terminate

suggesting

determinative

of

ten

factors

the

that
the

Treaty

no

with

one

case.

supporting
the

factor,

Judge

its

view

Republic

nor

of

group

McKinnon's

of

dissent

makes two arguments (1) A treaty is a law under the Supremacy Clause
and thus,
acton,

like any other law, can only be repealed by congressional

and

support

( 2)

for

The

the

history

claim

that

of

treaty

termination

the

President

alone

prov ides

may

1 it tle

end

a

treaty

and

the

committment.
must

I

petition

say

present

President

a

that

Judge

forceful

unlimited

and

McKinnon's

argument

that

unconstitutional

dissent
the

majority

power.

The

cert

gives

the

majority's

response to Judge McKinnon's two points is simply that (1) The effect
of

a

treaty

upon domestic

law,

which

is a matter of congressional

concern, is different than the effect of a treaty upon foreign policy
discretion,

and

( 2)

The

history of

treaty

termination provides

no

example of a treaty being terminated which the President did not want
to terminate.
On

the

merits,

I

think

this

case

presents

a

compl-e:it

and

difficult issue which I have some doubts could be adequately studied
and

--______________________
_
________ ____ __________
decided

by December

31.

But,

apart

from

the merits,

I

do

.;:;;

IL

~

not

think this Court should
....___.,consider the case for prudential reasons of

....

the

sort

Al though

'--

outlined

Chief

in

Judge

....._

Chie'f" Judge

Wright's

opinion

Wright's

concurring

alternatively

opinion.

refers

to

its

guiding principle as standing, exhaustion, or ripeness, the thrust of
the

concurrence

controversy

is

between

clear--the
the

federal

President

courts
and

should

Congress

not

decide

a

unless

it

is

3.
absolutely certain that a conflict exists. I agree.
I

do not

suggest,

as

the

concurrence may,

that

this

case

presents an Article III problem. Rather I believe that justiciability
doctrines allow the courts in appropriate circumstances to refuse to
hear

cases

case,

the

that meet
petrs

the

argue

case or
that

controversy requirement.

Congress

must

be

asked

to

In

this

approve

termination before the President's order is effective. Yet Congress
itself has

not

squarely

faced

the

issue.

The

two

Houses

have

not

resolved that the President's power is contrary to their own, nor has
2/3 of the Senate resolved that the treaty should stay in force.

The

majority says that such action is not necessary because it would be
In an ordinary case, the prospect of fuitility in the face

fuitile.
of

President's

the

position

would

obviate

an

exhaustion-type

requirement.
But this
President of

is no ordinary case.

Here it is claimed that the

the United States has acted unconstitutionally and

in

derogation of constitutional power given solely to the Congress.

I

do not believe that the judicial branch,

and especially this Court,
,

should
clear

intrude

into

the

political

ebb

and

indication that Congress has asserted

President

is

claimed

to

usurp.

In

this

flow of

power

"

ab.sent

the authority that
case,

the

a

the

substantial

possibility exists that a majority of the members of Congress agree,
or

at

least

acquiese,

in

the

Accordingly, I would deny cert.

President's

assertion

of

authority.

THIRD SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
December 7, 1979 Conference
List 3, Sheet 1
No. 79-856

Motion of Myres S. McDougal
and W. Michael Reisman for
Leave to File Arnicus Brief

GOLDWATER

v.
CARTER
SUMMARY:

Profs. McDougal and Reisman ask for leave to file an

amicus brief under Rule 42(3) in support of petrs.

Petrs have con-

sented; the SG's office has apparently refused consent.
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS:

Petrs state their interest in this case

arises as professors who specialize in international and constitutional law, are experts in the conduct of foreign affairs, and are
concerned about the constitutional procedures in the conduct of
foreign affairs.

-

2 -

Amicus states:
This case is of major interest and concern
to many lawyers and citizens. If the Court of
Appeals' decision is allowed to stand, it will
enormously increase the power of one person to
terminate international agreements to which the
United States is party, all but abrogating the
historic constitutional procedures by which
Congress was vouchsafed a role in a key part of
the treaty process and through which political
power in our system has been checked and balanced.
Externally, it will weaken rather than strengthen
the foreign affairs power, for henceforth
foreign governments will no longer be able to
rely on the durability of our treaties, since
they will be terminable at the will of one
person.
Amici · suggest that the exclusion of the Congress from the termination of all agreements imports a radical restructuring of our constitutional system in favor of the Executive, not for peripheral and ephemeral

r

matters, but for matters which may be of the greatest national concern.
Even if such a development should be considered desirable, it should not
be accomplished through a decision which is candidly expedient.
The Court of Appeals improperly isolates the conduct of foreign
affairs from domestic activities and globalizes the foreign affairs
power, assigning all of it to the Executive.
The decision of the Court of Appeals, rather than strengthening
the
,
foreign affairs power in respect to treaties actually weakens it.
to the decision below, treaty partners could assume that

Prior

if the United

States entered into a treaty it was intentionally making an agreement
that was insulated, through constitutionally mandated procedures, from
capricious terminations or from unilateral termination as a result of
threats from a third party.
/
.......

I

If the decision below is permitted to stand,

than at the very best, prospective treaty partners will not be able to

gauge how much to rely on a treaty; at the very worst, they will conclude
that the United States can no longer make durable agreements.

-

3 -

One of the most destructive aspects of the Court of Appeals'
decision is that it creates expectations about future constitutional
\.._,

competence while claiming that it is not deciding the larger issue.
The President believesthat

hisclaim of exclusive constitutional

competence has been vindicated in the Court of Appeals while a number
of congressmen aver that they will henceforth insert reservations
in treaties as to termination procedures.

But, if the issue of

general competence has in fact been decided, such reservations will
not avail.

The prospect is one of more internal conflict.

Amici conclude "[t] question in this case is not the political
one of whether the treaty with Taiwan should be terminated, but the
legal one of by what constitutional procedures out country should
make such a choice.
tribunal·.··
(,._

This case urgently requires review by the highest

The costly-bought sharing and balancing of power in

our constitutional process, which~as so long served our freedoms
so well, should not lightly be abandoned."
DISCUSSION:

12/6/79

Leave to file should presumably be granted.

Marsel

Qj onrt of t~t 1Jlmtdt ~hdr.s
'J.lla~lpnghm. W- ~. 2llc?.l!·~

~uprtnir

CHAMBERS OF

December 7, 1979

THE CHIEF ..JusT1cE

Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
John and I have discussed the disposition of
this case and he drafted an "eight liner" on
which I have made a few suggestions. This is to
give you something to think about over the
weekend,
"Without intimating any view on whether
the question presented is a nonjusticiable
'political question,' we o
ta
petitioners do not have standing to
prosecute this action. Accordingly, the
judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit is vacated and the case is
remanded to that court with directions to
dismiss the complaint."
/
1

Regards,

UI~U)

..
~nµrtmt

<qimrt .ltf tfrt ~ t b .itatts

._as4ingfott, 1l3. C!J. 2UffeJ.1-$
CHAMBERS OF"

.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR .

December 8, 1979
No. 79-856, Goldwater v. Carter
Dear Chief:
The order as now drafted holds that the petitioners
have no standing. This theory reflects the Wright-Tamm
concurrence which stated that a congressman is not injured
unless Congress is injured, and that Congress is not injured
unless its will has been ignored. Congress has not been
ignored, because it has taken no action asserting a role in
treaty termination.
It seems to me that the problem is absence of
ripeness rather than lack of standing. The prudential
considerations are about the same, but I am reluctant to go
on record holding that individual congressmen (or a group of
them) lack standing to raise a constitutional issue
concerning the exercise of their official duties.
To be
sure, we would not be saying that there never could be
standing.
But with no explanation, a flat holding here on
standing could create trouble for the future.
I believe the Court would cause less confusion--and
better preserve our options for the future--if the holding
were phrased in terms of ripeness. For example, the Court
could hold that "this case is not ripe for judicial review
absent explicit legislative action affirming the belief that
Congress must be consulted prior to termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty with the Republic of China."
The ripeness language would focus attention more
directly on the role of the Court in a dispute between
Congress and the President. In my view we should not
intervene in such a situation unless it is clear that the
Congress and the President are at loggerheads.
Phrasing the
Court's order in terms of "standing" instead of "ripeness"
may suggest that the Court's attention is directed towards
the effect of treaty termination upon these congressmen,
rather than on the role of the Court vis-a-vis the coordinate
branches of government.
My notes indicate that you also endorsed the
"ripeness" ground.
Such a holding would be completely
compatible with the Wright-Tamm reasoning.
See n.25 of their
opinion.
I hope others will give further thought to placing
our holding on the ground that preserves--as I see it--

;

'

.
2.

maximum flexibility for the future.
It is also a ground that
laymen can . understand and probably agree with.
Of course, any order incorporating this suggestion
should also note that we do not intimate any v iew on whether
the question is a nonjusticiable "political question."
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference

.

...

Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1979

SENATOR GARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.
JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND CYRUS VANCE, SECRETARY OE ·
STATE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITIONERS' REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

we believe it important to reply to the Respondents' in
terrorem argument, at pp. 8-9of their Brief in Opposition, that
this Court must rule before January 1, 1980, "Lo/therwise, the
treaty will terminate on that date and, under international law,
that termination will be irrevocable, regardless of any subsequent judicial holding that the United States' internal procedures for arriving at the decision to terminate were
deficient."
This is simply not so.

-
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The issue being litigated is whether the President possessed
constitutional power to terminate the treaty without any kind of
congressional concurrence.

If he did not, his action was, and

remains, ineffective as domestic constitutional law, unless and
until that concurrence is obtained.

An invalid act, challenged

in pending litigation, does not acquire legitimacy by aging,
during the time that the case is being considered in the courts.
This Court's judgment reversing the court of appeals would have
exactly the same effect if rendered in 1980 as it would have if
rendered in 1979.
There is nothing in international law to the contrary.
the U.

s.

If

Constitution requires the concurrence of Congress, that

is the end of the matter.

Even if, contrary to fact, the Republic

of China were for some reason seeking to rely on the President's
notice of termination, Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on
Treaties would put the ROC (and the international community) on
;

notice, in view of the pendency of this litigation, that the
defect in the President's constitutional authority "was manifest
and concerned a rule of its

LI~., u.s~7

internal law of funda-

mental importance," hence cannot be taken to be the act of the
United States unless and until the deficiency is cured by congressional action.

The fact, of course, is that the Republic

of China promptly protested the termination as being in violation
of international law (R. 171).

See Appendix A to this Reply.

-
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The answer to Respondents' resuscitation argument, that the
judicial power could not order a terminated treaty back into
effect, is in Article X of the Treaty itself.

It says that

"This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely.

Either Party

may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the
other party."

If the notice of termination has not been

validly given in consequence of lack of congressional concurrence,
the treaty, by its terms, remains operative indefinitely, and
does not need to be "ordered back into effect."
The President could not impose "severe time restraints on
this court" by an ultra vires act.

If his notice of termination

was ineffective, so also was the date that it prescribed.
The Court has jurisdiction to decide this case effectively
at a time which suits its own convenience.

-
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Respectfully submitted,
DANIEL J. POPEO
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION
1612 K Street, N.W., Suite 605
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 857-0240
J. TERRY EMERSON
427 Russell Senate Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
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(202) 223-3148
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APPENDIX A TO
PETITIONERS' REPLY TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Taipei, Dece~ber 31, 1978
Your Excell ency,
The Government of the Republic of China has been given notice
by the Government of the United States of the termination of the
Mutua l Defense Treaty one year after the date of January 1, 1979.
The Government of the Republic of China has scrupulous1y

I

\

.

observed its obl igations under the Mut~al Oef~nse Treaty, and has
never vioiated any provisions of that treaty.
·,. l'

men~ to unilaterally give notice of termination for no justifiable
,-..._,_

ground is wholly unthinkable.
In accordance with

,, ..

(

For the U.S. Govern-

principles of international 1aw, ·the

cause and spirit constitute the basis of the provisions of a treaty.
To terminate the ~utua1 Defense Treaty unilatera11y without prior
consultations violates the basic spirit of the provisions of the

His Exce 11 ency

Leonard Unger
A.7.bassador ~xtraordinary and Plenipotentiary
United States Ewbassy, Taioei

treaty.
' There has been no vital change of circumstances since the
signing of the Mutual Defense ..Treaty and the termination o~ the

treaty can never=~ justified on the ground of rebus sic stantibus
(the principle of changed circumstances).
The Government of the Republic of China deplores the unilateral
termination of the Mut~al Defense Treaty and lodges its strongest
protest with the Govern~ent of the United States.
I avail myse1f of this opportunity to convey to Your Excellency
the assurances of my highest consideration.

I

''\ ,
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,

/ / ~ 1-t.~-t
Tsiang Yie~ (}
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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Re:

I

No . 856 - Goldwater v. Carter

I

II
I'

I

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:

I

I

Enclosed is a draft undertaking to e x press the

r-

views articulated in our discussion.

II

f'

'

"

:

I

In my view of the procedure, we should r emand to

,,>,

i

the Court of Appeals with directions that the case be

~

Lr,/'

l

,,,.

•.

L"

sent to the District Court to be dismissed but I will

I

not stand on a procedural protocol.

t·

i

Regards,

I
~
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Re:

No. 856 - Goldwater v. Carter

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.

~

..

·-·~
·.~

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the
case is remanded to the District Court with directions
that the District Court dismiss the complaint.
The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Stewart, Mr. Justice

·,

Marshall, Mr. Justice Rehnquist and Mr. Justice Stevens
!

~
F

l

,·

i

are of the view the case presents a political question
and is, therefore, non-justiciable.

l

~

l

Mr. Justice

is of the view the case is not ripe for judicial
;

I

Mr. Justice Brennan would

I!

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun would

j

grant the petition for cert.

I~

~

~
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CHAMBERS OF'

December 10, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
Dear Chief:
If the proposed disposition is adopted, would you
please add at the end thereof the following:
"MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, dissenting.
In my view,
the time issue is illusory; if the President does
not have the power to terminate the Treaty, (an
issue I do not presume to pass upon summarily)
the riotice of intention to terminate also has no
legal effect. Without further study, I do not
wish to pass on the issue of standing.
I therefore would grant certiorari and give the case
plenary consideration."
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: The Co n feren ce

QJamt cf t4t ~tilth ~tafts
jil'agqmg~ ~. QJ. 20.;r>i,

~u.pttntt

CHAMBERS Of"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 10, 1979
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Goldwater v. Carter
I agree with the result of the proposed order in this case

approved by the Chief Justice and John circulated late Friday, but
am troubled by its failure to cite any controlling authority from
this Court.

As Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion in

Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953), "we are not final because
we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final."

If I could be persuaded that the analysis which follows on

the .issue of "standing" is incorrect, I will cheerfully change my
mind and vote to join the proposed order.

But as I read the case of

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), five out of the nine
Justices who participated in that case thought that the 20 Kansas
state senators who voted against ratification of the Child Labor
Amendment had standing in this Court sufficient for Article III cas e
or controversy purposes to question the ratification by Kansas of
that amendment.

Chief Justice Hughes, delivering what is referred

to as the "opinion of the Court" in the United States Reports, said:
"Our authority to issue the writ of certiorari is
challenged upon the ground that petitioners have
no standing to seek to have the judgment of the
state court reviewed, and hence it is urged that
the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. We
are unable to accept that view." 307 U.S. 433,
437.
\

-
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Black, J., and Frankfurter, J., in separate opinions, each
joined by Roberts, J., and Douglas, J., argued that there was no

.,;,

standing, but the first sentence of the concurring opinion of
Justice Black makes it clear that those four recognized that they
were in dissent on this point, 307 U.S. 433, 456.

By means of a

pure "nose counting" process, Hughes, CJ, Stone, Reed, Butler, and
McReynolds, JJ, held there was standing; but all save Butler and
McReynolds, JJ, held that the issue of the time in which Congress
could accept ratifications of an amendment by a state legislature
was a "political" one in that case, and therefore one on which the
Court was not empowered to pass.
A ~ curiam reversal of a lower court by this Court with the
votes of only six Justices, or with the votes of only five if one of
the four dissenters states that he would not wish to have the case
given plenary consideration by granting certiorari, is no stranger
to us.

But I have understood its theory as being that the lower
<

court had, at least in the eyes of the six who joined the opinion,
plainly departed from a precedent of this Court and therefore
plenary consideration was unnecessary.

It seems to me that a ~

curiam of this sort which not only does not cite the authorities

I,

......"

...

upon which it relies for reversal, but seems (at least to me) to run
counter to an authority of this Court which has never been
overruled, might be thought to give the appearance of "brute force"
\

and would surely be subject to very valid criticism.

....',
\

.r
..
''•,

-
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The reason that I agree with the . result of the proposed~
curiam is that it directs the Court of Appeals to vacate its opinion
and remand, presumably for dismissal by the District Court.

I would

point o~t here that I am not sure that some of our more recent cases
on standing, such as Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 426 U.S.
208 (1974), or Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) do not
I

make it crystal clear that dismissal for lack of "standing" is
because the District Court lacked "jurisdiction" to hear the case or
because the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief
might be granted.

See Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Northwestern

Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951).
The reason I agree with the result is that I would simply invert
the language of the proposed~ curiam, and assume that there is
standing but hold that the issue decided by the Court of Appeals and
by the District Court is a "political" question or a
"non-justiciable" question which requires the same result.

I agree

with the comments expressed at various points in the Conference
discussion on Friday to the effect that, at least in the field of
foreign affairs, the authority of the President to act is a
"political" or "non-justiciable" question, and Art. III courts are
not empowered to pass judgment on it.

A good part of my reason for

believing this is the opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), and the following observation in Coleman
v. Miller, supra, 307 U.S. at 455:
"There are many illustrations in the field of our
conduct of foreign relations, where there are

- 4 -

'considerations of policy, considerations of
extreme magnitude, and certainly, entirely
incompetent to the examination and decision of a
court ·of justice.' Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199,
260."
For at least 30 years we have vacated and remanded with
instructions to dismiss the complaint in cases where there was no
case or controversy by the time the matter reached this Court even
though there was one when the case commenced.
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

United States v.

I do not believe that any of our

cases are in either explicit or implicit conflict with treating
cases which involve "political" questions or "non-justiciable
issues" in the same manner.

I think there is even better reason

than in the case of mootness by the time the case reaches this Court
to vacate and wash out prior federal proceedings when it is
determined that the case involves a "political" question. When we
vacate under Munsingwear, supra, we are simply saying that this
Court may not adjudicate a case which no longer involves the Art.
III type of controversy which is an indispensable prerequisite to
our jurisdiction.

But I think it is even more important that prior

federal decisions be washed out in a case which has decided a
political question, at least where the case seeks a decision as to
the authority of the President in the field of foreign affairs where
no cognizable injury in fact has occurred in the United States.
(This would distinguish the Steel Seizure Cases, where although one
of the grounds upon which President Truman relied was his power over
foreign affairs, steel mills located in the United States had been
seized pursuant to that order.)
\

-
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Thus I could join a ~ curiam much like that circulated on
Friday if its form were inverted, saying that assuming there were
standing on the part of the Senators, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is vacated with instructions to remand to the District Court
for dismissal citing Luther v. Bordan, 7 How. 1 (1849), Pacific
·Telephone Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), and United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Co., supra.
But in view of the wide variety of views expressed at
Conference, and the fact that I am in close agreement with the Chief
and John as to the proper disposition of the case, and yet as of now
cannot join the circulation of Friday, I am under no illusion that
the views I have just expressed will instantly command the agreement
of five others.

Particularly since Lewis, in his memorandum

circulated Saturday, seems to feel the issue is one of "ripeness",
and that the federal courts should have a good deal more discretion
in dealing with presidential powers in foreign affairs than my
previous discussion indicates I do, my guess is that it would be
quite difficult to compose a ~ curiam opinion commanding the votes: /
of six members of the Court for summary reversal.

It is quite

logical to inquire then, since these are difficult and by no means
fully settled constitutional questions, why we should not grant
certiorari and hear them argued in due course.
It is here that I think the Court is between a rock and hard
place.

One of the parties contends that if the case is not decided

by December 31, the issue will be moot.

\

I am not prepared to say

-
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flatly, without benefit of full briefing and oral argument, that
this is not so, although that is my present tentative view.

With

that contention in the case, I don't think we can blithely grant
certior~ri, and set the case for argument in January or February.

I

think this is especially true in light of the microscopic scrutiny
which our actions are apt to receive for a while after the "The
Brethren".

If after argument we decided the case was moot, we could

well be accused of ducking a tough issue.

The argument would not be

necessarily that we were wrong in deciding that it was moot, but
that we should have set it for expedited briefing, argument, and
decision in order to assure that it did not become moot.

If we try

to avoid that pitfall by simply agreeing among ourselves now that we
would, after argument in 1980, decide that the case was not moot in
order to avoid such criticism, I think we would be transmuting the
"mootness" doctrine into a principle of judicial convenience to
which I, for one, could not subscribe.
A second alternative would be to call for accelerated briefing
and argument, and decide the case before January 1.
the worst possible alternative.

I think this is ~

I suppose that 95% of the public

consider that time taken in reaching a judicial decision is fungible
with time taken to saw wood:

if you can cut X cords of wood in 12

8-hour days, you should be able to cut the same amount in 8 12-hour
days.

All of us who have had any experience with the judicial

process know that this is not so -- that a sort of brain fag sets in
after a certain amount of time of pondering the issues in a

.,

,.
~

7

particular case, and they have to be put on the mental back burn e r
to simmer for a period before concentrating on them again.

We know

this, but I am quite sure that those who have not been judges may
not.

I mentioned in Conference Friday the tremendously accelerated

schedule of argument and decision in the Steel Seizure Cases (fou r
days after the District Court enjoined the President from seizing
the steel mills, this Court granted certiorari before judgment and
set the case for argument nine days later.

The opinion of the

Court, and the various concurring and dissenting opinions, were
filed June 2, 1952 -- 21 days after oral argument, and 30 days af t er
certiorari had been granted) and my opinion that this Court has bee n
suffering for nearly 30 years from an opinion which much too
casually brushed off serious collateral questions in a determine d
effort to reach and decide the merits of a very important
constitutional question.

It was undoubtedly a good faith effort by

the Court to respond to an event of great public importance, but
that is not necessarily the formula for a decision which makes good
law.

All of us except John will remember the struggle with Buckley
~

v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which we heard argument after full
briefing on November 10, 1975, and issued t~e opinion January 30,
1976 -- a period of nearly three months -- but nonetheless involved
two or three days of conference and the farming out to several
different members of the Court of different portions of the opinion
to write.

If we tried to decide this case on its merits after

briefing and argument by December . 31, we would be trying to do in

\

;

-
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three weeks what it took us three months to do in Buckley v. Valeo.
A third alternative is to deny certiorari; as of late last week
I think I told Byron that would be ~y vote at Conference, but I now
think the Court of Appeal's "one day excursion ticket'' approach to
the case is wholly wrong and ought not to be left standing.
The most positive alternative, from my point of view, is that if
there are six votes to order dismissal of the case, a simple order
to that effect be entered, and those of us who felt obliged to
support our vote with writing, as I now feel I would, could file
separate opinions supporting the order.

There would be no Court

opinion, even a ~ curiarn, so that our action would have very much
the "one day excursion ticket" effect and would not bind future
Courts even to the extent that a ~ curiam opinion would if and
when the question arose again.

But such an order would have the

virtue of removing from the books decisions of the Court of Appeals
and of the District Court which I am convinced are wrong.
Sincerely,
Copies to the Conference

\

,•,
'

Draft Order

December 10, 1979

Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
.,

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted.
Without deciding whether the case presents a nonjusticiable "political question" or whether petitioners
would otherwise have standing to prosecute this action,
we hold that in any event this case is not ripe for
judicial review.

Accordingly, we vacate the judgment

of the United States Court of Appeals for the District

,:I·.

of Columbia Circuit and remand the case to that Court
with directions to dismiss the complaint.
.,

"

. ,·

•..,

1

·~

December 10, 1979
.l

• r

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

Goldwater v. Carter
I agree with the result of the proposed order in this case

·'

approved by the Chief Justice and John circulated late Friday, but
am troubled by its failure to cite any controlling authority from
this Court.

As Justice Jackson said in his concurring opinion in

Brown v. Alle&, 344 U.S. 443, 540 {1953), "we are not final because
we are infallible, but we are fnfallible only because we are
final."

If I could be persuaded that the analysis which follows on

. the issue of "standing" is incorrect, I will cheerfully change my
mind and vote to join the proposed order.

But as I read the case of

..

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 {1939), five out of the nine
Justices who participated in that case thought that the 20 Kansas
state senators who voted against ratification of the Child Labor
Amendment had standing in this Court sufficient for Article III case
~

,..

or controversy purposes to question the ratification by Kansas of
that amendment.

Chief Justice Hughes delivered what is referred to

as the "opinion of the Court" in the United States Reports, the
Court said:
"Our authority to issue the writ of certiorari is
challenged upon the ground that petitioners have
no standing to seek to have the judgment of the
state court reviewed, and hence it is urged that
the writ of certiorari should be dismissed. We
are unable to accept that view." 307 U.S. 433,
437.
Black, J., and Frankfurter, J., in separate opinions, each
joined by Roberts, J., and Douglas, J., argued that there was no
standing, but the first sentence of the concurring opinion of

.(

,•.
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Justice Black makes it clear that those four recognized that they
were in dissent in this point, 307 U.S. 433, 456.

By means of a

pure "nose counting" process, Hughes, CJ, Stone, Reed, Butler, and
McReynolds, JJ, held there was standing; but all save Butler and
McReynolds, JJ, held that the issue of the time in which Congress
could accept ratifications of an amendment by a state legislature
was a "political" one in that case, and therefore one on which the
Court was not empowered to pass.
A ~ curiam reversal of a lower court by this Court with the
votes of only six Justices, or with the votes of only five if one of
the four dissenters states that he would not wish to have the case
given plenary consideration by granting certiorari, is no stranger
to us.

But I have understood its theory as being that the lower

court had, at least in the eyes of the six who joined the opinion,
plainly departed from a precedent of this Court and therefore
plenary consideration was unnecessary.

It seems to me that a ~

curiam of this sort which not only do e s not cite the authorities
upon which it relies for reversal, but seems (at least to me) to run
counter to an authority of this Court which has never been
overruled, might be thought to give the appearance of "brute force"
and would surely be subject to very valid criticism.
The reason that I a gr e e with the result of the p r opo sed ~
curiam is that it directs the Court of App e als to vacate its opinion
a nd r e mand, presumably for dismissal by the District Court.

I would

po int o ut h e re that I a m not s ure that some of our more rec e nt c ase s

;

J

- 3 -

.
h

on standing, such as Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee, 426 U.S.
208 (1974), or Sierra v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) do not make it
cyrstal clear that dismissal for lack of "standing" is because the
Distr·ict Court lacked "jurisdiction" to hear the case or because the
plaintiffs faiied to state a claim upon which relief might be
granted.

See Montana-Dakota Utilities v. Northwestern Public

Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951)

(Opinion of Jackson, J.)

The reason I agree with the result is that I would simply invert
the language of the proposed~ curiam, and assume that there is
standing but hold that the issue decided by the Court of Appeals and
by the District Court is a "political" questJon or a
"non-justiciable" question which requires the same result.

I agree

with the comments expressed at various points in the Conference
discussion on Friday to the effect that, at least in the field of
foreign affairs, the authority of the President to act is a
"political" or "non-justiciable" question, and Art. III courts are
not empowered to pass judgment on it.

A good part of my reason for

believing this is the opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Co., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), and the following observation in Coleman
v. Miller, supra, 307 U.S. at 455:
"There are many illustrations in the field of our
conduct of foreign relations, where there are
'considerations of policy, considerations of
extreme magnitude, and certainly, entirely
incompetent to the examination and decision of a
court of justice.' Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199,
260."
We have vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the

'

~

'

.

'

-
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complaint in cases where there was no case or controversy by the
time the matter reached this Court even though there was one when
the case commenced for at least 30 years.
Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950).

United States v.

I do not believe that any of our

•·

cases are in either explicit or implicit conflict with treating
cases which involve "political" questions or "non-justiciable
issues" in the same manner.

.,

I think there is even better reason

...

,·

than in the case of mootness by the time the case reaches this Court

•.,

to vacate and wash out prior federal proceedings when it is
determined that the case involves a "political" question. When we
vacate under Munsingwear, supra, we are simply saying that this

,.

court may not adjudicate a case which no longer involves the Art.
III type of controversy which is an indispensable prerequisite to
our jurisdiction.

But I think it is even more important that prior

federal decisions be washed out in a case which has decided a
political question, at least where the case seeks a decision as to
the authority of the President in the field of foreign affairs where

,,.

no cognizable injury in fact has occurred in the United States.
.

I

(This would distinguish the Steel Seizure Cases, where although one
of the grounds upon which President Truman relied was his power over
foreign affairs, steel mills located in the United States had been
seized pursuant to that order.)
Thus I could join a ~ curiam much like that circulated on
Friday · if its form were inverted, saying that assuming there were
.~

standing on the part of the Senators, the decision of the Court of

•'

-
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Appeals is vacated with instructions to remand to the District Court
,,

for dis missal citing Luther v. Berdan, 7 How. 1, Pacific Telephone

~,t

".·
. '

Co. v. Oregon, 233 U.S. 118, and United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Co., supra.
But in view of the wide variety of views expressed at

•··

Conference, and the fact that I am in close
agreement with the Chief
I
and John as to the proper disposition of the case, and yet as of now
cannot join the circulation of Friday, I am under no ilusion that

·,,

the views I have just expressed will instantly commai:1d, t he agreeme nt
of five others.

Particularly since Lewis, in his memorandum

circulated Saturday, seems to feel the issue is one of "ripeness",
and that the federal courts should have a good deal more discretion
in dealing with presidential powers in foreign affairs than my
previous discussion indicates I do, my guess is that it would be
quite difficult to compose a ~ curiam opinion commanding the votes
of six members of the Court for summary reversal.

It is quite

logical to inquire then, since these are difficult and by no means
fully settled constitutional questions, why we ~hould not grant

.,
,,.......

.,,

:or·•

certiorari and hear them argued in due course.

'-'(,

It is here that I think the Court is between a rock and hard
place.

One of the parties contends that if the case is not decided

by December 31, the issue will be moot.

I am not prepared to say

flatly, without ben~fit of full briefing and oral argumeqt, that
thi,s :i:s not so, although that is my present tentative view.

With

that contention in the case, I don't think we can blithly grant
(.

'

(

''

) '
•1
1.
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certiorari, and · set the case for argument in January or February.

I

think this is especially true in the light of the microscopic '
scrutiny which our actions are apt to receive for a while after the
"The Brethran".

If after argument we decided the case was moot, we

could well be Sccused of ducking a tough issue.

The argument would

not be necessarily that we were wrong in deciding that it was moot,
but that we should have set it for expedited briefing, argument, and
decision in order to assure that it did not become moot.

If we try

to avoid that pitfall by simply agreeing among ourselves now that we
would, after argument in 1980, decide that the case was not moot in
order to avoid such criticism, I think we woµld be transmutting the
"mootness" doctrine into a principle of judicial convenience to
which I, for one, could not subscribe.
A second alternative would be to call for accelerated briefing
and argument, and decide the case before January 1.
the worst possible alternative.

I think this is

I suppose that 95% of the public

consider that time taken in reaching a judicial decision is fungible
with time taken to saw wood:

if you can cut X cords of wood in 12

8-hour days, you should be able to cut the same amount in 8 12-hour
days.

All of us who have had any experience with the judicial

process know that this is not so -- that a sort of brain fag sets in
after a certain amount of time of pondering the issues in a
particular case, and they have to be put on the mental back burner
to simmer for a period before concentrating on them again.

We know

this, but I am quite sure that those who have not been judges may

-
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..
not.

I mentioned in Conference Friday the tremendously accelerated

schedule of argument and decision in the Steel Seizure Cases (four
days after the District Court enjoined the President from seizing
the steel mills, this Court granted certiorari before judgment and
set· the case for argument nine days later.

.'

The opinion of the

Court, and the various concurring and dissenting opinions, were
filed June 2, 1952 -- 21 days after oral argument, and 30 days after
certiorari had been granted (and my opinion that this Court has been
· suffering for nearly 30 years from an opinion which much too
casually brushed off serious collateral questions in a determined
effort to reach a~d decide the merits of a ~ery important
constitutional question.

It was undoubtedly a good faith effort by

the Court to respond to an event of great public importance, but

.

I

that is not necessarily the formula for a decision which makes good
law.

All of · § ' except John will remember the struggle with Buckley

v. Valeo, in which we heard argument after full briefing on

;

November 10, 1975, and issued the opinion January 30, 1976 -- a
period of nearly three months

but nonetheless involved two or

three days of conference and the farming out to several different
members of the Court of different portions of the opinion to write.
If we tried to decide this case on its merits after briefing and
argument by December 31, we would be trying to do in three weeks
what it took us three months to do in Buckley v. Valeo.
A third alternative is to deny certiorari; as of late last week
I think I told Byron that would be my vote at Conference, but I now

~

.' '

)

.
.

'

;
-
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think the Court of Appeal's "one day excursion ticket" approach to
the case is wholly wrong and ought not to be left standing.
The most positive

alternative, from my point of view, is that

if there are six votes to order dismissal of the case, a simple
order to that effect be entered, and those of us to felt obliged to
support our vote with writing, as I now feel I would; could file
separate opinions supporting the order.

,.

There would be not Court

opinion, even a ~ curiam, so that our action would have very much
the "one day excursion ticket" effect and would not bind future
Courts even to the extent that a ~ curiam opinion would if and
when the question arose again.

But such an.order would have the

virtue of removing from the books decisions of the Court of Appeals
and of the District Court which I am convinced are wrong.
'

Sincerely,
Copies to the Conference

'

'·
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR .

December 11, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re:
Goldwater
Carter
-- - - --v.-- - - - -No. 79-856

Potter's admonition against the propriety of a vote t o deny
cert after five or more of us have voted to grant and vacate is
sufficiently persuasive to cause me to change my vote to one to affirm
for the reasons stated in the attached. If the present majority
vote to grant, vacate and direct dismissal should dissolve in favor
of a denial of the petition, I might join that disposition.

Sincerely,

\

;

Goldwater v. Carter

No. 79-856

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the order directing the
District Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the
President's well-established authority to recognize, and
withdraw recognition from, foreign governments. Opinion, App.
27A-29A.

In holding that this case presents a nonjusticiable
"political question," the Court, in my view, profoundly
misapprehends the political question principle as it applies to
matters of foreign relations. Properly understood, the
political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an
exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
"constitutional[ly] commit[ted]". Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211-13, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when a
court is faced with the antecedent question whether a
particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-21 (1969). The issue of
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it
falls within the competence of the courts.
The constitutional question raised here is prudently
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty with
\

Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the

,,

Peking government, because the defense treaty was predicated
upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan government was the
only legitimate political authority in China. Our cases firmly
establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone
the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign
regimes. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
410 {1964); Baker v. Carr, supra, at 212; United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-230 {1942). That mandate being clear,
our judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further.
See Baker v. Carr, supra, at 212; United States v. ~ink,, supra,
at 229.

;

\
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December 11, 1979

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

RE:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
r

'

Dear Bill:
I join again.

Regards,

GJ
Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc: The Conference

QJcurt cf fftt ~e~ .:%tltl.cg
~w.dp:n:gtcn. lt). QJ. 20ffeJ~~

~Ul)t"tntt

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN, JR.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE

Re: Goldwater v. Carter

No. 79-856

Potter's admonition against the propriety of a vote to deny
cert after five or more of us have voted to grant and vacate is

/,l

sufficiently persuasive to cause me to change my vote to one to affirm
for the reasons stated in the attached. If the present majority
vote to grant, vacate and direct dismissal should dissolve in favor
of a denial of the petition, I might join that disposition.

Sincerely,

/~
.,.
\

"'

Goldwater v. Carter

No. 79-856

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the order directing the
District Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the
President's well-established authority to recognize, and
withdraw recognition from, foreign governments. Opinion, App.
27A-29A.

In holding that this case presents a nonjusticiable
"political question," the Court, in my view, profoundly
misapprehends the political question principle as it applies to
matters of foreign relations. Properly understood, the
political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an
exercise of foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
"constitutional[ly] commit[ted]". Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
211-13, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when a
court is faced with the antecedent question whether a
particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-21 (1969). The issue of
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it
falls within the competence of the courts.
The constitutional question raised here is prudently
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty with
.,

Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition of the

Peking government, because the def e nse treaty was predicated
upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan government was the
only legitimate political authority in China. Our cases firmly
establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone
the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign
regimes. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
410 (1964); Baker v. Carr, supra, at 212; United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228-230 (1942). That mandate being clear,
our judicial inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further.
See Baker v. Carr, supra, at 212; United States v. ~ink, supra,
at 229.
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December 11, 1979

THECHIEF.JUSTICE

RE:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Bill:
I join again.

Regards,

0
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

I ,
I

cc: The Conference

I
l

lI

1 ~ '

t :: .

1
I

j)~mtt <!fltltrl of f:ltt~~ .§hdts
'Jlll'Mfyi:ngtcn.· ~. C!f. 20gtJ!.~
CHAMBERS OF

.

~·

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

,,.

December 11, 1979

Re:

No. 79-856, Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Chief,

\

, I would change th:-~ond sentence of our Order to
read as follows:
The judgm~nt of the Court of Appeals is
vacated, and the case is remanded to the District Court with
directions to dismiss the complaint.
In a case from a state court, or from a federal
court of appeals reviewing the action of an administrative
agency, our power is appropriately limited to remanding the
case to the court from which it came.
In the federal judicial system, by contrast, this Court may appropriately remand
any case to the federal trial court, and has done so countless times.
(See, ~ ' Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United
States, 326 U.S. 690, for a random example.)
Apart from the above suggestion, which is reall y
quite minor, I think that the proposed Order is satisfactory.
If Bill Rehnquist or anyone else writes in explanation of why the case is non-justiciable, I shall very
likely join such writing. If all five of us are inclined to
do so, such a written explanation might well become a ~
curiam, and Lewis Powell's statement could still remain as a
concurrence in the Order.

'.

..

,,'
.:

,.

In any event, I do not now plan to write anything
myself, but shall await future developments with interest.
Sincerely yours,
The Chief Justice
·'

Copies to the Conference

..

,:

.
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CHAMB E RS OF

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

December 11, 1979
I

Re:

•

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Potter:
Re your memo of today, you must have been looking
at an earlier draft.

The second sentence of the
•.

order attached to my memo of December 10 reads:

~-

"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated and the case is remanded to the
District Court with directions that the

\

·. '·

District Court dismiss the complaint."
i

I
~

.,

1

{

Mr. Justice Stewart

I

Copies to the Conference

C

·,

•
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CHAMBERS OF"

,,

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

)i,··

December 11, 1979

I '

Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

I

Dear Bill:
Please show me joining your concurring opinion.
Regards,

I
1

l

'·

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

'

.

;

~
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i

.. ,

Ii ..
l

!!
;
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I

I
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CHAMBERS 0~

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

December 11, 1979

Re:

/

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Bill:
Please show me joining your concurring opinion.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference

;

tlyt 'Jfuntdt ,§tatrs
~asfyingto-n. g}. C!t· ~O~Ji~

~ltprtntt <!Jonrt of

CHAMBERS OF'

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

December 11, 1979

!
j

ll' .

1·
i
t·.

Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

r
I

I
I

Dear Potter:
Re your memo of today, you must have been looking
at an earlier draft.

The second sentence of the

order attached to my memo of December 10 reads:
"The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
vacated and the case is remanded to the
District Court with directions that the

t

t:

I',,f ·
j.

I'l'

I •

I

•

District Court dismiss the complaint."

Mr, Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

..,'
.,

'

;§npunu QiltUrl it! flrt ~ t h ;§taftg

._asqingLm. ~. QI. 2.0ffe~,
CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 11, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

I propose to make the following stylistic change in
the presently circulating third draft of my opinion. At
the end of the text on page 3, the phrase
each of
which has weapons at its command to protect and assert its
interests, weapons not available to private litigants
outside the judicial forum • • •
should be deleted, and
substituted with the following:
each of which has
resources available 'to protect and assert its interests,
resources not available to private litigants outside the
judicial forum • • • •
11

•

•

•

11
11

•••

11

Sincerely,

,1

'·

'•

1

I

JS

1 2/ 11/79

~w.,

MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING

~~~ ~~

(

/)/~/~

~ )

~-;;,~~; with the~ult~in this o<H>e] Boc~e I would

O

the

order:

complaint

for

reason,

different

a

.

I

This Court has recognized that an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckle/~ Valeo,
424

U.S.

1,

113-14

(1976)

(per

curiam).

J

,.,..,,~~

Prudential

considerations persuade me that aAdispute between Congress and
he President

is

.,,...~

not Xri;?e

t:s.e

uAleG9

Congress

has

)

~~~
explici tl/

~-~~~expressed

its

view

unconstitutional.

In

Congress

that

1

assert

constitutional
Court

to

role

decide

that
this

in
the

case,

theJ
the

the

President's

1 members

have

been

termination of

validitJ

of

such

of

both

deprived
a

treatJ.
a

is

action

claim

Houses
of

of

their

For
when

this

r

1-

2.

OlH!lr~lHH::~'!f majori tJ of

J- ..

the Congress maj well

agree with the

President's view of the case would be to decide a controverst
that i s now more hjpothetical than real.
To consider a congressman's claim before Congress has
taken

explicit

action would

legislative disputes
working
1

into

encourage

the courts

the diversion of intraand

relationship between Congress

impede

and

the

the

practical

President.

The

ebb and flow of power between these two branches turns primarilJ
on

political,

' judicial

j

courts

not

process

into

the

legal,
would

midst

,(:/.'; esolved bj Congress
judicial

considerations.
allow

of

few

political

and

intervention.

a

the

We

congressmen
battles

President

should

EarlJ resort

not

to

that

without
decide

to the

call
well

maJ

the

the

need

delicate

be
for

issues

affecting the allocation of power between the Presidential and
Congress

until

the

Legislative

disagreement with the Executive.

.l,_,_

Branch

has

indicated

When that occurs,

its

this Court

maJ be confident that its intervention is necessarJ and that the

dispute is concrete.

~~)

-- -_

----...._

..

. ~

Irr-- this case, Congress has not disputed the Presidents
'\

assertion of authoritJ.

Al though

the

Senate

resolution declaring that Senate approval
termination of

anJ mutual

defense

treatJ,

has

considered

a

is necessarJ for the
see

125

Cong.

Rec.

S7015, 87038-39 (dailJ ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been

\

3.

taken on the resolution.
15,

1979).

intended

Moreover,

to

(dailJ ed.
1979).
House

have
June

Thus,
have

it

See _._
id.

1979)

~

effect.

id.,

it cannot be said
rejected

(dailf ed. Nov.

is unclear whether the resolution was

restroactive
6,

at S16683-92

the

at

See

S7862

id.

S7054-64

(dailJ ed.

that either

President's

at

the

claim.

June

18,

Senate or

the

If

the

Congress

chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do
so.
II
;

The

order

issued

this

bj

Court holds

that

the

issue

presented bf this case is a nonjusticiable political question.
Application of the political question doctrine means that this
issue can never be reviewed bJ this Court.
'vt.,

the

political

precedents.
369

U.S.

question

~-,;.-,c~~
In mJ view, -ti~e o'f
'\

~

doctrine~ is

6'4-4~

inconsistent

with

~ ,}+our

~

As set forth in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr,
186,

incorporates
resolution

217

three
of

(1962),

the

~olit...i~i

inquiries:

questions

committed

doctrine

q~ecEiOR

Does

the

issue

bj

the

text

involve
of

the

(_.ii)

Constitution

to

a

coordinate

branch of

governmen

td) (/)

Would

resolution of the question demand that a court move be1ond areas
,..
~

of

judicial

expertis~ and

(,/)

Do

prudential

counsel against judicial intervention?

considerations

If this case were ripe
-1,AA,~~-

for review, the answer to each of these inquiries would~require

4.

us to dee ide it.
First,

in decidinq whether a political question exists

because of "a textuallJ demonstrable constitutional commitment
of

the

i s sue

to

a

coo rd in ate

po 1 i t i ca 1 branch , "

i b id . ,

this

Court must examine the constitutional provisions governing
exercise of the power at issue.
486, 519 (1969).

upon

the

the

~ 1 1 v. McCormack, 395 U.S.

No constitutional provision explicitlJ confers

President

the

power

to

-

terminate

treaties. / And,

I believe that

without passing on the merits of the question,

'sArticle II,

2, which give{the President~power to make treaties

§

with the advise and consent of the Senate, and Article VI, which
makes treaties
indicate

part

the

supreme

the

text

of

the

commit

the

power

to

that

unquestionablj

of

President alone.

law

of

the

land,

Constitution
terminate

Cf. Gilligan v. Morgan,

further

does

treaties

413 U.S.

1,

to

not
the

6

'

and Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 (1849). /
Second,
and

manageable

there

is no

standards

for

"lack of

judiciallJ discoverable

resolving"

this

case;

nor

is

a

decision impossible "without an initial policJ determination of
a kind clearlJ for nC?njudicial discretion." B a k e r ~ ~ ' 369

~
u.s.,

at 217.

terminate a
o

l,1.,·~,1,

~ ~

we11 are a s ~ d : ; ~ r ~ : : . . . : ; 0 ~ ~

treat,r without congressional approval. I\ Reiij2l,!tJ;.ion

· S us
require
A

t_o

app 1 i

norma 1

~ . : . f ._,

5.

principles 0£ interpretation to the constitutional provisions at
issue. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548-49. The present
case

involves neither review of

Commander-in-Chief nor

the

President's

impermissible

activities as

interference

in the

field

of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to
decide,
order

for example, whether a treatj required the President to
troops

suppose

that

relations
supra,

into

a

ever1

lies

foreign

case

bejond

or

question

presented

Congress

and

the

"it

controversJ which

judicial

at 211 • This case

But

countrj.

cognizance."

"touches"

not

error

touches
Baker

to

foreign

-

v.

Carr,

foreign relations,

but the

relationship

between

concerns

President,

is

the

the

President's

authori tj

to

conduct foreign relations.
A

H.,d-' ~

A inhe&~t

in

simple
the

hjpothetical

demonstrates

the

confusion

Court's

President signed a mutual defense treatj with a foreign countrJ
and announced that it would go into effect despite its rejection
bj

the

Senate.

Under

todaJ's

holding,

that

situation

would

present a political question even though Article II,~ 2 clearlj
would resolve the dispute.

Although the hjpothetical case might

be eas~ to resolve because

it demands merelj textual rather

than

the

interstitial

anal1sis,

nature

of

the

presented is nofdifferent ~ h e issue presented
"\.

legal

issue

6.

In both, the Court would
whether

interpret the Constitution to decide
approval

congressional

is

qive

to

necessarJ

a

Presidential decision on the validitJ of a treatf the force of
law. Such an inquirJ demands no expertise or information beJond

~«.

the reaches of judicial competence.

Cf. Chicago

&

Southern Air

-----· -

Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).1
~~~P)0

FinallJ,

the political question doctrine ~ - app1} if

~~

~~'"M4«.R.

ra.so.1,.-1,H;.J..ert'\--0-it--.a---e-i~~:w.e-\i.J..G--Q.:~~s.s--,:1~~~-err-\i..~l\respect

~

~K<A~

, r ~ branches

of governmd J i f the Court must avoid

potential i tf of embarrassment

bi various
"unusual

departments

need

for

on

the

from multifarious pronouncements

one

question,"

unquestioning

decision alreadJ made."

II

or

adherence

if

there

to

a

is

an

political

Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217. i fAssuming

that the case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra,
none

of

these

prudential

considerations

would

be

present.

Interpretation of the Constitution does not implj lack of repect
for a coordinate branch.
If

the

President

and

the

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548.
Congress

had

reached

irreconcilable

positions, final disposition of the question presented bJ this
case

would

eliminate,

constitutional
government

rather

interpretations.

brought

to

a

The

halt

than

create,

spectre
because

of
of

intransigience of the President and the Congress

multiple

the

federal

the

mutual

would require

7.

this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our dutJ to saJ
what the law is.

See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703

(1974); Marburj v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).

~ru::

In · m1 view,
with

its

the Court's holding todaJ is incompatible

willingness

Presidential

or

on

previous

congressional

See Buckle; v. Valeo, 424 U.S.

occasions

powers
1,

to

have been

decide

whether

impinged

upon.

138 (1976); ~ e d States v.

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket V e t o ~ , 279 U.S.
655, 676-78 (1929); MJers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).2
,,

j un~er the criteria enunciated in Baker v. ~ . this Court has
the

responsiblitJ

1Legislative

to

Branches

decide
must

whether

plaJ

a

both

role

the
in

the

Executive
decision

and
to

I
I

i terminate a treatJ.
1

If this case were ripe for judicial review,

then we would be unable to avoid the question

pres::J

fl-

lfp/ss

12/11/79

Article II,

§

Rider A, p. 4 (Goldwater)

2 of the Constitution authorizes the

President to make treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate.

Article VI provides that

treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the
land.

The text of the Constitution does not state

whether the President alone may terminate a treaty
or whether, as in the case of incorporating it into

a,,.
our fundamental law, the Senate must concur by twot\

thirds vote.

And if it be assumed that a

termination role on the part of the Senate may be
inferred, the Constitution is silent as to the
;

required vote and also is silent as to whether the
House of Representatives also has a role.

Cf.

Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973), and
Luther v. Borden, 70 How. 1, 42 (1849).
serious but open questions.

These are

lfp/ss

12/11/79

:..::_:_:_/

~oldwater · footnote

A maiority of the Court today

decides a maior constitutional question without the
benefit of full briefinq and arqument.

Normally,

the Court would make such a iudqment only after the
critical testinq and debate that are the essence of
the adversary system.

It seems especially

unfortunate that the ultimate constitutional
decision has been made before an impasse exists

r.

between the exectuv1e and leqislative branches.
~

Whether one speaks in terms of the absence of
"ripeness" or, as the opinions of Judqes Wriqht and
;

Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as an
absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact
is that neither the Senate nor the Conqress as a

~A~

whole~ taken issue with the President's
decision.

The Court thus has resolved a non-

constitutional crisis by a constitutional iudament.

lfp/ss

12/11/79

Thus, the iudicial branch should avoid "the
potentiality of embarrassment [that would resultl
from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question".

Similarly, the

doctrine restrain/s iudicial action where there is
an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made".

;

lfp/ss

12/11/79

-In sum, under the criteria enunciated in
Baker · v: · earr, this Court has the responsibility to
decide whether both the executive and leqislative
branches have constitutional roles in the decision

).......~~~
whether to terminate a treaty. A,J,if the Conqress, bv
appropriate formal action, had challenqed the
President's authority to terminate the treaty with
Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty as to the status
of the treaty could have serious consequences for
our country.

In such a situation, it would

duty of this Court to resolve the issue.

;

FOOTNOTES

1.
foreign

This

policJ,

Court

has

recognized

maJ

Congress

leave

that,

the

in

the

President

area of

with

wide

discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304

( 1936).

As

~

)_,._,. J-:t..4-- ~ I
stated~ "the President alone has the

power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate~ but he
,,.

alone negotiates."
interfere

with

Id.

neither

at 319.
the

Resolution of this case would

President's

abilit.{

to

negotiate

treaties nor his dutJ to execute their provisions. We are merelJ
being asked to decide whether a treat/, which cannot be ratified

'>~tr,r~

without Senate approval, continues in effect until thel\Congress
takes further action.
2.

Coleman

v.

Miller,

U.S.

307

433

(1939)

is

not

relevant here.

In that case, the Court was asked to review the

legitimacJ

a

amendment.

of

state's

Four members of

ratification

of

J.,

Douglas,

JJ.,

constitutional

the Court stated that Congress has

exclusive power over the ratification process.
(Black,

a

concurring,

with

whom

Roberts,

joined).

Three

members

of

the

Id.,

at 456-60

Frankfurter,
Court

and

concluded

more narrowlJ that the Court could not pass upon the efficacf of
~-

}"t.

state

ratification

proposed

amendment

or

fix

must

a
be

reasonable
ratified.

time

within

Id.,

at

which

452-54.

a

The

proposed constitutional amendment at issue in Coleman would have
overruled previous decisions of this Court. Compare id. at 435
n.1

with BaileJ v.

Drexel

Furniture Co~,

Hammer v~ Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251

259 U.S.

20

(1922):

(1918). Thus, judicial review

of the legitimacJ of a state's ratification would have compelled
this Court to oversee the verJ constitutional process used to
overturn Supreme Court decisions.
entirelJ appropriate
step

aside.

See

for

Scharpf,

the

In

such circumstances

it

is

judicial branch of government to

Judicial

Review

and

The

Political

Question: A Functional AnalJsis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966).
The present case involves no similar principle of judicial nonintervention.

lfp/ss

12/11/79

Rider A,

p. 1

(Goldwater)

Prudential considerations persuade me that a
dispute between Congress and the President is not
ready for judicial review unless and until the
dispute has reached the stage where each has taken
disparate action officially as to its
constitutional authority.

In this case, a limited

number of members of both houses of Congress assert
that the President has acted unlawfully in
terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they
therefore have been deprived of their
constitutional role with respect to a treaty that
;

has become a part of the supreme law of the land.
But there has been no official action by Congress.
In this posture of the case, we do not know whether
there will ever be an official confrontation
between the legislative and executive branches.
Differences between the President and
the Congress are commonplace under our system.
These differences should, and almost invariably,
turn upon political rather than legal
considerations.

The judicial branch should not

decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress unless there is

2.

in fact an impasse between them of constitutional
dimensions.

A different view could encourage small

groups or even individual members of Congress to
seek judicial resolution of issues that are
political and non-justiciable or at least that have
not reached the stage where the normal political
process cannot resolve a conflict as to the power
to act under the Constitution.

;

8.

FOOTNOTES

1.

A majority

of

the

Court

today

decides

a

major

constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and
argument.

Normally, the Court would make such a judgment only

after the critical testing and debate that are the essence of
the

adversary system.

constitutional

between

the

It

seems especially unfortunate that a

decision , bas been made before an impasse

executive

and

legislative

branches.

ex'if/s

Whether

one

speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or, as the opinion
of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as
an absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact is that
neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue
with

the

President's decision.

The Court has

thus resolved a

non-constitutional crisis by a constitutional judgment.
2.

foreign

This

policy,

Court

has

Congress

recognized

may

leave

that,

the

in

the

President

area of

with

wide

discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the

power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes tr~aties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
( !M

alone negotiates."

Id.

at 319.

k,,ru

IJh

'ftv

d')l

,,,.J)

Resolution of this case would

,,.

9.

interfere

with

neither

the

President's

ability

to

negotiate

treaties nor his duty to execute their provisions. We are merely
being asked to decide whether a treaty, which cannot be ratified
without Senate approval, continues in effect until the selflte or
perhaps the Congress takes further action.
3.

Coleman

v.

Miller,

307

U.S.

433

(1939)

is

not

relevant here.

In that case, the Court was asked to review the

legitimacy

a

of

amendment.

state's

ratification

of

J.,

Douglas,

constitutional

Four members of the Court stated that Congress has

exclusive power over the ratification process.
(Black,

a

JJ.,

concurring,

with

joined).

Three

whom

Roberts,

members

of

the

Id., at 456-60
Frankfurter,
Court

and

concluded

more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of
state

ratification

proposed

amendment

or

fix

must

a
be

reasonable . time
ratified.

Id . ,

within
at

which

4 5 2-5 4 •

a

The

proposed constitutional amendment at issue in Coleman would have
overruled previous decisions of this Court. Compare id. at 435
n.1

with Bailey v.

Drexel

Furniture Co.,

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251

259 U.S.

20

(1922);

( 1918). Thus, judicial review

of the legitimacy of a state's ratification would have compelled
this Court to oversee the very constitutional process used to
overturn Supreme Court decisions.
entirely appropriate

for

the

In such circumstances

it

is

judicial branch of government to

;

1 0.

step

aside.

See

Scharpf,

Judicial

'Review

and

The

Political

Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966).
The present case involves no similar principle of judicial nonintervention.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING
Although

I

concur

with

the

result

reached

in

the

Court's per curiam opinion, I would dismiss the complaint for a
different reason. 1
I

'I!his Court has recognized t hat an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley~ Valeo,
424

U.S.

1,

113-14

(1976)

curiam).

(per

Prudential

considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until
each

branch

has

constitutional
members

of

taken

authority.

Congress

disparate

action

In

this

case,

claim

that

the

a

asserting

1 imi ted

President

its

number
has

of

acted

unlawfully in terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they
therefore have been deprived of their constitutional role with

;

2.

respect to a treaty that has become a part of the supreme law of
the land.

But there has been no official action by Congress. In

the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there
will ever be an official confrontation between the legislative
and executive branches.
Differences between the President and the Congress are
commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost
invariably

do,

turn
The

considerations.
affecting

the

Congress

than

legal

judicial branch should not decide

issues

allocation

until

impasse.

on

the

of

political

political

power

rather

between

branches

the

reach

President

a

and

constitutional

A different view would encourage small groups or even

individual members of Congress to seek

judicial resolution of

issues before the normal political process He:e the oppot Lt:1ni;e.Y'

~
~

the

resolve

as

conflict

to

distribution

the

of

constitutional powers.
As

noted,

Congress

President's

assertion

considered

a

has

not

of

authority.

resolution

declaring

disputed

officially

the

Al though

the

has

that

Senate

Senate
approval

is

necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty, see
125

Cong.

Rec.

S7015,

S7038-39

(daily ed.

June

6,

1979),

no

final vote has been taken on the resolution. See id. at S1668392 (daily ed. Nov.

15,

1979).

Moreover,

it is unclear whether

3.

the resolution was intended to have restroactive effect. See id.
at

87054-64 (daily ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed.

June 18, 1979). Thus, it cannot be said that either the Senate
or

the

House

have

rejected

the

President's

claim.

Congress chooses not to confront the President,

If

the

it is not our

task to do so.
II
t> /..,

J.

The

~

ea

b.i'i this Court holds

that

the

issue

"'
presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question.
Application of the political question doctrine means that this
issue can never be reviewed by this Court. In my view, reliance
upon

the

the political question doctrine

unnecessary.
set forth

It also is

is

inappropriate and

inconsistent with our precedents.

in the seminal case of Baker v. Carr,

3 69 U.S.

217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three inquiries:

As
186,

(i) Does

the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text
of the Cons ti tut ion to a coordinate branch of government.

(ii)

Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond
areas

of

judicial

expertise.

considerations counsel against

--

and

judicial

(iii)

Jo

prudential

intervention?

If this

case were ripe for review, the answer to each of these inquiries
would--in my opinion--require us to decide it.
First, in deciding whether a political question e xists

;

4.

because of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of

the

issue

to a

coordinate political

branch,"

ibid. ,

this

Court must examine the constitutional provisions governing the
LM-

exercise of the power
486, 519 (1969).
upon

the

Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S.

a,t,....i;.._,~

\

No constitutional provision explicitly confers

President

the

power to terminate treaties.

Further,

Article II, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the President to
make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Article
VI provides that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of
the

land.

text

of

power

These provisions
the

to

Constitution

terminate

add

does

treaties

support
not

to

to

the

view that the

unquestionably
the

President

commit

the

alone.

Cf.

Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973) and Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1, 42 (1849).
Second,
and

manageable

there

is no

standards

for

"lack of

judicially discoverable

resolving"

this

case;

nor

is

a

decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S., at 217.
Constitution

We simply are asked to decide whether under the
the

President

.

congressional approval.
easy,

but

it

only

interpretation to

terminate

a

treaty

without

Resolution of the question may not be

requires
the

may

us

to

apply

cons ti tut ional

normal

prov is ions

principles
at

issue.

of
See

5.

Powell

v.

McCormack,

involves

neither

395

U.S.,

review

of

at

the

548-49.

The

President's

present

case

activities

as

Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the field
of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to
decide, for example, whether a treaty required the President to
order

troops

suppose

that

relations
supra,

into

a

every

case

lies

at 211 .

foreign

beyond

o,r

question

presented

Congress

and

the

to

II

"it

controversy which

judicial

Th is case

But

country.

cognizance."

touches II

us

President,

error

touches
Baker

the

the

relationship

President's

to

foreign

v.

foreign rel at ions,

concerns
not

is

Carr,

but the
between

a.uthori ty

to

conduct foreign relations.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
find inherent in the Court's holding in this case.
the

President

signed

a

mutual

defense

Assume that

treaty with

a

foreign

country and announced that it would go into ~ffect despite its
rejection by the Senate. Under today's holding,

that situation

. would present a political question even though Article II,
clearly would

resolve

the dispute.

§

2

Al though the hypothetical

case might be easy to resolve because it demands merely textual
rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue
presented is not different from the issue presented in the case
before us.

In both, the Court would

interpret the Constitution

;

6.

to decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of
law. Such an inquiry demands no expertise or information beyond
the reaches of judicial competence.

Cf. Chicago

Southern Air

&

Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).2
Finally, the political question doctrine rests in part
on

the

prudential

need

for

mutual

respect

among

the

three

branches of government. Thus, the judicial branch should avoid
"the

potentiality

multifarious
question."

of

embarassment

pronouncements
Simiarly,

the

by

[that

various

doctrine

would

result]

departments

restrains

from

on

judicial

one

action

where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217.
Assuming that the case were ripe for judicial review,
see Part I supra, none of these prudential considerations would
be present.

Interpretation of the Constitution does not

lack of repect for a coordinate branch.
395 U.S., at 548.
irreconcilable
presented
multiple
federal

by

case

constitutional
government

final

would

disposition

eliminate,

interpretations.

brought

to

a

halt

of

rather
The

because

intransigience of the President and the Congress

•j

1

McCormack,

If the President and the Congress had reached

positions,
this

Powell v.

imply

the

question

than

spectre
of

the

create,
of

the

mutual

would require

;

7.

this Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say
what

the

law

is."

United

States v.

Nixon,

418 U.S.

683,

703

(1974) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)).
III
In my view, the Court's holding today is incompatible
with

its

willingness

Presidential

on

previous occasions

or congressional powers have

See Buckley~ Valeo, 424 U.S.

1,

to decide

been

whether

impinged -upon.

138 (1976): United States~

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974): The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S.
655, 676-78 (1929): Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).3
In sum,
Court

under
has

the

the criteria enunciated
responsibility

to

in Baker v.

decide

whether

Carr,

this

both

the

executive and legislative branches have constitutional roles to
play in the decision whether to terminate a treaty.

If in this

case the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan,
the

resulting

our country.

uncertainty could have

serious consequences for

In such a situation, it would be the duty of this

Court to resolve the issue.

;
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Rider A,

p. 1

(Goldwater)

Prudential considerations persuade me that a
dispute between Congress and the President is not
ready for judicial review unless and until the
dispute has reached the stage where each has taken
disparate action officially as to its
constitutional authority.

In this case, a limited

number of members of both houses of Congress assert
that the President has acted unlawfully in
terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they
therefore have been deprived of their
constitutional role with respect to a treaty that
;

has become a part of the supreme law of the land.
But there has been no official action by Congress.
In this posture of the case, we do not know whether
there will ever be an official confrontation
between the legislative and executive branches.
Differences between the President and
the Congress are commonplace under our system.
These differences should, and almost invariably,
turn upon political rather than legal
considerations.

The judicial branch should not

decide issues affecting the allocation of power
between the President and Congress unless there is

2.

in fact an impasse between them of constitutional
dimensions.

A different view could encourage small

groups or even individual members of Congress to
seek judicial resolution of issues that are
political and non-justiciable or at least that have
not reached the stage where the normal political
process cannot resolve a conflict as to the power
to act under the Constitution.

lfp/ss

12/11/79

Thus, the iudicial branch should avoid "the
potentiality of embarrassment [that would resultl
from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question".

Similarly, the

doctrine restraints iudicial action where there is
an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made".

;

1
lfp/ss

12/11/79

Rider · ~;-p:·1·t6oldwater}

In sum, under the criteria enunciated in

Baker · v: ~earr, this Court has the responsibility to
decide whether both the executive and leqislative
branches have constitutional roles in the decision
whether to terminate a treaty.

If the Conqress, by

appropriate formal action, had challenqed the
President's authority to terminate the treaty with
Taiwan, the resultinq uncertainty as to the status
of the treaty could have serious consequences for
our country.

In such a situation, it would be the

duty of this Court to resolve the issue.

;

lfp/ss

12/11/79

Rider A,

p.

4 (Goldwater)

Article II, § 2 of the Constitution authorizes the
President to make treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate.

Article VI provides that

treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the
land.

The text of the Constitution does not state

whether the President alone may terminate a treaty
or whether, as in the case of incorporating it into
our fundamental law, the Senate must concur by twothirds vote.

And if it be assumed that a

termination role on the part of the Senate may be
inferred, the Constitution is silent as to the
;

required vote and also is silent as to whether the
House of Representatives also has a role.

Cf.

Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 6 (1973), and
Luther v. Borden, 70 How. 1, 42 (1849).
serious but open questions.

These are

lfp/ss

1?./11/79

:_:_:_:_/

~oldwater ~ footnote

A maiority of the Court today

decides a maior constitutional question without the
benefit of full briefinq and arqument.

Normally,

the Court would make such a iudqment only after the
critical testinq and debate that are the essence of
the adversary system.

It seems especially

unfortunate that the ultimate constitutional
decision has been made before an impasse exists
between the exectuvie and leqislative branches.
Whether one speaks in terms of the absence of
"ripeness" or, as the opinions of Judqes Wriqht and
;

Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as an
absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact
is that neither the Senate nor the Conqress as a
whole have taken issue with the President's
decision.

The Court thus has resolved a non-

constitutional crisis by a constitutional iudqment.
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79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
;

MR. J,&i_TICE POWELL, CONCURRING~~~

, fI-'~

r;fl.

';1

Al though

I

~~

with

the

result

reached

in

the

"Co~rt' s per curiam opinion, I would dismiss the complaint for a
different reason. 1
I

This Court has recognized that an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley~ Valeo,
424

U.S.

1,

113-14

(1976)

(per

curiam).

Prudential

considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and

2.

the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until
each

branch

has

constitutional
members

of

taken

authority.

Congress

disparate
In

claim

action

this

case,

that

the

a

asserting

limited

President

its

number
has

of

acted

unlawfully in terminating the treaty with Taiwan, and that they
therefore have been deprived of their constitutional role with
respect to a treaty that has become a part of the supreme law of
the land.

But there has been no official action by Congress. In

the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there
will ever be an official confrontation between the legislative
and executive branches.
Differences between the President and the Congress are
commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost
invariably

do,

turn

considerations.
affecting
Congress

the
until

impasse.

The

on

judicial

allocation
the

of

political

political
branch
power

rather

should
between

branches

than

legal

not decide

issues

the

reach

President

a

and

constitutional

A different view would encourage small groups or even

individual members of Congress to

seek

judicial

resolution of

issues before the normal political process has the opportunity
to

resolve

the

conflict

as

to

the

distribution

of

constitutional powers.
As
President's
considered

noted,

Congress

assertion
a

has

not

of

authority.

resolution

declaring

disputed

officially

the

Although

the

has

that

Senate

Senate
approval

is

,.

3.

necessary for the termination of
125

Cong.

Rec.

S7015,

see

S7038-39

(daily

no

ed.

final vote has been taken on the resolution. See id.
92

(daily ed.

Nov.

15,

1979).

Moreover,

it

6683-

is unclear

the resolution was intended to have restroactive effect. See
at

S7054-64 (daily ed. June 6,

June 18, 1979). Thus,

1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed.

it cannot be said that either the Senate

or the House has rejected the President's claim. If the Congress
chooses not to confront the President, it is not our task to do
so.

.J

~ ~

w

~ ~ .,.,,.l, I>-(

~

II

The

(

~

~~ ~u~ ~ h i i J Court

hol;s

that

~~-c..,(.

I

the

issue

"\

presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question.
Application of the political question doctrine means that this
;

issue can never be reviewed by this Court. In my view, reliance
upon

the

the

unnecessary.
set forth

political question doctrine
It also

is

is

inappropriate and

inconsistent with our precedents.

in the seminal case of Baker v.

Carr,

3 69 U.S.

217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three inquiries:

(i)

As
186,
Does

the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text
of the Constitution to a coordinate branch of government.

(ii)

Would resolution of the question demand that a court move beyond
areas of j ud ic ial expertise.

(iii) Do prudential considerations

counsel against judicial intervention?
for review, the answer to each of these

If this case were ripe
inquiries would--in my

4.

opinion--require us to decide it.
First, in deciding whether a political question exists
because of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of

the

issue

to

a

coordinate political

branch,"

ibid.,

this

Court must examine the constitutional provisions governing the
exercise of the power in question.
U.S.

486,

confers

519

(1969).

upon

Further,

the

Article

No

constitutional

President
II,

President to make

2

§

Powell v.

of

the

power

the

McCormack,

provision

to

explicitly

terminate

Constitution

395

treaties.

authorizes

the

treaties with the advice and consent of the

Senate. Article VI provides that treaties shall be a part of the
supreme law of the land.

These provisions

~

,:1:1'

support

;:f'

the

view that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably
commit the power to terminate treaties to the President alone.
Cf.

Gilligan

v.

Morgan,

413

U.S.

1,

6

(1973)

and

Luther

v.

Borden, 7 How. 1, 42 ( 1849).
Second,
and

manageable

there

is no

standards

for

"lack of

judicially discoverable

resolving"

this

case;

nor

is

a

decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S., at 217.

We simply are asked to dee ide whether u>Aae:i; tlrn ,r
the

~~~~~~-k:,

President A~

congressional approval.
easy,

but

it

interpretation

only
to

a

treaty

without

Re solution of the quest ion may not be

requires
the

terminate

us

to

apply

constitutional

normal

provisions

principles
at

issue.

of
See

5.

Powell

v.

McCormack,

involves

neither

395

U.S.,

review

Commander-in-Chief nor

of

at

the

548-49.

The

present

President's

impermissible

case

activities

interference

in the

as

field

of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were asked to
decide,
order

for example, whether a treaty required the President to
troops

suppose

that

into
every

relations

lies

supra,

211.

at

a

foreign

case

beyond

or

But

country.
controversy

judicial

"it

which

is

error

touches

cognizance."

Baker

v.

to

foreign
Carr,

This case

question

presented

Congress

and

the

"touches" foreign relations, but the
~ ~.,'"C,,<.4.~ ' 1 . ~
us concerns the A r-elatiTh±p between

to

President,

not

the

President's

authority

to

conduct foreign relations.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
find inherent in the Court's holding in this case.
the

President

signed

a

mutual

defense

treaty

Assume that

with

a

foreign

country and announced that it would go into effect despite
rejection by the Senate.

Under today's holding,

that situation

would present a political question even though Article II,
clearly would
case

resolve

the

dispute.

its

§

2

~~~

Al though

the 4- hypothetical

.-:i..u--~-~
.rn..ig]it !le e.aS¥ t0--.z:.e:aolJ.T~"1 because it demands merely textual

rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue
presented is not different from the issue presented in the case
before us.

In both, the Court would

interpret the Constitution

to decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of

6.

law. Such an inquiry demands no expertise or information beyond
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

\

December 12, 1979
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

I propose to add at the end of footnote 2 on page 5
of the present third draft of my concurring opinion the
following:
", so long as they do not trench upon
exclusively federal questions of foreign policy. Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968)."
Sincerely,
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December 12, 1979

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w... . .J .

BRENNAN , .JR.

RE:

No. 78-856

Goldwater v. Carter

Proposed Disposition
Dear Chief:
I suggest that the statement as to me (which
is satisfactory in form) should go at the end since
I am the only dissenter.
Sincerely,

j,

/?zd
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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CHAM BERS Of"

.JUS T ICE THURGOOD MARS HALL

Re_:

December 12, 1979

/

No, 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
,,_

Dear Chief:
Please have the Order show the following:
''MR. JUSTICE .MARSHALL concurs in

the result."
Sincerely,

T.M.
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The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference
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C HAM BE RS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

/
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,

'

December 12, 19·79

Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

....
.. .
~

Dear Chief:
',
'
You have my proxy in working out
the final
details in this case.
·,.

•'.

Respectfully,

~
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The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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December 12, 1979

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

/
Re:. No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
Dear Chief:
Further consideration of the "proposed disposition"
which you have circulated prompts me to make the following
suggestions:
1. After the sentence setting forth Byron's
and my position, would it not be advisable to
add "MR. JUSTICE BLACKMON has filed a statement
in which MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins"? This would
parallel the other descriptions in the "disposition."
2. Because Byron's and my position is in partial dissent, I wonder whether its place in the
"disposition" should not follow the places of
Thurgood, Lewis, and Bill Rehnquist.
Sincerely,

/C,.;.,.
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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December 12, 1979

.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

Re:

No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Chief:
Please have the Order show the following:
''MR.

JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in

the result."
Sincerely,

T.M.

;

The Chief Justice
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 12, 1979

Re:

No. 79-856, Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Bi 11,
Please add my name to your concurring
opinion.
Sincerely yours,
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t •

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

If the order proposed with the Chief Justice's memorandum of December 7 is to be issued, Byron and I would
prefer that the last paragraph read as follows:
"MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join in the grant of the petition for a writ of
certiorari but would set the case for argument
and give it plenary consideration."
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 12, 1979
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
...

-~··~

I propose to add at the end of footnote 2 on page 5
of the present third draft of my concurring opinion the
following:
", so long as they do not trench upon
exclusively federal questions of foreign policy. Zschernig
v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 441 (1968)."
Sincerely,
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C HAM6E:RS O F"

J USTI C E LEWIS F. PO W E L L , JR .

December 12, 1979

79-856 · Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Chief:
I circulate herewith a second draft of my opinion.
At this time (as of the Conference this morning)
there were four votes for Bill Rehnquist's opinion, with
Thurgood reserving judgment until later. When all of the
votes are in, I may have to make conforming changes. The
enclosed draft, however, is what I am sending to the printer.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

December 12, 1979
'.

Re:

~o. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Chief:
Your proposed disposition is satisfactory to me.
Sincerely,

~

\0
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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December 12, 1979

C HAMBERS OF

.JU S TI C E WM . .J . BRENNAN, .JR.

-,

RE:

No. 78-856

Goldwater v. Carter

Proposed Disposition
Dear Chief:

..
•'

I suggest that the statement as to me (which
is satisfactory in form) should go at the end since
I am the only dissenter.
Sincerely,

/ r

/M
The Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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CHAMl!IERS 01'"

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

V1- I

December 12, 1979

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re:

No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

If the order proposed with the Chief Justice's memorandum of December 7 is to be issued, Byron and I would
prefer that the last paragraph read as follows:
"MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN
join in the grant of the petition for a writ of
certiorari but would set the case for argument
and give it plenary consideration."
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December 12, 1979

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
Dear Chief:
Further consideration of the "proposed disposition"
which you have circulated prompts me to make the following
suggestions:
1. After the sentence setting forth Byron's
and my position, would it not be advisable to
add "MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN has filed a statement
in which MR. JUSTICE WHITE joins"? This would

parallel the other descriptions in the "disposition."
2. Because Byron's and my position is in partial dissent, I wonder whether its place in the
"disposition" should not follow the places of
Thurgood, Lewis, and Bill Rehnquist.
Sincerely,

11().AThe Chief Justice
cc: The Conference
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CMAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

December 12, 1979

Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Chief:

.

You have my proxy in working out the final
details in this case.
Respectfully,

yL
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMB E RS OF"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

December 12, 1979

Re:

79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
Enclosed is suggested format following which
the several statements will appear.
Each of you should indicate whether you wish
your position described in this way or otherwise.
I anticipate that the "Statements" will follow
in this order:
Mr. Justice Brennan

Mr. Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mr. Justice Powell
Mr. Justice Rehnquist

PROPOSED DISPOSITION
12/12/79

The petition for writ of certiorari is granted.

The

judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case
is remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss
the complaint.

1

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN would grant the petition for certiorari
and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and has
filed a statement. (More?)

MR. JUSTICE WHITE and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join in the grant
of the petition for a writ of certiorari but would set the
case for argument and give it plenary consideration.

..
~

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concurs in the judgment (More?)

MR. JUSTICE POWELL concurs in the judgment and has filed
a statement.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST concurs in the judgment and has filed
a statement in which MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, MR. JUSTICE
STEWART and MR, JUSTICE STEVENS join,
.
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To: The
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.

...

_

Chief Justice ·
Justice Brannan
Justice· Sfewart
Justice White
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice .Ste
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From: Mr. Justice Blackmun
Circulated:~~~~~~~

1_2~D_E_C_l_S_?S
Recirculated: ____
No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter
MR.

\

JUSTICE

BLACKMUN'

with

.~whom

MR • . JUSTICE

WHITE

joins'

dissenting in part:
In my view,

the time factor and its importance are illusory;

if the President does not have the power to terminate the'.Treaty

,.
{a substantial issue that we should address only after briefing
and oral argument), the notice of intention to terminate surely
has no legal effect.

It is a

study, . to pass on the

issue

of standing or ripeness.
the

petition

for

argument and give
deserves.

indefensible,

-z._

or on the

While I

certiorari,

ithout further

I

issues

join in the grant of
would

set

the

case

for

oral

it the 'plenary consideration it so obviously
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PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ST ATES, ET AL.
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the Court, I
would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial review.

I
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicia.l review. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1, 113- 114 (1976) (per curiam). Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and
the President is 11ot ready for judicial review unless and until
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than
legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide
issues affecting the aUocation of power between the President
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups
or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal politicaI process has the
opportunity to resolve the conflict.
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the
President's action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to
alteration in the supreme law of the land. Congress has
taken no official action. In the present posture of this case,
we do not know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive Branches.

;
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GOLDWATER v. CARTER

_Although the Senate has considered a resolution dec1ari 11g
that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any
mutual defense treaty, sec 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038S7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been taken
on the resolution. See id., at S16683-Sl6692 (daily ed. Nov_.
15, 1979) Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution
would have retroactive effect. See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily
ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ('d. June 18, 1979).
It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has
rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not
to confront the President, it is not our task to do so. I
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case.

11

MR. JUSTICE REHNQrrrsT suggests, ho\,\,ever, that the issue
presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question
which can nc>ver be co11sidcred by this Court. I cannot agree.
In my view , reliance upon the political-question doctrine is
inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth in the seminal
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 ( 1962), the doctrine
incorporates three inquiries . (i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the kxt of the Constitutioll
to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise? ( iii) Do prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention'? Jn my opinion the answer to
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case
if it were ripe.
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitrnent of the issue to a coordinate political
branch," ibid., turns on an examination of the constitutional
provisions governing the exorcise of the power in question.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 (1969). No consti~
tutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the
power to termmate treaties. Further, Art. II, § 2 of the
Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate. Article VI provides.

COLDWATER v. CARTER

that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.
These provisions add support to the view that the text of the
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1,
42 (1849) .
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S., at 217. We are asked to decide whether the President
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of
interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present
case involves neither review of the President's activities as
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the
field of foreign affairs.
uch a case would arise if we were
asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v.
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but
the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional
division of power between Congress and the President.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
find inherent in MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST's concurring opinion.
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. Jus'l'ICE
REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political
question even though Art. II, § 2, clearly would resolve the
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems
self-evident because it demands textural rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is no
different from the issue presented in the case before us. In

.

'

4

GOLDWATER r. CARTER

both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to
dC'ci<le whether congressional approval 1s necessary to give a
Presidential decision 011 the validity of a trPaty the force of
law. Such an inquiry d0mands no special competence or
information beyond the reach of thr judiciary. Cf. Chicago
& Southern Air Lines v Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S.
103, 111 (1948) .1

<lential concerns calling for mutual respect among the thrcJ
Finally, the political-quPstion doctrine rests m part on pru:l.,
branches of government. Thus, the Judicial Brauch should
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment I that would result]
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one riuestion ." Similarly. the doctrrne restrains .1ud1cial action
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political deciSIOll already macle.'' Baker v. Carr., supra,
at 217
Lf this case were npe for .1udicia1 review, sec Part I supra,
noue of these prudential considerations would be present.
Interpretation of the Constitution does not unply lack of
respect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. S., at 548. If the President and the Cougrrss had reached
irreconcilable positions. final dispositiou of the question pre·
sc>nted by tlus case would eliminate. rather than create. multi.
ple constitutional interprelat10ns. The spectre of the Federal
Government brought to a halt because of thP mutual intran.
sigence of the PresidC'nt and the Congress would require this
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say
1 Tlw Cour( hns rC'cognizrd that, 1n th<· ar<·a of forPig11 polte.v, C'ongrrR1'
ma~· lea.vr tlw Pre,;1drnt with wide d1HcrPtio11 that otlwrw1:::P might nm
afoul of tlH' 11ondelrgat1011 doctnnr . Cnited Stall'i; ,. Curtiss-Wright
Expm-t Corp., W9 l1 , . a04 ( rn:~fi) . A;; ;;(ated in that CHH(', "thr Pre::;idrn t. alone haH tlw powrr to :::prak or list en m, a n'11rr,;pn ta ilv!' of th<'
Nat1011 HP ,nakf,s trra11r,- w1tl1 the adv1<·f' and ron~ent of 11H' Senate,
but, he :don<' uegotrntrs.'' Id. , a( ;{10 (emphaH1::1 in the ongrnal) . BPsolut1011 of tlrn, ca~e would rnterfrre with nr1tlwr th<' Pr!'~1cleut s abilit~· lo
nrgotia(r treaties nor his duty to C'Xl'rute thrir provi,-1011,; W<' are merely
being a::;ked lo dernle whrtlwr a t rPaty, wh1rh cannot br rntifiecl wit bout
Senate approval, continue~ 111 rtfr('( until lhr Sena t P or prrha p,; the
Cougrr~,; la kl' fmthe1 nrt wn

GOLDWA1'ER v. CARTER

'l

'what the law is. ' 1 United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703
(1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, l Cranch 137, 177
( 1803).

III
In my view, the suggestion that this case present~
patible with this Court's willingness on previous occasions to
decide whether one branch of our government has impinged
·upon the power of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 707
(1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 676-678 (1929);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 2 Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the responsibility to
decide whether both the Executive and Legislative Branches
have constitutional roles to play in. termination of a treaty.
If the Congress, by appropriate formal action, had challenged
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan,
the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for
our country. 1n that situa.tion, 1t would be the duty of this
Court to resolve the issue,
2 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 ( 1939), is not, relevant here.
In
tha.t case, th(' Court was asked to review lhe legitimacy of a State's
ratification of a constitutional amendment. Four Members of the Court
stated that Congress has exclusive power over the ratification proce~s.
Id., at 456-460 (Black, J ., conrmring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas, J,J., joined). Threr Members of thr Court concluded more
narrowly t.hat. the Court could not. pass upon the efficacy of sta.tc ratification. They also found no standnrds by which the Cou rt could fix a rea,sonable time for the ratification o[ a proposed amendment. Td., at
452-454.
The propos('d constitutional amendmenL aL issue• in Coleman would
have overruled decis10ns of this Court. Compare id., at 435, n. 1 with
Bailey v. Drexel Ji''urniture Co .. 259 U. S. 20 (1922); Hamrner v. Dagenhart, 257 U. S. 251 (1918). Thus, judicial review of the legitimacy of a
State's ratification would have compellrd this Court to overser the very
constitutional process used to over1 urn Supremr Court, drcisions. In.
such circumstances it iR entirely appropriatr for the J11dicial Branch of
government to i:;tep asidr. Sre Scharp[, Jud1cia.l Rrvww and Thr Political
Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J . 517, 589 (1066) . The
present case involves no similar primiple of jmlirial nonintervention.
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No. 79-856

TO BE PRINTED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

DEC 19 1979

OCTOBER TERM, 1979

MICHAEL RODA'K, JR., tlERiK

SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.
JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND CYRUS VANCE, SECRETARY OF
STATE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETI~IONERS' SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

DANIEL J. POPEO
Washington Legal Foundation
1612 K Street, NW, Suite 605
Washington, DC 20006
J. TERRY EMERSON
427 Russell Senate Building
Washington, DC 20510
PAUL D. KAMENAR
910 Seventeenth Street, NW
Tenth Floor
Washington, DC 20006
NORTHCUTT ELY
ROBERT F. PIETROWSKI, JR.
FREDERICK H. RITTS
RALPH J. GILLIS
Law Offices of Northcutt Ely
Watergate 600 Building, NW
Washington, DC 20037
Attorneys for Petitioners

;

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1979

SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.
JAMES EARL CARTER, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, AND CYRUS VANCE, SECRETARY OF
STATE

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

PETITIONERS' SUPPLE~ENTAL BRIEF

Petitioners, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 24(5),
hereby file this Supplemental Brief in further reply to.
Respondent's Brief in Opposition at page 16 concerning the
original design and intent of the Fra~ers.

Respondent's

argument is so contrary to the historical record that Petitioners
believe it imperative to answer with the words of the Framers
the:r'1SP.lves ~,rhich, because of time constraints, have not heretofore
been brought to this Court's attention.

Respondents argue the Framers were silent on treaty termination
both at the Constitutional Convention and in the document and would
have the Court infer that the Framers meant for the President to act
alone.

Actually, the consistent statements and actions of at least

twelve of the most prominent Framers and Founding Fathers, including
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, John Jay, James
Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, Gouverneur Morris, George Mason, C. C.
Pinckney, Rufus King, Hugh Williamson, and James Iredell, prove that
treaty termination was designed to be a shared power exercised by the
President with some form of concurrence by the legislature.

Thus, John Jay declared in The Federalist:
"They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal
them; and it will not be disputed that they who make
treaties may alter or cancel them . . . . " The Federalist,
No. 64, at 394 (Rossiter ed. 1861).
~
Respondents have claimed below that the words by John Jay are
''ambiguous."

The Nation's leading authority

(R. 397).

on John Jay disagrees.

Professor Richard B. Morris, Gouverneur Morris

Professor of ·History Emeritus at Columbia University and editor of
The Papers of John Jay, states:
"It just so happens that I have before me a copy of the
original draft of 'Federalist' Letter No. 64 in Jay's own
handwriting, with some variances from the published text.
Throughout Jay is talking about treaty-making as a shared
function, and it is a fair inference from his text that he
would have regarded treaty termination in the same light."
125 Cong. Rec. Sl5718 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1979).
In part Professor Morris relies on the fact that Jay's personal
draft includes the following important sentence which was erroneously
omitted in the newspaper edition:
"With respect to the responsibility of the President and
Senate, it is difficult to conceive how it could be increased."
Id. (Emphasis added).
The inclusion of the missing sentence in the authentic draft
of The Federalist proves beyond any doubt that Jay was thinking of
joint action by the executive and legislative branches, and not action
by the President alone, when he referred to the making and cancellation
of treaties.
In explaining how a treaty could be terminated, even in case of
a breach by the other nation, James Madison, the "Father of the
Constitution," wrote on January 2, 1791:
"That the contracting powers can annul the treaty cannot,
I presume, be questioned, the same authority, precisely
being exercised in annulling as in making a treaty."
1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 524-525
(lo65)
(emphasis added)_!_/

1/

In Madison's words, there are three grounds for legislative
participation: l)"the power vested by the Constitution with respect
to Treaties in the President and Senate makes them the competent
Judges" of whether to terminate, 2)"as the treaty is a law, the whole
Legislature are to judge of its annulment," and 3)"in case the President
and Senate be competent in ordinary Treaties, the Legislative authority
(may) be requisite to annul a Treaty of Peace, as being equivalent to a
Declaration of War, to which that authority alone, by our Constitution,
is competent." 1 Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 524-525
(1865). Thus Madison sawa:-1-ational basis for~istinguishing between
treaties according to their subject matter and relationship to other
powers of the Congress.
-2-

In 1796, James Iredell, one of the leading figures in explaining
the Constitution at the North Carolina ratifying convention, wrote
that it is Congress alone "to whom, I conceive, the authority is
entrusted" for "vacating" a treaty.-.J:.../
In early 1801, when he was still Vice President, Thomas Jefferson
wrote in the first manual of Senate procedure:
"Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is the law of
the land. It differs from other laws only as it must have
the consent of a foreign nation . . . . Treaties being declared, equally with the laws of the United States, to be
the supreme law of the land, it is understood that an act
of the legislature alone can declare them infringed and
rescinded." T. Jefferson,~ Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the Senate of the United States, Sec.
I:1r-(1801Y--(emphasi~dded.) ~ ~~
The statements of other Framers and Founding Fathers are all
consistent with and supportive of the above stated conclusions by
Madison, Jay, Iredell and Jefferson.

For example, it is well known

that the Framers were concerned with restoring dependability to our
treaties and were anxious to gain the respect and confidence of foreign
nations.

Alexander Hamilton identifies the want of respect in our

treaty relations as one of the most material defects under the
Articles of Confederation meant to be cured by the Constitution._l/
James Wilson, a signer of the Constitution and one of the original
Justices of this Court, said at the Pennsylvania Convention to ratify
the Constitution that Article III, respecting the judicial department,
"will show the world, that we make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the character of the United States ... _!/

2/ See opinion by then Justice Iredell sitting as a
circuit judge, reprinted in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796).
3/ The Federalist no. 22, at 151 (Rossiter ed. 1961).
In the preface to his notes on debates in the Constitutional Convention, James Madison identified several instances where treaties
of the Confederation were violated. These depredations are catalogued by Madison among "the defects, the deformities, the diseases
and the ominous prospects for which the Convention were to provide
a remedy, and which ought never to be overlooked in expounding &
appreciating the Constitutional Charter the remedy that was provided." 3 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 548-549
(M. Farrand~. 1937) (nereinafter cited as Recoras)-.~4/ 2 The Documentart History of the Ratification of the
Constitutio'i1"518 (~Jensen ed.976).
~ ~-- -~
-3-

It is difficult to believe the Framers, who regarded violation
of "the sacred faith of treaties" as "wicked" and "dishonorable" and
contrary to our best interests in gaining respect among other nations,
would have made treaties repealable at the pleasure of the President
alone.2_/
It is also well known that the Framers were concerned with protecting valuable commercial interests and securing increased trade
rights._§/

Specific concern was expressed against making it easy to

abridge the common rights of navigation of the Lakes and the Mississippi
River which had been won by the United States in the Peace Treaty with
Great Britain._2_/

Other Framers mentioned the fear of the New England

states that our fishery rights by treaty off Newfoundland might be
easily given away._!/

C. C. Pinckney, a member both of the Federal

Convention and his state ratification convention, explained that
South Carolina, "considering the valuable produce it has to export,
is particularly interested in maintaining the sacredness of treaties."_Q/
Gouverneur Morris also pointed to the conclusion that treaties were
not to be easily cancelled when he said at the Convention that "the
more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set on thell}. :'!Q./

5/ So said James Wilson in his Lectures on Law, 1 The Works
of James Wilson 166-167 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967).
6/ ~·£·, 4 Records 58 (Madison's record of subject debated);
2 Recoras 449 (C.C. Pinckney), 452 (Madison). For a thorough discussion of the preoccupation of the Framers with economic and sectional interests when the treaty clause was debated in the Convention,
see also Bestor, Separation of Powers in the Domain of Foreign Affairs:
The Intent of the Constitution Historically Examined, 5 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 527, 613-619 (1974).
_2_/ E.£., 1 Records 308 (Hamilton); 3 Records 306-307 (H.
Williamson).
8/ George Mason said in the Virginia Convention that "The
Newfounc:Iland fisheries will require that kind of security which we
are now in want of . . . " 3 Records 335. Gouverneur Morris referred
to"the Fisheries or the Mississippi (as) the two great objects of the
Union." 2 Records 548. Surely the Framers did not intend to permit
the giving away of these two great objects at the whim of a single
officer of government.
9/ J. Elliot, 4 Debates in the Several State Conventions of the
Federar-constitution 279 (1861).~
~ ~-

_l_Q_/

2 Records 393 (emphasis added.)

-4-

Thus, the Framers sought to give each section of the country
an opportunity to exert an influence in the legislature in deciding
upon both the making and unmaking of treaties because of the direct
effect either action would have upon strong economic or political
interests in particular States or regions.

The Framers clearly were

as interested in protecting these regional interests by making it
difficult to revoke beneficial treaties as they were in protecting
those interests by guarding against harmful treaties.
Moreover, the intent of the Framers can be derived from their
belief that the termination of any treaty, particularly an alliance,
might lead to war with the injured nation.

George Washington relied

on exactly such a warning from his Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson 1
in 1793 when he refused to denounce the treaty of alliance with France
in part because "an injured friend is the bitterest of foes."

Jefferson

added that cancellation of the treaty would giye "just cause for war"
by our treaty partner._!l/
Respondents are correct in observing that the silence of the
Constitution on treaty termination is "hardly surprising."
respondents draw the wrong conclusion from this fact.

But

In the words

of historian Arthur Bestor:
"This silence can hardly be considered remarkable in
view of the fact that the framers neither discussed
nor provided for other comparable procedures notably
the repeal of a statute once enacted. The principal
concern of the members of these conventions was the
proper allocation of the various positive powers of
government. Only in exceptional instances did they
give attention to the negative use of these powers-in other words, to procedures for undoing or reversing
what had once been done." A Bestor, "Respective Roles
of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogating
of Treaties," 55 Washington Law Review 1, text
accompanying notes 67-68 (1979)
(to be published).

11/ The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 225, 231 (P. Ford ed.
1895).----itufus King, one o-r-the Framers, similarly advised Alexander
Hamilton that the President would not be justified by law in saying
the treaty was terminated. D. Malone, Thomas Jeffe~soti ·and the
Ordeal of Liberty 7 4 (.196 2) . Contrary to the implication of-Respondents' Brief in Opposition at page 16, note 7, Hamilton never
claimed the French Alliance was "terminated." He agreed as a member
of Washington's Cabinet the treaty was not void, but later wrote it
could be temporarily "suspended" becausethe alliance was defensive
only and France had initiated offensive war against most of the rest
of Europe. VII Hamilton's Works 83-93 (1850-51).
-5-

Furthermore, in the absence of specific constitutional instruction
on revocations, reversal by those branches participating in the adopting
process is the logical procedure of effecting any repeal.

This princi-

ple was so firmly established in English law that it was adopted in
America without question.~/

Blackstone's famous Commentaries on the

Laws of England, which was available to the Framers, gave repeated
emphasis to the maxim ''that it requires the same strength to dissolve,
as to create an obligation."_!l/
In summary, it is clear the Framers intended the same principle that the power to unmake is a corollary of the power to make - to apply
to the termination of a treaty, as to the repeal of other law._]i/

~/

Bestor, supra, at text accompanying note 74.

13/ William Blackstone, 1 Commentaries on the Laws of Enfland
160-16-r;-185-186 (4th ed. 1770). The fourth edition i~e<3"nerom
which the first American edition was reprinted at Philadelphia in
1771-1772.
14/ Also, the Framers may well have been guided by their
knowledge that Congress alone could annul a treaty for the United
States under the Articles of Confederation. In referring to the
Continental Congress, Hamilton advised Jefferson: "It is an obvious
truth, and is so stated, that Congress alone has the right to pronounce a breach of the treaty." 6 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson
7 (P. Ford ed. 1895). Absent speciric instruction in the Constitution~
it is reasonable to conclude that the Framers meant for the legislatuTe
to continue to exercise some role in treaty termination, as it had
done in the past, insofar as consistent with the other provisions of
the document.

-6-
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, CONCURRING
Al though I agree with the result reached by the Court,

\ u

I would dismiss the complaint kx:

~e.wj
;tRt1t.d1c1J.
'f'ea°'on.

11£-7~,fi>
ii

ei

I

This Court has recognized that an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley'!...:_ Valeo,
424

U.S.

1'

113-14

(1976)

(per

curiam).

Prudential

considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until

·2.

each

branch

authority.
are

has

taken

Differences

action

asserting

between

the

commonplace under our system.

almost

invariably

considerations.
affecting

the

Congress

until

impasse.

do,

The

turn

constitutional

President and

the

Congress

The differences should,

political

rather

than

judicial branch should not decide

allocation
the

on

its

of

power

political

Otherwise4 we

between

branches

would

reach

encourage

individual members of Congress

the

legal
issues

President

a

small

and

and

constitutional
groups

or

even ../

to seek judicial resolution of

issues before the normal political process has the opportunity
to resolve the

~

conflict.

In this case, a

JH111i",t

fttffllb eJ

od

members of Congress

claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty with
Taiwan

has

deprived

them

of

their

constitutional

role

with

respect to alteration in the supreme law of the land.
i.,a o b een- no official action -Is¥, Ceng r es,,; .

of

this

actual

case,

we

do

confrontation

branches.

Although

not

know

between
the

whether
the

Senate

In the present
there

ever

legislative

has

will

be

an

and

executive

a

resolution

considered

declaring that Senate approval is necessary for the termination
of any mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-39
( daily ed.
resolution.
Moreover,
retroactive

June 6,
See
it

is

1979) , no final vote has been taken on the

id.

at

unclear

effect.

See

S16683-92
whether
id.

at

(daily
the

ed.

Nov.

resolution

S7 054-64

( daily

15,

1979).

would
ed.

have

June

6,

3.

1979);
be

id., at S7862 (daily ed. June 18, 1979). Thus,

said

that

either

President's claim.
President,

the

Senate or

the

House

has

it cannot

rejected

the

If the Congress chooses not to confront the

it is not our task to do so.

I

therefore concur

in

the dismissal of this case.
I I

I)

)/p..

JtJJ"rlC~ f..eHJJ~,;1.(T .S<>'f'[e.c,fsJ
01-der o-€- this Coat t nz1 ds, however,

presented by this

case

is

a

nonjusticiable

that the issue

political

question

which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree.

In

my view,

is

reliance

e:As

inapprop! ie1!:e

our precedents.

upon

the

the

political question doctrine

11AAe eessar;;l,
As

set forth

I e el~e

i~ ---r ncons is tent with

in the seminal case of Baker v.

Carr, 369 U.S.

186, 217 (1962), the doctrine incorporates three

inquiries:

Does

( i)

the

issue

involve

resolution of

questions

committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch
of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that
a

court

move

beyond

areas

of

judicial

expertise?

(iii)

Do

prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?
In

my

opinion

the

answer

to

each

of

these

inquiries

would

require us to decide this case if it were ripe.
First,

the

existence

of

"a

textually

demonstrable

constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
branch,"

ibid. ,

provisions
Powell

v.

turns on an examination of the constitutional

governing

the

McCormack,

exercise
395

U.S.

of

the
4 86,

power
519

in

question.

(1969).

No

~

4.

constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President
the power to terminate treaties.

Further, Article II,

2 of

§

the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate.

Article VI provides that

treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.
provisions

add

Constitution
terminate
Morgan,

support

does

not

treaties

413 U.S.

to

1,

to
6

the

view

that

unquestionably
the

President

( 1973) ;

the

commit

alone.

Luther v.

text
the

Cf.

Borden,

These
of

the

power

to

Gilligan
7 How.

v.

1,

42

(1849).
Second,
and manageable

there

is no

standards

for

"lack of

judicially discoverable

resolving"

this

case;

nor

is

a

decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Baker
U.S., at 217.

~

Carr, 369

We are asked to decide whether the President may

terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional
approval.

Re solution of the quest ion may not be easy,

but it

only requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to
the constitutional provisions at issue. See Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S., at 548-49. The present case involves neither review of
the

President's

activities

as

Commander-in-Chief

nor

impermissible interference in the field of foreign affairs. Such
a

case

would

arise

if we were

asked

to decide,

for example,

whether a treaty required the President to order troops into a
foreign country.

But "it is error to suppose that every case or

~

,.

5.

controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance. 11 Baker
foreign

relations,

~

Carr,

but

supra,

the

at 211. Th is case

question

presented

to

II

us

touches 11
concerns

only the constitutional division of power between Congress and
the President.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
t. J;,rr,c (!- fe1-1J.J~u,,, ·~ C<Wcurr-1'1:1 tJ,1fl1{)X
find inherent in
'
·
·
Assume that
the

President

signed

a

mutual

defense

treaty with

a

foreign

country and announced that it would go into effect despite its
,-4(, .JLJS1'7C~ f."°N.UQIJUT''.f
a.Ii "j
rejection by the Senate. Under~
at situation
would present a political question even though Article II,
clearly would resolve the dispute.

§

2

Although the answer to the

hypothetical case seems self-evident because it demands textual
rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue
;

presented is no different from the issue presented in the case
before

us.

In

Constitution

both

to

cases,

decide

the

Court

whether

would

congressional

interpret

the

approval

is

necessary to give a Presidential decision on the validity of a
treaty

the

competence

force
or

-QO~~eteRGe.

of

law.

information
Cf.

Chicago

Such

an

beyond
&

inquiry
the

Southern

demands

reach
Air

of
Lines

no

the
v.

special

judiciary
Waterman

Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948 ~
Finally, the political question doctrine rests in part
on

prudential

concerns

calling

three branches of government.

for

Thus,

mutual
the

respect

among

the

judicial branch should

6.

avoid "the potentiality of embarassment [that would result] from

_,_

multifarious
question."

pronouncements
Sim~rly,

the

by

various

doctrine

on

departments

restrains

judicial

one

action

/

where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made." Baker .Y_:_ Carr, supra, at 217.
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I
supra, none of these prudential considerations would be present.
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of repect
for a coordinate branch.
If

the

President

positions,
case

and

the

Powell .Y_:_ McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548.
Congress

had

reached

irreconcilable

final disposition of the question presented by this

would

constitutional

eliminate,

rather

interpretations.

than

The

create,

spectre

of

the

multiple
federal

government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence
of the President and the Congress

would require this Court to

provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say what the law
is." United States .Y_:_ Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974), quoting
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).

...

In my view,
willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one
branch of our government has impinged upon the power of another.
See Buckley .Y_:_ Valeo, 424 U.S.

1, 138 (1976); United States v.

Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279

u.s ~

655, 676-78 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). j.-

~

7.

Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr,

---

the

responsibility

legislative

to

decide

branches

have

termination of a treaty.
action,
the

had

treaty

serious

challenged
with

both

constitutional

the

executive

roles

to

play

in

the President's authority to terminate

for

the
our

resulting
country.

uncertainty
In

that

could

have

situation,

would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue.

,._.

and

If the Congress, by appropriate formal

Taiwan,

consequences

whether

it

8.

FOOTNOTES

1.

A majority

of

the

Court

today

decides

a

major

constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and
argument.

Normally, the Court would make such a judgment only

after the critical testing and debate that are the essence of
the

adversary system.

It

seems especially unfortunate that a

constitutional decision has been made before an impasse exists
between

the

executive

and

legislative

branches.

Whether

one

speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or, as the opinion
of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as
an absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact is that
neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue
with the President's decision. There is no reason for the
;

to decide whether we are presented with a political question.
This
foreign

policy,

Court
Congress

has
may

recognized
leave

that,

the

in

the

President

area of

with

wide

discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation
doctrine. United States~ Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone

negotiates."

Resolution
President's

of

this

ability

Id.
case
to

at

319.

would

(emphasis
interfere

negotiate

treaties

in
with
nor

the

original)

neither
his

duty

the
to

9.

execute their provisions.

We are merely being asked to decide

whether

cannot

a

treaty,

approval,

which

continues

be

ratified

without

Senate

in effect until the Senate or perhaps the

Congress takes further action.

~

Coleman

v.

Miller,

307

U.S.

433

(1939)

is

not

relevant here.

In that case, the Court was asked to review the

legitimacy

a

of

amendment.

state's

ratification

of

a

constitutional

Four members of the Court stated that Congress has

exclusive power over the ratification process.
(Black,

J.,

Douglas,

concurring,

JJ.,

joined).

with

whom

Roberts,

Three members

of

Id., at 456-60
Frankfurter,

the

Court

and

concluded

more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of
state ratification.
Court

could

fix

a

They also found no standards by which the
reasonable

time

for

the

ratification of

a

proposed amendment. Id., at 452-54.
The

proposed

constitutional

amendment

at

issue

in

Coleman would have overruled previous decisions of this Court.
Compare id. at 435 n.1 with Bailey':!..:... Drexel Furniture Co., 259
U.S.

20

(1922); Hammer':!..:... Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251

judicial
would

review

have

of

the

compelled

legitimacy
this

of

Court

a
to

(1918). Thus,

state's

ratification

oversee

the

very

constitutional process used to overturn Supreme Court decisions.
In

such

circumstances

judicial

branch

Judicial

Review

of
and

it

is

government
The

entirely
to

Political

step

appropriate

for

aside.

Scharpf,

Question:

See
A

the

Functional

1 0.

Analysis,

75

Yale

L.

J.

517,

589

(1966).

c;;-=~nvolves no similar principle of judicial n ~

The

present

~
.
ntervent1on.

case
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MR. JUSTICE POWELL, ; loNCURRING

Although I agree with the result reached by the Court,
I would dismiss the complaint for a different reason.
I

This Court has recognized that an issue should not be
oecided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley:!...:_ Valeo,
j_

424

U.S.

1'

113-14
I\

( 1976)

(per

curiam).

Prud e ntial

considerations persuade me that · a dispute between Congress and
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until

2.

~ach

branch

authority.
are

has

Differences

commonplace

almost

taken

considerations.
affecting
Congress

the

the

members

on

judicial
of

political

branch

power

and

between

we

encourage

should,
than

the

President

a

small

and

legal

decide

reach

to seek

Congress

not

issues
and

con st i tut ion al
groups

judicial

the normal political process has

to resolve the

the

rather

should

branches

Congress

constitutional

The differences

i

would

its

President

political

of

.

-:,,

issues before

turn

1

Otherwise

individual

the

system.

allocation

until

impasse.

our

do,

The

asserting

between

under

invariably

action

or

even

resolution of

the opportunity

conflict.

In this case,

a

limited number of ~embers of Congress
,...
.,..

claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty with
Taiwan

has

deprived

them

of

their

constitutional

role

'

But there ~

respect to alteration in the supreme law of the land.
has been no official action by Congress.
of

this

actual

case,

we

do

confrontation

branches.
;'

Although

not

know

whether

between
the

In the present posture
there

ever

will

legislative and
:
has considered

the

Senate

with

a

be

an

executive

1

resolution

,i

declaring that Senate approval

is necessary for the termination

?6

of any mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038-39
/)

(daily ed.

June

r e solution.
Moreover,
retroactive

See
it

is

6,

1979),

id. ) at
unclear

effect.

See

no final

I l (.

S16683 fi 92
whether

vote has
(daily
the

ed.

be e n taken on the
Nov .

resolution

15,

1979).

would

have

10 .
id. ) at

S7054-64
/I

(daily

ed.

June

6,

;

I

3.

1979);
be

id., at S7862 (daily ea. June 18,

said

that

President 1 s
President,

either

claim.
it

the

Senate or

the

1979). Thus,
House

has

it cannot

rejected

the

If the Congress chooses not to confront the

is not our task to do so.

I

therefore concur

in

the dismissal of this case.
II
The order of this Court holds, however, that the issue
presented

by

this

case

is

a

non justiciable

political

quest ion

which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree.

In

my

is

view,

reliance

inappropriate

and

our precedents.
Carr,

369 U.S.

inquiries:

(i)

upon

the

the

political question doctrine

unnecessary. 1
As

set forth

186, 217
Does

the

It

also

is

inconsistent

with

in the seminal case of Baker v.

(1962), the doctrine incorporates three
issue

involve

resolution of

questions

committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate branch
of government? (ii) Would resolution of the question demand that
a

court

move

beyond

areas

of

judicial

expertise?

(iii)

Do

prudential considerations counsel against judicial intervention?
In

my

opinion

the

answer

to

each

of

these

inquiries

would

require us to decide this case if it were ripe.
First,

the

existence

of

"a

textually

demonstrable

constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
branch,"

ibid. ,

provisions
Powell

v.

turns on an examination o f

governing

the

McCormack,

exercise
395

U.S.

of

t he
4 86,

the constitutional
power
519

in

question.

(1969).

No

4.

constitutional
the power to

provision explicitly confers
terminate treaties.

Fut'ther,

upon

the

Artiole

President

II,§

2 of

(!)

the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with
the ad v ice and consent of the Senate.

Article VI provides that
These

tt"eaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.
provisions

add

Constitution
terminate
Morgan,

support

does

not

treaties

413

U.S.

to

1,

to
6

the

view

that

unquestionably
the

President

commit

text
the

Cf.

alone.

Luther v.

(1973);

the

Borden,

of

the

power

to

Gilligan
How.

7

v.

1,

42

(1849).

Second,
and

manageable

there

is

no

standards

for

"lack of

judicially discoverable

resolving"

this

case;

nor

is

a

decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for
U • .S.,

at 217.

nonjudicial discretion."

Baker

~

Carr,

369

We are asked to decide whether the President may

terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional
approval.

Resolution of

the question may

not

be

easy,

but

it

only requires us to apply normal principles of interpretation to
the constitutional provisions at issue. See Powell v. McCormack,

-5
395 U.S., at 548-49. The present case involves neither review of
I)

the

President's

activities

as

Commander-in-Chief

nor

impermissible interference in the fi~ld of foreign affairs. Such
a

case

would

arise

if

we

were

asked

to dee ide,

whether a treat y required the President to ord e r
foreign country.

for

example,

troops

into a

But "it is error to suppose that every cas e or

~

I

5.

controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
·
"Bk
cognizance.
a er

foreign

relations,

only the

~

C r'
~

but

supra,

the

at

question

211.

Th1's case "touches"

presented

to

us

concerns

constitutional division of power between Congress and

the President.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
find
the

Assume that

inherent in the Court's holding in this case.
President

signed

a

mutual

defense

treaty

with

a

foreign

country and announced that it would go

into effect despite

rejection by the Senate.

holding,

Under

today's

its

that situation

would present a political question even though A r t ~ II,

§

2

C,

1

Although the answer to the

clearly would resolve the dispute.

hypothetical case seems self-evident because

it demands textual

rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue
presented
before

is no different from the

us.

In

Constitution

both

to

cases,

decide

the

issue presented
Court

whether

would

in

the

case

interpret

the

approval

is

congressional

necessary to give

a Presidential decision on the validity of a

treaty

of

the

competence

force
or

-eompeten"e.

law.

information
Cf.

Chicago

Steamship Corp., 333 U.S.
Finally,
on

prudential

three

Such

an

inquiry

beyond
&

the

Southern

103, 111

demands

reach
Air

of

no

the

Lines

v.

special

judiciary
Waterman

(1948).2

the political question doctrine rests in part

concerns

calling

branches of government.

for

Thus,

mutual
the

respect

among

the

judicial branch should
-;
,:

--

-

o.

avoid "the potentiality of embarassment [that would result]
multifarious
question."

pronouncements
Simiarly,

the

by

various

doctrine

departments

restrains

on

judicial

from
one

action

where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made." Baker~ Carr, supra, at 217.
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I
supra, none of these prudential considerations would be present.
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of repect
for a coordinate branch.
If

the

President

positions,
case

final

would

constitutional

and

the

Powell~ McCormack, 395 U.S., at 548.
Congress

had

reached

irreconcilable

disposition of the question presented by this

eliminate,

rather

interpretations.

create,

than

The

spectre

of

the

multiple
federal

government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence
of the President and

the Congress

would require this Court to

provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say what
is."

United States~ Nixon,

418 U.S.

683,

703

th'= law

(1974), quoting

Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803).
III
In my view,

the Court's holding

today is

incompatible

with its willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one
branch of our government has impinged upon the power of another.
See Buckley~ Valeo,
Nixon,

418 U.S.

'

683,

424 U.S.
707

1,

138

(1976);

United States v.

(1974); The Pocket Veto Case,

279 U.S.

655, 676/178 (1929): Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).~

7.

Under
the

the criteria enunciated

responsibility

legislative

to

decide

branches

have

the

had

treaty

serious

challenged
with

whether

Carr, this Court has
--

both

constitutional

the

Taiwan,

consequences

-

the

executive

roles

to

and

play

in

If the Congress, by appropriate formal

termination of a treaty.
action,

in Baker v.

for

President I s

the
our

resulting
country.

authority

to

uncertainty
In

that

terminate
could

have

situation,

would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue.

it
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FOOTNOTES

1.

A majority

of

the

Court

today

decides

a

major

constitutional question without the benefit of full briefing and
argument.

Normally,

after the er it ical
the

adversary

the Court would make such a judgment only

testing and debate

system.

It

that

are

the essence of

seems especially unfortunate

that a

constitutional decision has been made before an impasse exists
between

the

executive

and

legislative

Whether

branches.

speaks in terms of the absence of "ripeness" or,

one

the opinion

n.S

of Judges Wright and Tamm in the Court of Appeals viewed it, as
an absence of standing by petitioners, the simple fact

is that

neither the Senate nor the Congress as a whole has taken issue
with the President's decision. There is no reason for the Court
to decide whether we are presented with a political question.
2.
foreign

This

policy,

Court
Congress

has
may

recognized
leave

that,

the

in

the

President

area

with

of

wide

discretion that otherwise might run afoul of the non-delegation
doctrine. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936). As stated in that case, "the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone

negotiates."

Resolution
President's

of

this

ability

_!i .

1
case
to

at

319 k>

would

(emphasis
interfere

negotiate

treaties

in
with
nor

the

original)~

neither
his

duty

the
to

I

9•

execute

their provisions.

We

whether

a

cannot

treaty,

approval,

which

continues

are merely being

in effect

be

asked

ratified

until

the

to decide

without

Senate

Senate · or perhaps

the

Congress takes further action.
3.

Coleman

v.

Miller,

307

U.S.

433

(1939)

is

not

relevant here.

In that case, the Court was asked to review the

legitimacy

a

of

amendment.

state's

Four members of

ratification
the

Court

of

a

stated

that Congress

exclusive power over the ratification process.
(Black,

J.,

Doug 1 as ,

JJ . ,

concurring,

with

j o in e d ) .

Three

whom

Roberts,

members

of

constitutional
has

,.,

Id., at 456-60
/I
Frankfurter, and

the

Court

concluded

more narrowly that the Court could not pass upon the efficacy of
They also found no standards by which the

state ratification.
Court

could

fix

reasonable

a

time

ratification

the

for

of

a

proposed amendment. Id., at 452-14.
The

"

-

proposed

constitutional

amendment

at

issue

in

Coleman would have overruled previous decisions of this Court.
Compare id. at 435 n.1 with Bailey~ Drexel Furniture Co.,
1

U.S.

20

(1922); Hammer~ Dagenhart, 247 U.S.

judicial
would

review

have

of

the

compelled

legitimacy
this

of

Court

a
to

251

259

(1918). Thus,

state's

ratification

oversee

the

very

constitutional process used to overturn Supreme Court decisions.
In

such

circumstances

judicial

branch

Judicial

Review

of
ano

it

is

government
The

entirely
to

Political

step

appropriate
aside.

Question:

;;)

See

for

~

A

the

Scharpf,

Functional

~

1 0.

Analysis,

75

Yale

L.

J.

517,

589

(1966).

The

present

involves no similar principle of judicial non-intervention •
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No. 70- 856. DPeided Decembrr -, 1979
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN J with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE
joins, dissenting in part.
In my view , the time factor audits importance are illusory;
if the President does not have the power to terminate the
Treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after
briefing and oral argument), the notice of intentiou to terminate surely has no legal effect. Tt is also i!?cl~f,;:1si]lle, without further study, to pass on the issue of justic1ability or on
the issues of standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in
the grant of the petition for certiorari, I would set the case
for oral argument aud give it the plenary consideration it so·
obviously deserves
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December 13, 1979

Re:

No. 78-856
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Goldwater v. Carter

Dear Chief:
As John indicated in his circulation of yesterday, you
also have my "proxy" for working out the details of the . oroer
and the timing of its release.
Sincerely,
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The Chief Justice
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No. 79-856 - Goldwater v. Carter

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
This case will come down as it appears in the
attachment at 4 o'clock or as soon thereafter as
printing can be completed.
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JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
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Dear Chief,
Your proposed order, circulated today,
is satisfactory to me .
Sincerely yours,

The Chief Justice
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BARRY GOLD'\VATER E'l' AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER,
PREl',IDENT OF THE UNITED ~TA TES, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTJORARI TO 'rHE VNITED S'l'ATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT 0~' COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

·o. 79- 850

Dce1dcd DrcPmlwr - , 1!)7!)

MR. JusTICE PowELL, concurring.
Although I agree with the result reache<l by the Court, 1
would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial review.

I
This Court has recogmze<l that an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1. 113- 114 (1976) (per curiarn). Prudrntial considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and
the Presideut is not ready for judicial review unless and until
each branch has taken actio11 asserting its constitutional
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than
legal consideratio11s. The Judicial Branch should not decide
issues affecting the aliocatiou of power between the President
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups
or even individual Members of Cougress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the
opportunity to resolve the conflict.
In this case, a few Members of Cougress claim that the
President's action rn terminating the treaty with Taiwan has
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to
l\alt811ati(.m in the supreme law of the land. C'oHgress has
taken no official action. l II the present posture of this case,
we do not know whether there ever will be an a<'tual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive Branches.

2
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.Although thr Senate> has considered a resolution declaring
that Senate approval is necessary for thr termination of any
mutual defense treaty, ser 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038S7039 ( daily ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been taken
on the resolution . See id., at S16683- Sl6092 (daily ed. Nov.
15, 1979) . Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution
would have retroactive effect. See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily
ed. June 6, 1979); 1:d., at S7862 (daily C'd. June 18, 1979) .
It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has
rejected the President's claim. If thr Congress chooses not
to confront the Preside11t, it is not our task to do so. I
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case.

11
Mn. JUSTICE REHNQITIST suggests, hov\C'Ver, that the 1ssue
presented by this case is a nonjusticiablP political question
which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree.
In my view , reliance upon the political-question doctrine is
inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth in the seminal
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 ( 1962), the doctrine
incorporates three inquiries : (i) Does th e issue involve resol ution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution
to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considC'rations counsel
against judicial i11tervention '? In my opinion the answer to
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case
if it were ~
.
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
branch ," ibid., turns 011 an examination of the constitutional
provisions governing the exercise of the power in question.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519 ( 1969) . No co11stit utional provisio11 explicitly confers upon the President the
power to terminate treaties. Further, Art. II, § 2 of the
Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with
the advice and consent of the f.;enate . Article VI provides

;
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3

that treaties shall be a part of the supremo law of the land.
These provisions adu support to the view that the text of the
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1,
42 (1849).
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a decision impossible "without an initial policy cleterminatio1i of a
kind clearly for nonjuuicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S., at 217. We are askeu to decide whether the President
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of
interpretation to tho co1Jstitutional provisions at issue. See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present
case involves neither review of the President's activities as
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the
field of foreign affairs.
uch a case would arise if we were
asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations lies beyond Judicial cognizance." Baker v.
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches'' foreign relations, but
the questio11 presented to us concerns only the constitutional
division of power between Congress and the President.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
find inherent in MR. Ju8TICE REHNQUIST's concurring opinion.
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. JUSTICE
REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political
question even though Art. II, § 2, clearly would resolve the
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems
self-evident because it demands textural rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is no
different from the issue presented in the case before us. In
j

4
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both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to
decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of
law. Such an inquiry clc>mands no special competence or
informatiou beyond the reach of the judiciary. Cf. Chicago
& Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S.
103, 111 (1948) .1
dcntial concerns calling for mutual respect among the three)
Fiually, the political-question doctrine rests in part on
branches of government. Thus. the Judicial Branch should
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment I that would result]
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one questi011." Similarly, the doctrrne restrains judicial action
where there is au "unusual n<'ed for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made.'' Baker v. Carr, supra,
at 217.
If this case were ripe for Judicial review, see Part I S'Upra,
none of these prudential considrrations would be present.
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of
resprct for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. R., at 548. If the President and the Co11gress had reached
irrrcoucilable positions. final disposition of the question preseuted by this case would eliminat<'. rather than create. multiple co11stitutional intC>rpr0tat1011s. The spectre of the Federal
Govcrnme11t brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigPnce of the President and the Congress would require this
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say

pr~,L

l The Court hns recognized thal, in ih<' aren of torrign pohr.v, Congre;.;R
m:1.,· lP,we 11w Prr~idrnl with widC' diserPt10n that othC'rwi::;e might run
afoul of the uondelrgation doc·trinr . 'L 'nited 8tate1S Y. Curtiss-Wrioht

fi};vpurt C'orp., W9 ( l. S. ;30-J (1!l:3ii). As stated 111 that case, " the Pre,;ide11t. alone ha,; tlw powrr to ~peak or li~te1i m; a rPpre"'c'ntativP of the
Nation . He makes trrntw,; with tlw adviC'e and ron"ent of the Senate ;
b11t, hl' alon<' 1wgotmteH.'' Id., at ;~rn (<'m1iha.~i::; 111 tlw onginal). l~e1:10l11tio11 of tlrn: ca8e would 111terfrre with nrithrr tlw Prrs1dent ',; abilit~· 10
urgotiate treaties nor hi,; duty to Px<·<·ute their prm·i,;1011s. WP are merely
bPing a:-kecl to deride whether n. trc·at~·, winch cannot be rntifird without
Sernt1P approval , contmue~ m etfP<·1 until !hr Senate or pPrhnps the
Cougrp:,;s t ak<· further ar11011.

.
'·

;

~-'

•'
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what the law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703
(1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, l Cranch 137, 177
(1803),

III

w, / ~

::{

__

In my view, the suggestion that this case present~ incompatible with this Court's willingness on previous occasions to
decide whether one branch of our government has impinged
·upon the power of another. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S.
1, 138 (1976); United States v. Ni:ron, 418 U. S. 683, 707
(1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 67(i-678 (1929);
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 2 Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the responsibility to
decide whether both the Executive and L<'gislative Branches
have constitutional roles to play m termination of a treaty.
If the Congress. by appropriate formal action. had challenged
the President's authority to terminate the treaty with Taiwan,
the resulting uncertainty could have serious consequences for
our country. In that situation, it would be the duty of this
Court to resolve the issue.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 (198!l), is nol rrlrvan( lwre. Jn
that. case, the Court was asked to re\'lew the leg1timacy of a Statr's
ratification of a ronRtitulional amendnwnt. Fom l\frmbers of the Court
stated that Congres~ ha:,; exclusive powrr over the raiificat1on prore~::;.
Id.. a1 4-56-460 (Black, J., concurring, with whom Robrrts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas, .J.J., Joined). Three Member~ of the Court conrluded more
narrowly that thr Court could not pm;i; upon the rffiracy of 8tate ratification. They also found no 8hmdnrcls by which tlw Court could fix a rrnsonable time for 1he ratifirat1ou of n propoRPd amendment . lcl., at
452-154.
The proposrd constitutional amendmen1, al i~~U<' in Coleman would
hn,vo overruled clec181011s oJ th1~ Com!. Compart' id., ut 435, n . l with
Baile!! v. Drexel Furniture Co .. 259 ll . S. 20 (Hl22); Harnme1· v. Dagenhart, 257 U. S. 251 ( Hl18) . Thut-, juchrial review of the kg1t unary of a
State'~ ratification would have comprllrd th1~ Cour1 to over~Pe the very
, · ut10nnl rocess used to
Suprrmr Court drr1sion:,,. In.
,mch circu1n..-;h111res 1t ft'" rnt1rl'1~- appropriatp for th<' .Judicial Branch of
government to step as1dP. ~ee 8C'h,1rpl, .Jud1c1al RPnew and Thr Polit1cnl
Question: A Functional Ana]y:,,1:-., 75 YalP L .. J. 517. 589 (1D66) . Tho
preRent ca;:;e mvolvr~ no ~unilar prinr1plr of ,1udic1al nonint<•rvention.
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The petition forAwrit of certiorari 1s granted. The .1udgment of the Court of Appeals 1s vacatt>d and the case 1s
remanded to th<' District Court with dirertio11s to dismiss the
complaint.
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the grant of the 1wt1t10n for~ Tit of certiorari but wo~1kl set
the case for argument and giw Jt plenary consideratioJJ. MR.
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COURT OF APPEALS FOR 'l'HE DIS'l'RIC'r OF COLUMBIA CIHC'UlT
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with whom THE
and Mn. Jus'l' ICJ,J

MR. Jus'l'ICE REHNQUIST,

CHIEF Jus'l'ICE1

Sn: VENS join.,
concurring.
I am of the view that the basic questiou presented by the
petitioners in this case is "political" and therefore nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the President in
the conduct of our couutry's foreign relations and the extent
to which the Sena.te or the Congress is authori,md to uegate
the action of the President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S.
433 (1939), a case in which members of the Kansas Legislature brought an action attacking a vote of the State Senate
in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment,
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote in what is referred to as the
"Opinion of the Court":
"We think that ... the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, i II the light of previous
rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as
a political q uestiou pertain iug to the political departments, with the ultimate authority in the Congress in the
exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the Amendmeut. . . . The precise question as
now raised is whether, when the legislature of the State,
as we have found, has actually ratified the proposed
Arnendment, the Court should restrain the State officers
from -certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State,
because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the question from coming before the political departments. \Ve
find no basis in either Constitution or statute for such
MR.

JusTICE

S'l'EWAR'l',

.~
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judicial action. Article V, speaking solely of ratification,
contains no provision as to rejection . .. ." Jd., at 450.
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that
"Congress in controlling the pro.m ulgation of the ru-Joption of
a constitutional amendment has the final determinatiou of
the question whether by lapse of time its proposal of the
amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifications." ld., at 450.
I believe it follows a fortiori from Coleman that the controversy in the instant case ir, a nonj usticiable political dispute
that should be left for rm,olution by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Governme11t Here, while the Constitution is express as to the manner in which the Renate shall
participate 111 the ratification of a Treaty, it is silent as to
that body's participation in the abrogation of a Treaty. In
this respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra.
As stated in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F . Supp. 1291, 1302 (ND Ill.
1975) (three-juuge court) :
"A q uestiou that might be answered in different ways for
different amendments must surely be controlled by political standards rather than stanclards easily characterized as .i uclicially rnallageable.''
In light of the absence of auy constitutional provision governiug the terminat10n of a Treaty, and the fact that differe11t
termination proceuures may be appropriate for different
treaties (sec. e. g., n. 1, fofra), the instant case in my view,
also "must surely be controlled by political standards."
I think that the Justifications for concluding that the question here is political in nature are even rnon' compelling than
in Coleman because it involves foreigu relations-specifically
a treaty commitment to use military force in the defense of a .
foreign governmcut if attacked. ln United States v. CurtistWright Corp., 299 U S. 304 (1936), this Court saiJ :
"Whether, if the Joint Resolution had related solely to
internal affairs 11t would be open to the challenge that it
constituted an unlawful de]('gation of legislative power to

;

.
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the ExecuHve, we find it unnecessary to determine. The
whole aim of the Resolution is to affect a situation entirely external to the l1 uited States. and falling within ~
the category of foreign affairs . . . ." ~ "G. S., at 315.( The present case differs in sC'veral important respects from
Youngstow11 Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579
( 1952), cited by petitioners as authority both for reaching the
merits of this dispute and for reversing the Court of Appeals.
Iu Youngstoum privak litigants brought a suit contesting the
President's authority under his war powers to seize the Nation's steel industry, an action of profound and demonstrable
domestic impact. Here, by (Q,Qn trast, we are asked to settle
a dispute betwee11 coequal branches of our government. each
of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests, resourcrs not available to private litigants outside
the judicial forum. 1 Moreover, as in Curtiss-Wright, the
effect of this action . as far as W<' can tell. 1s "C'n ti rely external
to the Unifrd States. and l fallsJ within the category of foreign affairs." Finally, as alreacly noted, the situation pre1 AR oh~crvrd hy Judg<' Wright in hi,- <'011r11rring opmrnn hrlow :
" Congrrt'~ ha:; imtiatl'd tlw fNmmnlion of ireatiP:; by dirl'eling or rrquiring thr PrPHidrnt to giw notirr of tnmmation, withoui any prior pre~idrntml rrquP~1 Congn·~,; ha~ annull<•d trcat.ie~ without any prrsidential
noticr . It ha:, eonfrrn·cl on the Pn·RidPnt the J)O\H'r to tl'rmmat(• a partwular treaty, and 1t haH enactrd statutPs practically nulhfymg lhe clomc:;ti(I PffrC'!s of a I n,nty and thus eaused thr PrPs1dPnl to carry out
I~ J \lon•ovrr, Congrr,;s hn,: a varirty of powPrfnl tool.
1Prmination. . .
for infhwnrmg foreign polir~' c!Pci:;ions that hrar on trPaty matters.
Under Artirh· I. SeC'!10n 8 of thr Con~t1tut1on, 1( ran rrg11late commerce
with fon•ig11 na.11011s, nusr and snJ>port armies, and declare war. H has
powrr over the· appointmrnt of ambas,;adors and 1hr fundmg of rmbassies
and coni::ulatr~. Congre:<~ thus rP(aim: a, strong 111tluencr over thr Pre~ident!,, roml11eL in lrmty matler~ l~I As our political h1:-:tory drmonstruk:::, trraty crrat10n and tC'rm111at1011 arr complt•x phrnomena rooted
in the d~·namic n•lat10111<hip !wt W<'<'n t lw t.wo polii1ral brn11rhe,:: of our
~overnment. We t h11,; ~houlcl dPriine the mv1tatio11 to R<'t 111 concrete tL
particular eo11:-:t1tut1onally aeceptabl<' arrangemm1 by which the President
and Cong rps,; arc> to 8hare trl'at \ trrm11wt10n / ' Pet1tiou, pp. 44A-45A(footnotes omittpd ) ..
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sented here is closely akin to that presented in Coleman,
where the Constitution spoke ouly to the procedure for ratification of an amendrnen t. not to its rejection.
Having decided that the question presented in this action is
nonjusticiable, I believe that the appropriate disposition is for
this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss
the complaint. This procedure derives support from our
practice in disposing of moot actions in federal courts. 2 For
more than 30 years, we have instructed lower courts to
vacate any decision on the merits of an action that has become moot prior to a resolution of the case in this Court.
United States , . Munsi11gwear, 340 U. S. 36 (1950). The
Court has required such decisious to be vacated in order to
"prevent a judgment, ui1reviewable because of rnootness, from
spawning any legal consequences." / d. , at 41. It is even
more imperative that this Court invoke this procedure to,
ensure that resolution of a "political question," which should
not have be0n decided by a lower court, does not "spawn any
legal consequences. '' An Art. III court's resolution of a question that is "political" in character, can create far more disruption among the three coequal branches of government
than the resolution of a question presented in a moot controversy. Since the political nature of the questions presented
should have precluded the lower courts from considering or
deciding the merits of the controversy, the prior proceedings
in the federal court~ must be vacated, and the complaint
dismissed.
;

2 Th1;; Court, of l'our~<', ma)· no! proh1b11 :;ta tc C'onrt,, from deciding
political q11r~tion~. any more' lh:111 1t ma.,· prohibil lhc'm from deC'iding
que8tion:; 1hat are moot. Doremus v. Board of EdW'ation, ;NZ U. 8 . 429 ,
434 (19,52), ~o long a,; the·)· do not trench upon rxC'lu~ivPly fedcml qucHtion8 of forPign polic·y. Zscherni11 v. Miller, :lHH U. S. 4'..19, 4t i968) .
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lVfo. JUSTICE POWELL, concurring.
Although 1 agree with the result reached by the Court, I
would dismiss tht> complaint as not ripe for judicial review,
]

This Court has recognized that an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U. S 1, 113-114 (1976) (per curiam). Prudential cousiderations µersuade me that a dispute between Congress and
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than
legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide
issues affecting the aHocation of power between the President
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutioual impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups
or even rnd1vidual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolutiou of issues before the normal political process has the
opportunity to resolve the conflict.
Tn this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the
President's actioll in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to
\ a change iu the supreme law of the land. Congress has
taken no official action. In the present posture of this case,
we do not know whether there ever will be an actual coufrontaf.1011 bPtween tJw Legislative ancl Executive Branches.

•.t.:
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Although the Senate has considered a resolution declaring
that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any
mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038S7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979), no final vote has been taken
on the resolution. See id., at S16683-S16692 (daily ed. Nov.
15, 1979). Moreover, it is. unclear whether the resolution
would have retroactive effect.· See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily
ed. June 6, 1979); id., at S7862 (daily ed. June 18, 1979) .
It cannot be said that either the Senate or the House has
rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not
to confront the President, it is not our task to do so. I
therefore concur in the dismissal of this case.

Il
MR. J US'l'ICE REHNQUIST suggests, however, that the issue
presented by this case is a nonjusticiable political question
which can never be considered by this Court. l cannot agree.
In my view, reliance upon the political-question doctrine is
inconsistent with our precedents. As set forth in the seminal
case of Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrine
incorporates three inquiries : (i) Does the issue involve resolution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution
to a coordinate branch of government? (ii) Would resolution
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas of
judicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel
against judicial intervention'? Iu my opinion the answer to
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case
f if it were ready for review.
First, the existence of "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordiuate political
brauch," ibid., turns on an examiuatiou of the constitutional
provisions govcrniug the exercise of the power in question.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519 (1969). No consti~
tutional prnvision explicitly confers upon the President the
power to terminate treaties. Further, Art. II, ~ 2 of the
Constitutiou authorizes the President to make treaties with
the advice and consent of the SenatR, Article VI provides
'·

.

'
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that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.
These provisions add support to the view that the text of the
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v,
Morgan, 413 U. S 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1,
42 (1849)
Second. there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving" this case; nor is a decision impossible "without au initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for 11onjudicial discretion." Baker v. Carr, 369
U. S., at 217. We are asked to decide whether the President
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be
easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of
interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue. See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present
case involves neither review of the President's activities as
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the
field of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were
asked to decide. for example, whether a treaty required the
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relations hes beyond j u<licial cognizance." Baker v.
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but
the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional
division of power between Congress and the President.
A sunple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
find inherent i11 MR. ,J usTiCE REHNQUIS'r's concurring opinion.
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. JusTICE
REHNQUIST's analysis that situat10n would present a political
questioH even though Art. II. § 2, clearly would resolve the
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems
self-ev1cleut because it clernancls textual rather than interstitial analysis, the 11atur€' of the legal issue presented is no·
(ilifferPnt from thC' i·8strn presented m the case before us. In·

'
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both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to
decide whether congressional approval is pecessary to give a
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of
law. Such an inquiry demands no special competence or
information beyond the reach of the judiciary. Cf. Chicago
& S<YUthern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U. S.
103, 111 (1948). 1
Finally, the political-question doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns calling for mutual respect among the three
branches of government. Thus, the Judicial Branch should
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment [that would result]
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question." SimilarlY. the doctrine restrains judicial action
where there is an "unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra.,
at 217.
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra,
none of these prudential considerations would be present.
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of
respect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. S., at 548. If the President and the Congress had reached
+rreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question presented by this case would eliminate, rather than create, multiple constitutional interpretations. The spectre of the Federal
Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence of the President and the Congress would require this
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say
1 The Court has recognized that, in the area of foreign policy, Congress
lffl,Y leave. the President with wide discrt'tion that otherwise might nm
11.foul of the uondelegation doctrine. United .States v. Curtiss-Wright
E;rport Corp., 2!)9 U. S. 304 (HJ36). As ~tittetl in that. case, '·the President alont' ha.H the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
Nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate;
but he alone negotiates.'' Id., at 319 ( empha.Hi::; in the original). Resoltition of thiH caHe would interfere with neitht'r the President's ability to
riegotiate treaties nor hi::1 duty to execute their provisions. We are merPly
being a,;ked to decide whether a treaty, which cannot be ratified without
Senate approval, contmues in effecL until the Senate or perhaps the
Congress take fnrthe1 action.
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·wbat the law is." United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 7p3
(1074) , quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cnanch 137, 177
( 1803).

Ill
Ju my view, the suggestion that this case presents a political
question is incompatible with this Court's willingness on previous occasions to deciae wliether one branch of our governme11t has impinged upon the power of another. See Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418
U. S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655,
676-678 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).2
Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the
responsibility to decide whether both the Executive and Legislative Branches have constitutional roles to play in termin~tion of a treaty. If the Congress, by appropriate formal
action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate
the treaty with Taiwan, the resulting uncertainty could have
serious consequences for our country. In that situatioB, it
would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue.
C'oletrtan v. Mille1·, 301 U. S. 433 (1939) , is not relevant 11ere. In
that case, the Court was asked to review the legitimacy of
State's
ratification of a constitutiona.l amendment. Four Members of the Court
stated that Congress has exclusive pown over t.he ratification proces,,,
Jct., at 456-460 (Black, J., concurring, with whom Roberts, Frankfurter,
and Douglas, J.J'., joined) . Three Membertl of the Court concluded more
narrowly that the Court could not pas~ upon the efficacy of sta.te ratification. They also found no standarqs by which the Court could fix a reasonable time for the ratification of a proposed amendment. Id., at
452-45'k,
The proposed constitutional amendm<:'nL a.t issue in Coleman would
luwe overruled decisions of this Court. Compare id., at 435, n. 1 with
Bailey v. Drexel Purniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922): Hammer v. Dagenha1't, 257 U. S. 251 (1918). Thus, judicial review of the legitimacy of a
State's ratification would have compelled this Court to oversre the very
eoni:-titutional proces:; used to reverse Supreme Court decisions. In sush
circumsta nces it may be entirely appropriate for the .Judicial Branch of
\
government to step aside. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and The Political
Question : A Functional Analysis, 75 Yale L. J. 517, 589 (1966) . The
pre::;en1, cwe involves no :,;imilar principle of judicial nonint~rvbntion.
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MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
MR, JusTICE STEWART, and MR, JUSTICE STEVENS join,
concurring.
I am of the view that. the basic question presented by the
petitioners m this case is "political" and therefore nonjus~
ticiable because it involves the authority of the President irt
the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent
to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate
the action of the President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S.
433 ( 1939) , a case in which members of the Kansas Legislature brought an action attacking a vote of the State Senate
in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment,
Mr, Chief Justice Hughes wrote in what is referred to as the
"Opinion of the Court":
61
We think that, , , . the question of the efficacy of ratificatious by state legislatures, in the light of previous
rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as
a political question pertaining to the political depart..
ments, with the ultimate authority m the Congress in the·
exercise of its control over the prnmulgation of the adoption of the Amendment. , . , The precise question as
now raised is whether, when tbe legislature of the State,
at1 we have found, has actually ratified the proposed
Amendment, the Court should restrain the State officers:
from certifying the ratification to the Secretary of State,
because of an earlier rejection, and thus prevent the questiou from coming beforp the political departments. We
fi11d no basi8 in either Constitution or statute for such
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judicial action, Article V, speaking solely of ratification,
contains no provision as to reJection . .•." Id., at 450.
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that
sccougress m controlling the promulgation of the adoption of
a constitutional amendment has the final determination of
the question whether by lapse of ti,m e its proposal of the
amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifications.'' l d , at 456.
I believe 1t follows a fortiori from Coleman that the controversy in the instant case is a nonjusticiable political dispute
that should be left for re:solution by the Executive and Legislativr Branches of the Government. Here, while the Constit ution is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall
participate m the ratification of a 'I'reaty, it is silent as to
that body's participation in the abrogation of a Treaty, In
this respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra.
As stated in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F , Supp 1291, 1302 (ND Ill.
1975) ( three-juuge court):
uA question that might be answ~red in different ways for
different amendments must surely be controlled by pohticaJ standards rather than standards easily characterized as .I mhc1ally manageable.9 1

In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termmation of a Treaty, and the fact that different
termination procedures may be appropriate for different
treaties (see, e. g., n 1, infra) , the instant case in my view,
also " must surely be controlled by political standards."
J think that the justifications for concluding that the ques- ·
t ion here is political m nature are even more compelling than
in Coleman beca use it involves foreign relations-specifically
a treaty commit ment to use military force in the defense of a .
foreign government if attacked. In United States v. CurtissW right Corp. , 299 U. S. 304 ( 1936). this Court said .
'' Whether, if the Jornt Resolution had related solely to
illtemal affairs ~t. would be open to the challenge that it
coJJstitut,ed an unlawful delegation of legislative power to,
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the Executive, we find it unnecessary to determine. The'
whole aim of the Resolution is to affect a situation entirely external to the United States, and falling within
the category of foreign affairs.. . ." 299 U. S., at 315.
The present case differs in several important respects from
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579·
(1952), cited by petitioHers as authority both for reaching the
merits of this dispute and for reversing the Court of Appeals.
In Youngstown private lihgaHts brought a suit contesting the
Presideut's authority under his war powers to seize the Nation's steel industry, an action of profound and demonstrable
domestic impact. Here, by contrast, we are asked to settle
a dispute between coequal branches of our government, each
of which has resources available to protect and assert its in- ·
terests, resources not available to private litigants outside
the judicial forum. 1 Moreover, as 111 Curtiss-Wright, the
effect of this action, as far as we can tell, is "entirely external
to the United btates, and [ falls] within the category of foreign affairs.'' ..Fiually, as already noted, the situation preAs observed Ly Judgl' Wright in hi~ concurring opinion below:
"Congre,;s has imtiakd the tcrmina110n of treaties by directing or requiring the President to giw notice of lermmation, without any prior presidenlrnl rf'411e~t. Congre~;., has annullf'd treaties without any pre~idential
notice. It has confrrrcd on the Prrs1drnt the powpr to trrminate a particular treaty, and 1t has enacted ~tatutes pract,ically nullifying the domestw effects of a t1'eaty and thm: caused the Pm,idenl to carry out
termma.t1on. . . 1.11I Moreover, Congre~,; has a variety of powerful tools
for mfiuencmg foreign policy dPc1~1ons that bear on trpaty matters.
Under Article I. Section 8 or thr Con:,11t11t1on, it ran regulate commerce ·
with forf'1gn nat1om:, ra1~e and support armies, and declare war. It has
pown oVPr the appomtment of amba,;,mdors nnd the funding of embassies
and consulate::;. Congre:-:-; thus retains a Rtrong mfiuence ovrr the President's conduct, m treaty matter" . rirJ A, our political history demonstrates, treaty creat10n and termination arc romplf'x phf'nomena rooted
in the dynamic relat1011,-,h1p bPtwc<'n the t.wo political branches of our
government. We thu~ Rhould dcC'hne the inVJta.tion to set iu concrete a
particular con:-1titut1onally acceptable arrangement by which the Pre,;iclent
and Congress are to share treaty termmation." Petil10n, pp. 44A-45A
(footnote::; omitted).
1
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sented here is closely akin to that presented in Coleman,
where the Constitution spoke ouly to the procedure for ratification of an amendment, not to its rejection.
Having decided that the question presented in this action is
nonjusticiable, I believe that the appropriate disposition is for
this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss
the complaint. This procedure derives support from our
practice in disposing of moot actions in federal courts. 2 For
more than 30 years, we have instructed lower courts to
vacate any decision on the merits of an action that has become moot prior to a res0Iutio11 of the case in this Court.
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36 (1950). The
Court has req uire<l such decisions to be vacated in order to
"prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from
spawning any legal consequences." f d. , at 41. It is even
more 11nperative that this Court invoke this procedure to.
ensure that resolution of a "political question," which should
not have been decided by a lower court, does not "spawn any
legal consequences." An Art. Ill court's resolution of a question that is "political" in character can create far more disruption among the three coequal branches of government
than the resolution of a question presented in a moot controversy. Siuce the political nature of the questions presented
should have precluded the lower courts from ·considering or
deciding the merits of the controversy, the prior proceedings
in the federal courts must be vacated, and the complaint
dismissed.
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11 'fhb Court, or rour,;e, may nof, prohibit, state courts from deciding
polit1cal que~t10ns, any more thru1 it may prohibit them from deciding
que~t1ons that arP moot, Dorem~~ v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429,
404. (Hl52), ~o long ar-: they do 1101. trench upon exclusively federal quest10118 oC foreign pohcy. z.~cher11£g v. Muler, 389 U. S. 429, 441 (1968).
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL, V. JAMES EARL CARTER,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL,

i ,.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 79-856. Decided December 13, 1979

MR. Jus'l'ICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JusTICE WHITE
joins, dissenting in part.
In my view, the time factor and its importance are illusory;
if the President does not have the power to terminate the
Treaty ( a substantial issue that we should address only after
briefing and oral argument), the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect. It is also indefensible, without further study, to pass on the issue of justiciability or on
the issues of standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in
the grant of the petition for certiorari, T would set the case
for oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it so,
obviously deserves.
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BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL,
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 79-85l1. Decided December 13, 1979

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the District
Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it rests upon the President's
well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign governments. Opinion, App. 27 A-29A.
In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political
question," the plurality, in my view, profoundly misapprehends the political question principle as it applies to matters
of foreign relations. Properly understood, the political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of
foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to
which authority to make that judgment has been "constitutioi1al[ly] commit[ted]." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,
211-213, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when
a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular branch has been constitutionally designated as the
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519-521 (1969). The issue of
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls
within the competence of the courts.
The constitutional question raised here is prudently
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty
with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition
of the Peking government, because the defense treaty waspredicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan
g0,vernment was the only legitimate political authority in
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China. Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes. See Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v.
Carr, supra, at 212; United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203,
228-230 (1942) . That mandate being clear, our judicial
inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further. See Baker
v. Carr, supra, at 212 ; United States v. Pink, supra, at 229.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BARRY GOLDWATER E'l' AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
PETITION FOR WRlT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ON

o. 79-85(i. Decidrd Dcc·rmber 13, 1979

ORDER

.'

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is
remanded to the District Court with directions to dismiss the
complaint.

-

MH. .Ju,:;•r1 c~J MARSHALL concurs in the result.

.'

1Vl1t. Jus'rIC!!; PowELL concurs in the judgment and has filed
a statemf'nt,,

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIS'l' concurs in the judgment ancl has
filed a statement in which MR. CHIEJ<' JusTICE BURGER, MR.
,JUS1'1CID STEW ART, and MR. JUSTICE STEVENS join,
MR. JUSTICE WHI'l'E and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN join in
the grant of the petition for a writ of certiorari but would set
the case for argume11t and give it plenary consideration. MR.
JusncE BLACKMUN has filed a statement in which MR. Jus' L'lCE WHJ'Prn ,1oins.

.•

;

Mu. Jus'l'JCE BRBNNAN wou]d grant the petition for certiorari and affirm the judgment of thr Court of Appeals and
has filed a statf'ment.
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BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. v. JAMES EARL CARTER,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.
ON PETI'rION FOR WRI'r OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DIS'l'RICT 01!' COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
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To. 79-856. Decided December 13, 1979

MR. JusTICE POWELL, concurring.
Although I agree with the result reached by the Court, I
would dismiss the complaint as not ripe for judicial review.

I
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be
decided if it is not ripe for judicial review. Bucldey v. Valeo,
424 U. S. 1, 113- 114 (1976) (per curiam) . Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and
the President is not ready for judicial review unless and until
each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority. Differences between the President and the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences
should, and almost invariably do, turn on political rather than
legal considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide
issues affecting the aUocation of power between the President
and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse. Otherwise, we would encourage small groups
or even individual Members of Congress to seek judicial resolution of issues before the normal political process has the
opportunity to resolve the conflict.
In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the
President's action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to
a change in the supreme law of the land. Congress has
taken no official action . In the present posture of this case,
we do not know whether there ever will be an actual confrontation between the Legislative and Executive Branches.

;
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Although the , enate has considered a resolution declaring
that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any
mutual defense treaty, see 125 Cong. Rec. S7015, S7038S7039 (daily ed. June 6, 1979). no final vote has been taken
011 the resolution.
See id., at S16683-S1G692 ( daily ed. Nov.
15, 1979') Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution
would have retroactive effect. See id., at S7054-S7064 ( daily
ed. June 6, 197D); id., at S7862 (daily ed. Julle 18, H.)79).
It can11ot be said that either the Senate or the House has
rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not
to confront the President, it 1s not our task to do so. I
therefore conrur rn the dismissal of this case.

II

MR. JusTJ C~ REHNQUIS'J' suggests, however. that the issue
preselltcd by this case is a no11justiciable political question
which can never be considered by this Court. I cannot agree.
In my view, reliance upon the political-question doctrine is
mconsisteut with our precedents. As set forth i11 the seminal
case of Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), the doctrille
mcorporates three inquiries. (i) Does the issue mvolve reso1ution of questions committed by the text of the Constitution
to a coordinate branch of government'? (ii) Would resolution
of the question demand that a court move beyond areas or
Jmlicial expertise? (iii) Do prudential considerations counsel
against Judicial mtervention '? lu my opinion the answer to
each of these inquiries would require us to decide this case
if it were ready for review
First, the existence of ''a textually demonstrable coustitut10nal commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
branch ," ibid., turns on a11 examrnatiou of the constitutional
provisio11s goveruiug the exercise of the power in question .
Powell v. McCormack , 395 U.S. 48f:i, 5H) (19t:i9). No cousti'tutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the
power to terminate treatirs. Further, Art. II, § 2 of the
Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with
the a.dv1cr> and consent of the Senat,f' Article VJ provides
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that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land.
These provisions add support to the view that the text of the
Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to
terminate treaties to the President alone. Cf. Gilligan v.
Morgan, 413 U. S. 1, 6 (1973); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1,
42 (1849) .
Second, there is no "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving'' this case; nor is a decision impossible "without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." Balcer v. Carr, 369
U. S., at 217. We are asked to decide whether the President
may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional approval. Resolution of the question may not be
easy, but, it only requires us to apply normal principles of
interpretatiou to the constitutional provisions at issue. See
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S., at 548-549. The present
case involves neither r~view of the President's activities as
Commander-in-Chief nor impermissible interference in the
field of foreign affairs. Such a case would arise if we were
asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the
President to order troops into a foreign country. But "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches
foreign relatious lies beyond judicial cognizance." Baker v.
Carr, supra, at 211. This case "touches" foreign relations, but
the question presented to us concerns only the constitutional
division of power between Congress and the President.
A simple hypothetical demonstrates the confusion that I
find inherent in 1\/IR. JusTIGE REHNQUIS'r1s concurring opinion.
Assume that the President signed a mutual defense treaty
with a foreign country and announced that it would go into
effect despite its rejection by the Senate. Under Mr. Jus1. ICE
REHNQUIST's analysis that situation would present a political
question even though Art. II. § 2, clearly would resolve the
dispute. Although the answer to the hypothetical case seems
self-evident because' it demands textual rather than interstitial analysis, the nature of the legal issue presented is no
different from the issue presented in the case before us. fo
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both cases, the Court would interpret the Constitution to
decide whether congressional approval is necessary to give a
Presidential decision on the validity of a treaty the force of
law. Such an inquiry demands no special competence or
information beyon<l the reach of the judiciary. Cf. Chicago
& Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S.
103' 111 ( 1948) ,1
Finally, the political-question doctrine rests in part on prudential concerns calling for mutual respect among the three
branches of government. Thus, the Judicial Branch should
avoid "the potentiality of embarrassment [ that would result]
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question. '' Similarly, the doctrine restrains judicial actiou
where there 1s au "unusual need for unquestioning adherence
to a political decision already made." Baker v. Carr, supra,
at 217.
If this case were ripe for judicial review, see Part I supra,
none of these prudential considerations would be present.
Interpretation of the Constitution does not imply lack of
respect for a coordinate branch. Powell v. McCormack, 395
U. S., at 548. If the President and the Congress had reached
irreconcilable positions, final disposition of the question presented by this case would eluni11ate, rather thau create, multiple constitut10nal interpretations. The spectre of the Federal
Government brought to a halt because of the mutual intransigence of the President and the Congress would require this
Court to provide a resolution pursuant to our duty "to say
The Court hns l'ecogniz('(] that, in 1hr arPa of foreign policy, Congm,s
muy lr,wc the Pm,iclent wlth widt, di~cretion tlmt otlwrwikP might. nm
afoul of the nondelegation doctrine . United States v. C·urtiss-Wiight
Export Corp .. 299 U. S. ;304 (19:36) . A,-: ,-:tated in th:it. ca,-:e, "the Prcsi•
clen1, alonP ha,-: the power to "l>eak or I1s1l'll a~ a, represeu1atwc of the
Nat10n. FlP nwkes treaties with the adviC'e and con,-:en1 of tbe Senate;
bui. hr alOJH> negotiates.'' Id., nf :319 (emphas1,-: 111 the origmal). Re8o·
lution of t.lrn; ca~o wonld interfrl'e with neither the Prc1nde11t',-: nbilit)' to
negotia,te treatH'~ nor lu;s duty to exc·rute thr1r provi:,;ions. Wr ,,re merPly
bcmg askrd lo decide whrther a treat~·, winch caunot be ratifird without
Senate approval, con1mue:,; m d'fret, until the Seuafe 01 lJerhaps the
Congress take further a.ction.
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what the law is." United Stales v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 703
(1974), quoting Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137, 177
(1803).

nr

In my view. the suggestion that this case presents a political
question is incompatible with this Court's willingness on previous occasions to decide whether one branch of our government has impinged upou the power of another. See Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418
U. S. 683, 707 (1974); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U. S. 655,
676-678 (1929); Myers V. United States, 272 u. ·s. 52 (1926). 2
Under the criteria enunciated in Baker v. Carr, we have the
responsibility to decide whether both the Executive and Legislative Branches have constitutional roles to play in termination of a treaty. If the Congress, by appropriate formal
action, had challenged the President's authority to terminate
the treaty with Taiwan, thP resultin€!, uncertainty could have
serious consequences for our country. In that situation, it
would be the duty of this Court to resolve the issue.
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U S. 433 ( HJ30), is not, relevant hrrc. In
that case, the Court wa~ a~kcd lo revi<·w the legitimacy of' a. State's
ratification of a constitutional amendment. Four Members of the Court
staled that Congre,;1'1 ha::s exclu~ivc power 01 n the ratifica.tion procC~t>.
Id., at 456-460 (Black, J ., c011rurr111g, with whom Robert~, Frankfurter,
and Douglm,, .JJ ., .1omecl) . Three i\Im1ber,.: of the Court concluded more
narrowly that the Cour1, could not, patls upon the efficacy of Htate rntifict~tion. They abo found no H1 auda rd~ hy which the Court. could fix a reasonable l1tne lor the rntificaiion of a, propo,;ed am.endment id., at
452-454,
Tbe prnpospd constltutioual :imeudrnent. ai. isHIK• in Coleman would
have overruled dec1~ion,..: of tlu,..: Court. Compare id .. at 4:35, n. 1 wiLh
Baileu v. Dreul Furniture Co .. 251:l U. S. 20 (H)22) ; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 257 U. S. 251 (Hll8). Thu,-:, j11d1eial rc'v1ew of 1.he [pg1i.urn1c:v of a.
Slate'H ratificat1011 would havr compc•llrd tl111o Court to owr~ce the very
constitutional procrss used to rrwr:-;e Suprrm(• Court deri,;ion,;. In such
circnm,;tanee,..: 11 may be entirrly appropriate for the Jud1cial Branch of
govermncni, to :atep a::nde. Sec Schnrpf, .Jurl1crn.l Review and The Political
Question: A F1mct10nal A11aly/'<1~, 75 Yale L. ,J. 517, 589 (1066). Tho
prec1c11t , ca.,n mYolv<'• uo ,1mdar prmc·qJ.lr· of .111dicial uoni11tnvcutio11.
2
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SUPREME COUllT OF THE UNITED STATES
BARRY GOLDWATER ET AL. V. JAMES EARL CARTER,
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED ST ATES, ET AL.
ON PE'l'ITION FOR WRIT OF Cl!JRTIORARI TO 'l'HE UNI'l'ED S'l'ATES
COURT OF APP~JALS FOR THE DISTRIC'l' OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 79-856

Decided December 13, 1979

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, w1th whom THE CHrnF JUSTICE,
MR. JusrrrcE S'rEWAR'r, aud MR. JusTICE STEVENS join,
concurring.
T am of the view that. the basic question presented by the
petitioners iu this case is "political" and therefore nonjus~
ticiable because 1t mvoives the authority of the President in
the conduct of our country's foreign relations and the extent
to which the Sellate or the Congress is authorized to negate
the action of the President. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S,
433 ( 1939) , a case in which members of the Kansas Legislature brought au action attacking a vote of the State Senate
in favor of the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment,
Mro Chief Justice Hughes wrote in what is referred to as the
«iOpimon of the Court":
e think that . . . the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in the light of previous
rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as
a political question pertaining to the political depart..
ments, wiith the ultimate authority in the Congress in th~
exercise of its control over the promulgation of the adoption of the Amendment. . . . The precise question as
now raised is whether. when the legislature of the State,
as we have found, has actually ratified the proposed
Amendment, the Court shoulu restrain the State officers
from ·c ertifymg the ratification to the Secretary of State,
because of an earlier re.1ection, a11J thus prevent the question from coming before the political departments. We'
fiud no basis m either Coustitutwn or statute for such
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judicial action. Article V, speaking solely of ratification,
contains no provision as t,o rejection . . , .1' Id., at 450.
Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion concluded that
"Congress in controlling the promulgation of the adoption of
a constitutional amendment has the final determination of
the question whether by lapse of t~me its proposal of the
amendment had lost its vitality prior to the required ratifica~
tions-1' l d., at 456.
I believe it follows a fortiori from Coleman that the controversy in the instant case is a nonjusticiable politi,cal dispute
that should be left for resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government. · Here, while the Constitut;ion is express as to the manner in which the Senate shall
participate in the ratification of a 'rreaty, it is silent as to
that body's participation in the abrogation of a Treaty. In
this respect the case is directly analogous to Coleman, supra.
As stated in Dyer v. Blair, 390 F . Supp. 1291, 1302 (ND Ill.
1975) (three-judge court):
ssA question that might be answered in different ways for
different amendments must surely be controlled by political standards rather than standards easily charncterized as judicially manageablr/ 1
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In light of the absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a Treaty, and the fact that different
termination procedures may be appropriate for different
treaties (see, e. g., n. 1, infra), the instant case in my view,
also "must surely be controlled by political standards."
I think that the justifications for concluding that the question here is political in nature are even more compelling than
in Coleman because it involves foreign relations-specifically
a treaty commitment to use military force in the defense of a,
foreign government if attacked. In United States v. CurtissWright Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936), this Court said :
1
! Whether, .if the Jornt Resolution had related solely to
ill ternal affairs it would be open to the challenge that it
constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative power tQ
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the Executive, we find it unnecessary to determine. The·
whole aim of the Resolution is to affect a situation entirely extemal to the United States, and falling within
the category of foreign affairs . . . . " 299 U. S., at 315.
The present case differs in several important respects from
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579·
( 1952), cited by petitioners as authority both for reaching the
merits of this dispute and for reversing the Court of Appeals.
In Youngstown private litigants brought a suit contesting the
President's authority under his war powers to seize the Nation's steel industry, an action of profound and demoustrable
domestic impact. Here, by contrast, we are asked to settle
a dispute between coequal branches of our government, each
of which has resources available to protect and assert its in- ·
terests, resources not available to private litigants outside
the judicial forum. 1 Moreover, as rn Curtiss-Wright, the
effect of this action. as far as we can teU, is "entirely external
to thf' United States, and [falls] within the category of foreign affairs." ·Fiually, as alrrady uoted, the situation pre1

As observed

Ly

JudgP WrighL iu his eoncurring opinion below:

"Congre::-:; has 1111t1at<·d the termi111it 10n of treat1rs by dirrrting or requiring the Pre:;idrnt to g1w not1ep of termmat10n, without an~, prior presidentml rPqtw~t. CongrM, ha~ annullrd treaties without an~' presidential
notice. It, has confrnrcl on thr Prrs1dent the powrr to tenrnnate a particular treaty, and it has rnacted ~tatutes practically nullifying the domestic effrcts o[ a tr,caty and thus cauHrd the Pm,iclent to carry out
term1mtho11. . . I~,] Moreover, Con~r('ss ha~ a variety of powerful tools
for influencmg l'ore1µ;n pohry Jec1s1ons that bear on treaty matters.
Under Article I. Sect10n 8 of thr Co11stitut1on, 1l can rrgula.te commerce
with foreign na!Jom;, raise and ,;upport arrrue:,;, and cleelare war. It. has
power over the appomtment of amba"sadortl nnd thr funding of Pmbai;;sies
and consulates. Congre~,; thus rctnms a strong mfluence ovrr the President.'s conduct, m treaty matter,-. Iii] A,; our polit1eal hi:.;tory dcmonstralc::;, trraiy ereation and termination arc complpx phenomena rooted
in Lhe dynamic rrlat 10nsh1p bt>twr('ll tlw two political branches of our
govemment. We thu;,, ~hould deehne the mv1tahon to 1:,ei iu concrete a
particular corn;t1tut10nally ac<'Pptahle arrangement by which the Pre,..iclent
and Congres;-; arP to share treaty tcrmmat1011 ." Petit 10n, pp. 44A-45A
(footnote~ omitteJ),
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sentecl here is closely akin to that presented in Coleman,
where the Constitution spoke only to the procedure for ratification of an amendment, not to its rejection .
Having decided that the question presented in this action is
nonjusticiable, [ believe that the appropriate disposition is for
this Court to vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remand with instructions for the District Court to dismiss
the complaint. This procedure derives support from our
practice in disposing of moot actions in federal courts. 2 For
more than 30 years, we have instructed lower courts to
vacate any decision on the merits of an action that has become moot prior to a resolution of the case in this Court.
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U. S. 36 ( 1950). The
Court has required such decisions to be vacated in order to
"prevent a judgment, unreviewable because of mootness, from
spawning any legal consequences." f d., at 41. It is even
more imperative that this Court invoke this procedure to.
ensure that resolution of a "political question," which should
not have been decided by a lower court, does not "spawn any
legal consequeuces." An Art. III court's resolution of a question that is "political" in character can create far more disruption among the three coequal branches of government
than the resolution of a question presented in a moot controversy Since the political nature of the questions presented
should have precluded the lower courts from considering or
deciding the merits of the controversy, the prior proceedings
in the federal courts must be va.cated, and the complaint
dismissed.

',

,j'

"'·

,.r

'J'..

2 This Court., of r.onrse, may not prohibit state courts from deciding
political qurr;t10ns, any more than it may prohibit them from decidjng
qne;;t10ns that, arc moot, Doremus v. Boa.rd of Education, 342 U. S. 429,
434 (1952), so long m; they do not trench upon exclusively federal question, of foreign pohcy. Z8chernig v, Mi1/er, 389 U. S. 429, 44J (1968).
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MR. Jus'l'ICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JUSTICE WHITE
joins, dissenting in part.
In my view, the time factor and its importance are illusory;
if the President does not have the power to terminate the
Treaty (a substantial issue that we should address only after
briefing and oral argument) , the notice of intention to terminate surely has no legal effect. It is also indefensible, without further study, to pass on the issue of justiciability or on
the issues of standing or ripeness. While I therefore join in
the grant of the petition for certiorari, I would set the case
for oral argument and give it the plenary consideration it so
obviously deserves.
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ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 79-856. Decided December 13, 1979

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the order directing the District
Court to dismiss this case, and would affirm the judgment of
the Court of Appeals insofar as it·Tests upon the President's
well-established authority to recognize, and withdraw recognition from , foreign governments. Opinion, App. 27A-29A.
In stating that this case presents a nonjusticiable "political
question,'' the plurality, in my view, profoundly misapprehends the political question principle as it applies to matters
of foreign relations. Properly understood, the political question doctrine restrains courts from reviewing an exercise of
foreign policy judgment by the coordinate political branch to
which authority to make that judgment has been "constitutional[ly] commit[ted]." Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,
211-213, 217 (1962). But the doctrine does not pertain when
a court is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular branch has been constitut10nally designated as the
repository of political decisionmaking power. Cf. Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U. S. 486, 519-521 (1969). The issue of
decisionmaking authority must be resolved as a matter of
constitutional law, not political discretion; accordingly, it falls
within the competence of the courts.
The constitutional question raised here is prudently
answered in narrow terms. Abrogation of the defense treaty
with Taiwan was a necessary incident to Executive recognition
of the Peking government, because the defense treaty was
predicated upon the now-abandoned view that the Taiwan
government was the only legitimate political authority fo
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China. Our cases firmly establish that the Constitution commits to the President alone the power to recognize, and withdraw recognition from, foreign regimes. See Banco N acional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 410 (1964); Baker v.
Carr, supra; at 212; United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203,
228-230 (1942). That mandate being clear, our judicial
inquiry into the treaty rupture can go no further. See Baker
v. Carri supra, at. 212; United States v. Pink, supra, at 229.
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